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U.S. Navy

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 JULY - 31 AUGUST & 16 OCTOBER - 31 DECEMBER, 1943

FC Numbers 30932 & 30933

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

CNO (Naval History Div.)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Naval History Division
Washington 25, D. C.

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1 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 84,
U 565 CH 74,
U 593 CH 94,
U 617 CH 74,
U 458 CH 76,
U 73 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 375 CH 59 (outward bound),
U 409 CH 58 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 81 east of 31° E.
U 453 CO 57.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 73 put in to Toulon at 0830 on 1 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 371, 407, 431, 561.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance from Alexandria to Benghazi - Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

1) U 380: 2045/1 July CH 7522 westbound convoy of fast transports.

2) U 458: 0700/1 July CH 7812 convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0845/1 July CJ 7694 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, southerly course.

2) 0845/1 July CJ 7588 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers, southerly course.

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I. [illegible]

I. a) Patrol V-[illegible] positions at 0800 respectively [illegible] and [illegible]:

A. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 380 OH Ma;
U 655 OH Pa;
U 765 OH Da;
U 612 OH Ka;
U 468 OH Ja;
U 73 OH 33 (homeward bound);
U 177 OH 90 (outward bound);
U 405 OH 77 (outward bound).

B. Western Mediterranean:

U 81 west of 370 S.
U 473 OH 97.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0900:

U 73 left Lo to Toulon at 0830 on 1 July.

c) In port (at 0900):

1) Spezia: U 120, 616.
2) Pola: U [illegible].
3) Toulon: U 371, 407, 431, 751.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Nothing to report so far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report from Alexandria to Andabat - Dodecanese Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) Merchant:

1) U 81: 2047/1 July OH 9232 westbound convoy of 1 net transports.

2) U 473: 0700/1 July OH 9213 convoy.

b) Naval reconnaissance:

1) Gibraltar (July 1): 2 cruisers, 2 destroyers, southerly course.

2) 2047/1 July off Cape: 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 cruisers, southerly course.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

3) 1450/1 July CJ 7597 2 medium or heavy cruisers, westerly course, moderate speed; in the opposite direction, 3 probable light cruisers, moderate to high speed.

4) 1030/1 July CH 9483 4 ships, westerly course.

5) 1908/1 July CH 9555 1 transport of 8,000 GRT, 3 destroyers, easterly course, moderate speed.

6) 1940/1 July northeast of Bone, convoy of 16 ships and escort vessels, westerly course.

7) 2000/1 July CJ 7914 1 aircraft carrier, 1 battleship, easterly course, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

From radio traffic, it is evident that it is still possible that units of the "Warspite" group will soon be moving into the Eastern Mediterranean, supported by the Malta and Bone cruisers and that this group was probably lying in the Algiers area on 30 June, whilst Group "Howe" (the "King George V" and the "Howe") is probably still lying in the Oran area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0840/1 July 5 destroyers put out from Gibraltar, course set for the Mediterranean.

2) 1450/1 July the "Nelson" put out from Gibraltar,
1840/1 July put in again.

3) 1900/1 July Gibraltar 5 destroyers, course set for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 81: 1510/30 June CP 2389 1 steamer of 6,000 GRT, 1 destroyer put in to Mersin.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1047/1 July CO 5838 12 freighters, 9 escort vessels, course 110°, high speed.

2

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1055/1 July CO 5838 convoy, course 124°, speed 10 knots.

2) Several convoys are running to the North African coast.

3) Units of the Alexandrian naval forces are at sea.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Krieg) commenced the return passage from CP 2389 with one stern torpedo left and was ordered to make for Salamis for repairs and replenishing.

U 458 (Diggins) commenced the return passage after his periscope broke off for an unknown reason and his multi-unit hydrophones and D/F gear failed after attacking a convoy (see III.A.a.2).

U 380 (Roether) has commenced the return passage in compliance with the orders received.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1532/1 July as in III.A.b.4.
1658/1 July as in III.A.d.1.
1945/1 July and 2139/1 July as in III.A.d.2.
0147/2 July as in III.A.d.3.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

2 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 75 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 74,
U 593 CH 94,
U 617 CH 74,
U 458 CH 75 (homeward bound),
U 375 CH 83,
U 409 CH 84.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 54,
U 81 CP 27 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 407, 431, 561.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance from Alexandria as far as Benghazi, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0940/2 July CH 9525 1 destroyer, easterly course, high speed.

2) 1130/2 July CJ 7924 11 M.T.B.s, easterly course, high speed.

3) 1135/2 July CJ 7926 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, easterly course, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio intercept service there are either convoy movements or movements of naval forces in the Oran-Algiers area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1630/2 July 1 aircraft carrier of the "Illustrious" class, accompanied by 5 destroyers, put out into the Mediterranean from Gibraltar. Until 2200 she was observed to be engaged in gunnery practice east of Gibraltar, she then disappeared towards the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1000 CO 9348 11 freighters, 6 escort vessels, easterly course, moderate speed.

2) 1705 CO 7311 3 medium-sized freighters, course 45°.

3) 1810 CO 4393 1 medium-sized naval vessel, course 80°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 0200/2 July CO 6772-5998 bearings were taken on several ships.

2) Very lively convoy activity off the coast of Cyrenaica.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Report of enemy movements as in III.A.d was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

1) According to an agent's report, the 82nd American Airborne Division will probably be transferred to Tunisia. The very fact that the Airborne Division is being transferred indicates that the preparations for the operation planned (landing operation) are being particularly accelerated.

2) It was planned to dispatch a boat to operate in the Philippeville-Bone area as far as 9° E because of the heavy traffic running there at the time. The Italian Navy is against this plan as Italian U-boats are operating in this area.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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3 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 57 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 94,
U 565 CH 74,
U 617 CH 74,
U 375 CH 83,
U 409 CH 84,
U 458 CH 81 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 49,
U 81 CO 62 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put out from Toulon for the Western Mediterranean at 1800 on 3 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 407, 431, 561.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Cyrenaica, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1858/2 July CH 8364 3 freighters of 7,000 GRT each, easterly course, moderate speed.

2) 0850/3 July CJ 7853 9 medium-sized units, easterly course.

3) 1810/3 July CH 9527 1 destroyer, course 300°, moderate speed.

4) 1950/3 July CJ 7675 4 ships, 1 escort vessel, course 80°.

5) 2045/3 July CH 9186 1 merchant ship not exceeding 3,000 GRT, 1 escort vessel, course 100°, speed 8 knots.

6) 1030/3 July CH 9143 2 large freighters.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0900/3 July the battleship "Howe" put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean and at 1000/3 July she was joined by the battleship "King George V".

2) 0730/3 July 1 aircraft carrier of the "Illustrious" class was sighted from Gibraltar turning about with course set for the Mediterranean.

3) 1600/3 July Gibraltar: the "Nelson", the "Rodney", 4 destroyers, making for the Mediterranean.

4) 1520/3 July 1 aircraft carrier of the "Illustrious" class, 5 destroyers sighted from Gibraltar in the east.

They joined the battleships that had put out for the Mediterranean.

5) a) 0335/3 July Ceuta: 28 units, including 1 transport with 2 funnels.

b) 1530/3 July Cape Tres Forcas: 24 large steamers, 2 tankers, 1 destroyer, 4 anti-submarine vessels, easterly course.

6) 1000/3 July Gibraltar: 3 troopships probably medium-sized, 3 destroyers making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 81: 0250/3 July CO 2648 submerged submarine.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to a radio reconnaissance, there are several convoys off the North African coast.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Krieg) reported on request details of the torpedoing of a steamer on 17 June. According to this report the boat sank a steamer of 5,000 GRT.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1038/3 July as in III.A.d.5.a.
1254/3 July) as in III.A.d.1.
1729/3 July)
1557/3 July as in III.A.b.6.
1652/3 July as in III.A.d.3 and 4.
0832/3 July as in III.A.d.5.b.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

The Italian Navy has sanctioned the oral request made through Captain U-boats (see War Diary dated 2 July) for German U-boats to operate south of 38° N between 4° 30' and 7° E. It is intended to place U 371, which put out today, in this area.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 67 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 94,
U 565 CH 74,
U 617 CH 74,
U 375 CH 87,
U 409 CH 84,
U 458 CH 56 (homeward bound),
U 371 CH 63 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 49,
U 81 CO 23 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 put in to Salamis at 1330 on 4 July.
U 371 put in to Toulon at 2130 on 4 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 407, 431, 561.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Sicilian Channel, Alexandria as far as Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 375: 2140/4 July CH 8295 eastbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) a) 0810/4 July CH 8252 26 merchant ships not exceeding 10,000 GRT with destroyers and 1 aircraft carrier.

b) 1730/4 July CH 8412 36 merchant ships, 6 escort vessels, westerly course, moderate speed.

2) 0920/4 July CJ 7916 25 medium-sized merchant ships, 3 battleships (unlikely), 1 aircraft carrier, 4 M.T.B.s, easterly course.

3) 0825/4 July CH 8296 2 destroyers, easterly course, moderate speed.

4) 0835/4 July CH 8372 1 freighter, westerly course, low speed.

5) 1435/4 July CJ 7924 5 freighters, 1 destroyer, 2 M.T.B.s, easterly course, half speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 2215/3 July Gibraltar: 1 "Cairo" class cruiser.
2340/3 July 1 "Aurora" class cruiser put out in to the Mediterranean.

2) Until 0510/4 July Tangier: 104 units, some very large, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0807/4 July CF 8167 6 medium-sized freighters, 5 escort units, course 20°.

2) 0857/4 July CP 7196 14 medium-sized freighters, 5 escort vessels, easterly course.

3) 1605/4 July CO 5476 1 destroyer, course 135°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to radio intercept service there is very active convoy traffic off the coast of North Africa.

2) There are units of the Alexandria naval forces at sea.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 371 (Mehl) received as his attack area the area between 4° 30' and 7° E south of 38° N.

In case of strong anti-submarine operations in the operational area, U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) was ordered to make a detour to the east along the enemy traffic route and to report his position by short signal at the time of commencing his passage to the east.

U 565 (Franken) and U 617 (Brandi) were requested to make a position report by short signal as soon as possible. The conjecture that the enemy, which had disappeared, was making for the east from Ceuta and cruising along under cover of the coast, was passed on to the boats. Both boats were granted freedom of action against all targets, although operations against the warships, which included a cruiser as well as large tankers and transports reported as targets by radio message on 23 June, offered little likelihood of success. Both boats reported the following positions: U 565 at 0105 from CH 7557 and U 617 at 0026 from CG 9613.

U 371 was returning to Toulon as his attack periscope had been very difficult to move since the deep diving trial.

U 375 reported a success (see V.a) and commenced the return passage to Toulon as a result of the failure of the multi-unit hydrophones.

U 458 (Diggins) at 0200 on 6 July and U 380 (Roether) at 0900 on 6 July intended to cross 42° to the north.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

0857/4 July as in III.A.d.1.
1340/4 July as in III.A.b.1.

V. a) Successes:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) sank a freighter of 8,000 GRT belonging to an eastbound convoy on 4 July at 2140 in CH 8295.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

In accordance with instructions issued by the Italian Navy, operations in the area between 22° and 24° E were for the time being suspended for German U-boats because of E-boat operations there; U 453, therefore, was ordered not to enter this area or else to leave it immediately.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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5 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 68 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 94,
U 565 CH 75,
U 617 CH 96,
U 409 CH 84,
U 375 CH 83 (homeward bound),
U 458 CH 65 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 49.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 467, 431, 561.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Nile Delta, Alexandria as far as Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 593: 1543/5 July CH 9544 eastbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0855/5 July CH 9191 1 freighter, 1 escort vessel, course 130°, moderate speed.

2) 1400/5 July CJ 7824 4 destroyers, easterly course, high speed.

3) 1925/5 July CH 9546 1 destroyer, course 90°, moderate speed.

4) 1934/5 July CH 9568 15 merchant ships, several destroyers, apparently at anchor.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0715/5 July battleships of the "King George V" class put out from Gibraltar making for the Mediterranean.

2) 2130/5 July Straits of Gibraltar 32 medium-sized steamers, 1 small steamer, 3 small tankers, 5 landing ships (tank), 4 gunboats making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0945/5 July CN 2162 9 medium-sized units, northwesterly course.

2) 1745/5 July CP 7352 6 medium-sized steamers, 4 patrol vessels, course 285°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) and U 593 (Kelbling) were requested to make a position report. U 453 reported at 0341 from CO 5712. U 593 reported a success.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) intended to cross 42° N to the north at 0600 on 7 July.

U 407 (Brüller) put in again after the trimming trial as the pressure hull gland of the forward aerial leaks very badly. He intends to put out again at 1800 on 6 July.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1013/5 July as in III.A.d.1.
1627/5 July as in III.A.b.1.
0422/6 July as in III.A.d.2.

V. a) Successes:

U 593 (Kelbling) sank a steamer of 8,000 GRT belonging to an eastbound convoy at 1543 on 5 July in CH 9544, 15 miles westnorthwest of Cape Corbelin.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

6 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 39 (homeward bound),
U 375 CH 67 (" "),
U 458 CH 38 (" "),
U 593 CH 95,
U 409 CH 84,
U 565 CH 75,
U 617 CG 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 57.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0000:

U 371 put out from Toulon at 0700 on 6 July.
U 380 put in to Toulon at 1430 on 6 July.
U 458 put in to Toulon at 1745 on 6 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 407, 431, 561.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Alexandria-Tobruk, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0900/6 July CH 9524 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, course 90°, high speed.

2) 0853/6 July CH 9423 1 merchant ship, 1 destroyer, course 220°, moderate speed.

3) 1910/6 July CH 9529 1 aircraft carrier, 3 battleships, several destroyers, westerly course, high speed.

4) 2030/6 July CJ 7758 5 ships, stationary.

c) By radio intercept service:

Slight increase in radio traffic between Bizerta, Bone, Philippeville and Algiers.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1510/6 July Tres Forcas: convoy of about 40 ships making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 453: 1) 0610/6 July CO 5713 westbound convoy.
2) 1005/6 July CO 5721 westbound convoy, about 20 large ships, course 240°.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1635/6 July CO 4978 10 medium-sized steamers, 4 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, course 270°.

2) 1745/6 July CP 7352 6 merchant ships, 4 escort vessels, course 280°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Convoys or formations in the areas of Alexandria, Tobruk and Benghazi.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) reported convoys as in III.B.a and a success.

U 371 was requested to make a position report: Captain U-boats received a radio intercept message at approximately 2300 according to which at 1325 on 6 July a British unit in position "4238" (position not entirely clear) attacked a U-boat on the surface and probably scored a success. Working on the assumption that it was 42° 38' N, it may have been

U 371 which put out from Toulon at 0700 on 6 July, bound for the Western Mediterranean. Had U 371 not reported when requested to do so, it had been planned to put air reconnaissance into operation. U 371 reported at 0318 from CH 6667. According to radio intercept reports subsequently sent out from Naval High Command, the position of the attack was probably 37° 42' N, 2° 38' E. In this case it might have been U 593, but he was however not asked to make a position report because of the heavy enemy naval forces running through his area at the moment.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1318 as in III.A.b.1.
1823 as in III.A.b.2.
2115 as in III.A.b.3.
0340 as in III.A.d.

The sailing of U 407 was postponed for another 24 hours, that is to 1800 on 7 July. The reason: 2 leaking cylinder covers had to be replaced.

V. a) Successes:

U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) sank a steamer of 8,000 GRT belonging to a westbound convoy at 1005 on 6 July in CO 5721.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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7 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 375 CH 36 (homeward bound),
U 371 CH 69 (outward bound),
U 593 CH 94,
U 409 CH 84,
U 565 CH 75,
U 617 CG 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 57.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 375 put in to Toulon at 1400 on 7 July.
U 407 put out from Toulon at 1800 on 7 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 407, 431, 458, 561.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Cyrenaica as far as Benghazi, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0910/7 July CH 9527 13 merchant ships not exceeding 20,000 GRT, course 90°.

2) 1950/7 July CJ 7648 7 probable destroyers, 3 large transports, easterly course.

3) 2105/7 July CJ 7814 2 destroyers, 4 escort vessels, 2 M.T.B.s, 12 landing ships (tank), 6 freighters, 3 tankers of 10,000 GRT each, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1900/7 July 1 tanker, 2 freighters, 2 escort vessels, put out from Gibraltar in to the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1245/7 July CO 5811 29 units, westerly course.

2) 1517/7 July CP 7198 3 tankers, 2 concrete ships, making for Alexandria.

3) 1520/7 July CP 7152 1 passenger ship, course 280°.

4) 1553/7 July CP 7111 1 passenger ship, course 285°.

5) 2245/7 July CJ 3145 several destroyers and other naval vessels.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) Active convoy traffic off Cyrenaican coast.

2) From 1500 onwards heavy and unusual traffic reported from units located in the zones of Sfax and Susa to Malta and unknown fleet commands.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats U 565 and U 617 were ordered to operate independently within the area between Gibraltar and the meridian of CH 8445 because, the boats having failed to send in a report, no detailed review of the enemy situation can be obtained.

New attack areas were allocated as follows: U 593 (Kelbling) between the meridians of CH 8294 and 9455 and U 371 (Mohl) in the adjoining area to the east as far as 6° E. The operational area for German U-boats which was extended to 7° E by the Italian Navy (as in War Diary dated 3 July) was again reduced to 6° E, as Italian E-boats and U-boats were operating east of there.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1219 }
2331 } as in III.A.b.1.
1958 as in III.B.b.1.
0810 as in III.B.b.3 and 4.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

1) In Serial Number 18247/43 Most Secret, dated 28 June, Naval War Staff made the following report: "The sinkings achieved by German U-boats in the Eastern Mediterranean acquire special significance when it is remembered that because Anglo-Turkish maritime communications have not been interrupted here in any way, Turkey's attitude is definitely being unfavorably swayed. The number of boats operating in the Eastern Mediterranean is shortly to be increased by 3; 2 of these are to be sent to operate in the Cyprus area. The Naval Attache in Istanbul is requested to provide all possible information on shipping traffic in the ports of the south coast of Turkey and to send them immediately to Naval War Staff and to Captain U-boats Italy."

In answer to the request made by Naval War Staff, Captain U-boats Italy reported the courses he proposed to take, viz. teleprint message 19236/43 Most Secret dated 7 July 1943:
"It is intended to provide the following boats for operations - U 407 putting out on 7 July and U 561 putting out on 10 July from Toulon, and U 81 (after 15 July) from Salamis. Of these, one boat is to operate off Cyrenaica in the operational area now occupied by U 453, 2 boats in the sea area around Cyprus. It would be unwise to dispatch more boats than these in view of the small number of boats available and the tense situation in the Western Mediterranean."

2) The heavy occupation of Port Said and Suez led to discussion as to whether another minelaying operation should be carried out outside Port Said, in the area mined by our boats a year ago. This plan should effectively disturb the traffic.

The mines laid in the previous year had not been fitted with time devices. Naval War Staff was therefore requested to find out if it would be possible to enter the area again.

Naval War Staff was of the opinion that the firing units of mines could be expected to work for at least two years. This meant that it would not yet be possible to operate in the area mined last year.

It was equally impossible to carry out a minelaying operation in the enemy's swept channel in this area, because, owing to scanty air reconnaissance in this area, details of the route were not known.

(Signed) Kreisch.

8 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CH 95,
U 593 CH 83,
U 409 CH 84,
U 565 CH 74,
U 617 CH 74,
U 407 CJ 42 (putting out for the Eastern Mediterranean).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 375, 380, 431, 458, 561.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Western Mediterranean from the north as far as 37° 30' N.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Cyrenaica, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1950/7 July CJ 7648 7 probable destroyers, 3 large transports, easterly course.

2) 2102/7 July CJ 7814 2 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, 2 protective vessels, 2 M.T.B.s, 12 landing ships (tank), 6 freighters, 3 tankers, easterly course.

3) 1415/8 July CH 9641 1 passenger ship, easterly course.

4) 1700/8 July CJ 7931 4 M.T.B.s, eastsouth-easterly course.

5) 1950/8 July CJ 7838 10 merchant ships of approximately 8,000 GRT each, 2 M.T.B.s, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0100-0240 western approach of Straits of Gibraltar 8 large troop transports, 7 steamers, 2 cruisers, 14 light units.

0305-0400 the same convoy passed Ceuta making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1425 CN 2135 convoy of 20-30 ships, south-easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

7 July Mersin British steamer "Volsella" sailed in ballast.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) found no escort for the Bonifacio through passage at 1000 at Point H (Cape Senetose in 41°, 9.2 miles away). In answer to enquiries, the Italian Navy stated that the convoy put out from Maddalena at 0600. U 407 was ordered to wait for the convoy and reported at 1630 that he had been picked up by the convoy.

U 409 (Massmann) was requested to make a position report; the report was not received.

U 565 (Franken) was informed of the recall planned for 12 July.

U 593 was requested to make a position report and was informed of the recall planned for the night of 10-11 July. U 593 reported that he had commenced his return passage because he had exhausted his supply of torpedoes. He was given Toulon as his port of destination.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1417/8 as in III.A.d.
0001/9 as in III.A.b.3.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

At 1000 a conference was held at Supermarina between the Chief of the Italian Naval Staff (Admiral Sanssonetti) and Captain U-boats Italy on the operating of Italian and German U-boats in the event of an enemy landing.

I. Admiral Sanssonetti made the following survey of the situation:

1) The concentration of large landing supplies in the Tunisian ports as well as the ever increasing air attacks on Sicily point to the fact that the anticipated enemy landing will be concentrated mainly on Sicily whilst landing operations will probably be carried out on Sardinia and the Levant in an attempt to create a diversion.

2) The propositions made by Supermarina for possible Axis U-boat operations in the Sicilian Channel to resist an enemy landing were not accepted. Because the mine positions were unknown to the Axis naval forces and because of the heavy enemy air activities prevailing in the Sicilian Channel which will increase even more in the event of a landing, the U-boats could not expect to achieve any successes.

3) In the event of a landing, whether on Sicily or on Sardinia, the enemy would have to bring in supplies of men and materials from the west in addition to the supplies already

to hand in Tunisia, and they would have to be covered by naval escort forces. The sea area southwest of Sicily, therefore, took on a special importance, chiefly as an approach area for the heavy enemy naval forces. U-boats operating there should achieve good results. Supermarina, therefore, intended to put about 10 boats into operation in waiting positions in the sea area southwest of Sardinia immediately an enemy landing was reported. Supermarina requested that at the start of a landing operation, German and Italian U-boats in close co-operation, should be put into operation in the same sea area. Details were to be worked out by mutual agreement. Three Italian U-boats were lying available outside Leros for the operation in the Eastern Mediterranean east of Crete.

II. The following answers to the questions asked were supplied by Captain U-boats Italy:

1) Because of the reasons given by Supermarina it is not intended to put German U-boats into operation in the Sicilian Channel.

2) The propositions made in connection with putting the U-boats into operation are in general accepted. But as the exact time is unknown to us, it would be necessary to let the U-boats operate as long as possible against the enemy, that is against his present lines of communication, for this is the only area where they can hope to score any successes whereas they will find, distributed over the entire Mediterranean, enemy anti-submarine activity scarcely varying in strength. Operating together, in the same sea area, and against the same targets is out of the question. This is amply confirmed by the order given out to our own U-boats and air force forbidding them to operate against submarines in the operational area.

3) It is anticipated that the number of German U-boats available for operations during the second half of July will amount to 3 boats in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean respectively.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CH 95,
U 409 CH 84,
U 565 CH 74,
U 617 CH 74,
U 593 CH 91 (homeward bound),
U 407 CH 58 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 49.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 375, 380, 431, 458, 561.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Alexandria-Benghazi-Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1430/9 July CJ 7931 8 freighters of 7,000 GRT each, westerly course, with no escort.

2) 1927/9 July CJ 7829 to 7837 21 freighters, 2 cruisers, easterly course.

3) 1950/9 July 5 freighters of 7,000 GRT each. put out from Bone, also 2 freighters of 5,000 GRT each, 1 tanker of 8,000

GRT, 2 destroyers, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1630/9 July close into the north coast of Malta, several gatherings of ships with about 170 landing craft (tank) in 5 groups, probably accompanied by 2 battleships, mean course northwesterly.

1925/9 July 1 group of 5 cruisers, 40 probable landing craft (tank) and landing ships (tank) moved away to the east. 4 large ships (probably battleships) 30 miles northwest of Gozo, course 330° to 340°.

2340/9 July probably the same group 15 miles southwest of Licata, course 340°. According to a report from the naval radio station Empedode, the enemy was approaching the coast at 0143.

2030/9 July another group of 15 to 20 units 35 miles southeast of Licata, northerly course.

2210/9 July another group of 20 ships, many aircraft, 15 miles south of Cape Passero.

1935/9 July probably 2 groups (see 1630) comprising 3 cruisers and 45 ships, convoy of 3 large ships (possibly aircraft carriers), northern part of Gozo.

1810/9 July 3 merchant ships, 2 destroyers, 140 miles east of Malta, southerly course, and 2 battleships, 4 cruisers 21 miles eastsoutheast of Malta, course 290°.

1920/9 July presumably 18 special service vessels, 25 miles northeast of Pantellaria, course and speed not reported, and 1 large and 1 small naval

vessel, 1 stationary vessel, 30 miles north of Pantellaria.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

8 July 2 Greek ships from Port Said put in to Mersin.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

After the departure of U 593 (Kelbling), the meridian of CH 8356 became the new eastern boundary of the operational area for U 409 (Massmann) and at the same time the western boundary for U 371 (Mehl). U 409 was requested to make a position report. U 593 intended to pass north of 42° N on 11 July at 0000 and to be at the rendezvous at 0900.

The report on the enemy as in III.A.b.1. was transmitted to the boats at 2035/9 July.

For further operations see paragraph VI.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

1) Reports on the enemy:

At approximately 2300 Operations Staff, C-in-C South telephoned the reports of enemy sightings in War Diary III.B.b. to Captain U-boats Italy. It was clear from these reports that an enemy landing was definitely imminent either on the south coast or in the southeastern corner of Sicily.

2) Own situation:

In the Western Mediterranean there were 4 boats in the operational area (U 565, 617, 409, 371), in the Eastern Mediterranean U 453 was in the Benghazi sea area; and in the Tuscan Sea there was U 407 proceeding to the Eastern Mediterranean from Toulon.

On 10 July there were in Toulon, 2 boats ready to put out (U 375, U 561).

3) Considerations for U-boat operations:

According to the remarks already made in discussing the anticipated enemy landing on Sicily or Sardinia, it was presumed that enemy supplies from the west will principally be brought up through the ports of Algiers, Bougie, Philippeville and Bone. It is therefore planned in accordance with the arrangements made with Supermarina to transfer the boats lying in the west to the east. There is at the moment no single boat available, suitable for penetrating into the surmised landing area. And yet it is most important that we should operate there with boats. It is anticipated that the landings will be concentrated in the areas south of Syracuse and near Gela.

4) Decisions:

U 453 was ordered to leave his operational area on the route south of Malta and to make for CN 26. There the boat would incidentally also be favorably placed for the interception of enemy traffic to Malta or Tripoli. As the situation developed further operations were to be undertaken.

U 407 was ordered to continue his passage. It was intended to operate east of Sicily and southeast of Syracuse.

The boats lying in the Western Mediterranean, U 617, 565 and 409, were ordered to proceed to the eastbound enemy route.

U 371 was ordered to operate on the eastern side of his operational area as the Italians had not yet granted permission for a further withdrawal to the east. Meanwhile both the boats in Toulon are being prepared for the operation in the west and are instructed to put out as soon as possible and to proceed to CJ 4445.

(Signed) Kreisch.

10 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CH 96,
U 409 CH 82,
U 565 CH 75,
U 617 CH 78,
U 593 CH 65 (homeward bound),
U 407 CJ 98 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CO 45.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 375 put out from Toulon at 0730 on 10 July.
U 561 put out from Toulon at 1300 on 10 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 375, 380, 431, 458, 561.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Alexandria-Benghazi-Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 371: 1241/10 July CH 9616 westbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0755/10 July 35 miles north of Tunis, 31 freighters of 8,000 GRT each, 5-6 cruisers.

2) 1815/10 July CH 9465 1 cruiser, 8 landing craft (tank), 41 landing craft (infantry), 33 landing ships (tank), stopped.

3) 0145/11 July CJ 7688 1 convoy, no further information available.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1720/10 July 20 miles north of Bone, escort with 10 freighters from 5-6,000 GRT each, 2 transports of 10,000 GRT each, 6 destroyers, 1 escort vessel, easterly course, moderate speed.

2) 1700/10 July 20 miles north of Tabarca, 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 3 destroyers, easterly course, high speed.

3) 0755/10 July 20 miles eastnortheast of Bizerta, 31 freighters, 5-6 cruisers, easterly course.

4) 1920/10 July 10 miles northwest of Bizerta, 11 ships, course 80°.

5) 1945/10 July 45 miles northeast of Bone, 4 transports, 11 escort vessels.

6) 1655/10 July off Bizerta 1 destroyer, 1 tanker of 8,000 GRT, 5 freighters of 5,000 GRT each, 20 landing ships (tank), 8 landing craft (tank), 2 M.T.B.s.

7) 1920/10 July 13 miles east of Bizerta, 8 ships, course 300°, also 4-5 single ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio intelligence, it was gathered that warship units were being brought into the Mediterranean from the Red Sea.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 371 (Mehl) reported a success (see V.a) and commenced the return passage to Toulon. The boats intended to be at the Entrance Point "Northwest" on 12 July at 1200.

The enemy sighting report (as in III.B.b.7) was transmitted to the boats.

For other operations see paragraph VI.

V. a) Successes:

U 371 torpedoed 1 tanker of 10,000 GRT and 1 freighter of 8,000 GRT and left them sinking on 10 July at 1241 in CH 9616 (45 miles northeast of Bougie).

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

1) A study of the enemy situation to date does not yet give evidence of any threat to Sardinia or to Western Sicily. The enemy landings were concentrated on the area between Licata and Cape Scalambri and between Cape Passero and Syracuse. They had still to be detected, although a large group of enemy forces had been observed round Syracuse. It is quite clear that the landing operations were divided into 2 main groups as follows:

Group 1:

Between Augusta and Cape Passero and west of these points, with about 400 landing craft, 100 merchant and transport vessels protected by 2 battleships, 1 aircraft carrier, 10 cruisers and 20 destroyers.

Group 2:

Between Licata and Cape Scalambri, with about 300 landing craft, 100 merchant and transport vessels protected by 2 battleships, several cruisers and 20 destroyers. This confirms the decision taken on 9 July, which resulted in U 453 being ordered to the sea area west of Malta and in U 407 being ordered to the area southeast of Syracuse in anticipation of enemy concentration in those areas.

The number of landing craft and transports in operation could make a preliminary landing of

5 Divisions possible. Whilst a massing of our own boats was not as yet imperative in the west, especially in view of the fact that 10 Italian U-boats were there, the enemy situation made it necessary to operate principally to the east and southeast of Sicily.

Deviations were made from the orders previously received so that it was now planned to put U 375 (Koenenkamp) and U 561 (Henning) into operation to the east and to the south of Sicily. The 2 boats which had in the meantime put out from Toulon, were ordered to make for Point "H", that is for the light 41° true and 9·2 miles from Cape Senetose, there to be picked up by an escort for the passage through the Strait of Bonifacio. Both boats reported that they would arrive there on 11 July. U 407 (Brüller) was then given as his attack area the region southeast of Syracuse, south of the parallel of naval grid square 3232, east of the 200 meter line, as some of our own minefields lie inside the 200 meter line. As according to air reconnaissance, the majority of the transports were lying inside the 200 meter line, after determining the position of the mines and reporting the positions of the minefields to U 407, the 200 meter line was made the western boundary of his operational area. In accordance with instructions from C-in-C Navy, U 565 (Franken) and U 617 (Brandi) were ordered to remain in their operational areas east of Gibraltar.

As Supermarina only granted freedom of action for German U-boats in the Western Mediterranean as far as 7° E (the eastern boundary of the operational area), U 371 (Mehl) and U 409 (Massmann) were deployed as follows: U 371 between the meridians of CJ 7484 and CH 9385, U 409 in the adjoining grid square to the west. The northern boundary for both boats is the parallel of CH 9355.

The plan to put U 371 and U 409 into operation in the sea area east and south of Sicily, was dropped, as U 565 and U 617 could remain only a few days longer in their operational area so that after their departure we would not have a single boat left in operation in the Western Mediterranean.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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11 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CH 95,
U 565 CH 74,
U 617 CH 74,
U 371 CH 93 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 375 CJ 42 (outward bound),
U 561 CJ 42 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 35,
U 453 CN 63.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put in to Toulon at 1030 on 11 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance embracing North African coast and Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1600/9 July 300 ships with invasion troops put out from Algiers under fleet escort.

2) 100 ships put out from Tunis under fleet escort.

3) 0120-0250/11 July Ceuta: 15 units, course set for the Mediterranean.

4) At sunset on 7 July, a Portuguese destroyer sighted a convoy of about 300 ships of all classes, 3 battleships, 3 large aircraft carriers, 8 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 70 miles north of Fayal (Azores), easterly course, speed 10 knots.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

No important new reports (see paragraph VI).

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The escort promised for 0700/11 July at Point "Hans" for U 375 and U 561 (see War Diary dated 10 July) only arrived at the position at 1100. (It put out from Maddalena at 0415.) Both boats intended to be at the rendezvous off the Strait of Messina on 12 July at 1900. At 1500 the boats were lying east of the Strait of Bonifacio.

Contrary to previous reports, U 371 (Mehl) intended to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 1300 instead of at 1700.

U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) received as his attack area the grid squares CN 26, 31 and 34.

After the breaking off of operations by U 371, U 409 (Massmann) was informed that the eastern boundary of his operational area would now be the meridian of 7° E.

The position of our own minefield in the Gela sea area (southeast coast of Sicily), as well as a report on the enemy landing situation was transmitted to the boats.

1751/10 July the boats were informed of the convoy as in III.A.d.3.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

According to the latest reports from air reconnaissance there were about 110 transports, 300 landing craft in the sea area off the east coast of Sicily and about 180 transports and 300 landing craft off the south coast. The two groups of battleships and cruisers had not been spotted again.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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12 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CH 95,
U 565 CH 75,
U 617 CH 74,
U 371 CH 39 (homeward bound),
U 375 CJ 83 (outward bound),
U 561 CJ 83 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 35,
U 453 CN 26.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put in to Toulon on 12 July at 1330.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Alexandria as far as the sea area round Benghazi, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 561: 1922/12 July CJ 9564 1 periscope.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0900/12 July CJ 7697 1 convoy of 30 ships, easterly course.

2) 1509/12 July CJ 7726 1 freighter of 4,000 GRT, easterly course, high speed.

3) 2040/12 July CJ 7349 6 freighters of 3,000 GRT each, easterly course, high speed.

4) 2050/12 July CJ 7933 3 cruisers, 18 destroyers, several landing craft.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic movements of naval forces probable between Bizerta and Algiers.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 375: 2200/12 July 3 M.T.B.s opposite Messina.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0700 in the Agrigento area as far as Cape Passero 9 cruisers, 21 destroyers,

19 small vessels, 52 freighters, in all 310,000 GRT; 167 landing craft.

0700 in the Cape Passero area as far as Syracuse 2 cruisers, 15 small vessels, 32 freighters, in all 193,000 GRT; 50 landing craft.

2) About noon torpedoboats were reported in the harbor of Augusta.

In the afternoon the area east of the Catania aerodrome was shelled by 7 heavy units, including 1 battleship.

3) 1722/12 July CO 9256 2 small vessels, stopped.

4) 0105/13 July CN 3182 70 ships, course and speed unknown.

5) 0120/13 July CN 3432 1 battleship or heavy cruiser.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 561 (Henning) reported from CJ 9514 at 1712: "All-round dipole waterlogged." The boat was ordered to continue the passage.

U 565 (Franken), who put out on 17 June, was ordered to employ delaying tactics during his return passage in the night of the 12/13 July on the enemy traffic route as far as the meridian of 7° E, which is at the moment the eastern boundary of the operational area for German U-boats, and from there to make for Toulon.

The attack areas were allotted as follows: 26 for U 561, 31 for U 375 (Koenenkamp), 34 from the morning of 14 July for U 453 (Schlippenbach), all are to be CN grid squares. U 453 reported from 6355, that his diving ability is limited to 100 meters.

The position of a minefield off the east coast of Sicily and the latest report of the struggle for Sicily were transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

On 12 July at 2200, U 561 was torpedoed by M.T.B.s and sunk in the Strait of Messina directly opposite Scaletta. The Commanding Officer and 1 Stoker P.O. 2nd Class were rescued. The boat, proceeding in joint action with U 375, had been advised to exercise the greatest caution during his passage through the Strait of Messina because U-boats had twice been sighted on 11 July in 9831 and 9597.

Supermarina directs that rescue operations should be undertaken to save the survivors.

VI. General situation:

No important new events.

The enemy has brought up further supplies of men and materials for Sicily.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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13 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CH 96,
U 565 CH 75 (homeward bound),
U 617 CH 74,
U 375 CJ 98 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 35,
U 453 CN 62.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 593, 371.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance north of 37° 30', west of 8° E.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Alexandria-Benghazi, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2 battleships in Bone, 1 battleship in Bizerta.

2) 1947/13 July CJ 7687 15 freighters, 5 landing craft (tank), 12 escort vessels, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio service, there were shipping movements between the Central Mediterranean and Algiers.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to Italian Intelligence Service in Ceuta: 12 or more unidentified ships passed on 13 July between 0000 and 0020, en route for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 407: 0012/12 July 1 light cruiser, standing on and off.
0416/12 July 1 destroyer, both in CN 3270.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0700/13 July according to the aerial photographs, 21 large landing craft, 5 landing ships (tank), 20 freighters, 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers between Licata and Cape Passero.

Between Augusta and Cape Passero 87 large and 30 small landing craft, 3 landing ships (tank), 79 freighters, 11 cargo vessels, 4 transports, 3 anti-aircraft cruisers, 4 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 12 escort vessels, 1 monitor.

2) 0415/13 July CN 3265 100 ships.

3) 0443/13 July CN 3234 2 convoys, comprising 30-40 ships, heavy escort, course 300°.

4) 0445/13 July 3243-3254 20 units, several destroyers, 4 cruisers, making for Augusta.

5) 1630/13 July CO 5836 11 merchant ships, 4 escort vessels, 2 destroyers, course 120°.

6) 0730/13 July 2 battleships off Gela.

7) 1630/13 July 2 battleships of the "King George V" class, east of Syracuse.

8) 1841/13 July 10 miles off Empedode 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer, standing on and off.

c) By radio intercept service:

Units of the "Warspite" group, which had been located on 12 July at 2045 about 60 miles southeast of Malta, were identified from radio traffic in the Malta-Sicily area; in addition there were at least 2 American cruisers and the cruisers stationed in Malta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 409 (Massmann) was ordered to operate on the eastern boundary of the operational area for German U-boats laid down by Supermarina as 8°.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was ordered to commence his passage to the operational area (square 31) along the coast of Sicily; he had been granted freedom of action against all targets except submarines.

U 407 (Brüller) reported an enemy sighting and a success as in III.B.a.

The latest report of actions on land and sea in the Sicilian campaign was transmitted to the boats.

They were also informed that conditions for attacking were very favorable at the moment.

V. a) Successes:

U 407 (Brüller) fired an unsuccessful fan of four on a cruiser on 12 July at 0012 and heard one explosion at 0416 in 3270 after having fired a second fan against a destroyer.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Further strong contingents of enemy forces are being brought up to the main Sicilian landing beaches.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CJ 77,
U 617 CH 74,
U 565 CH 75 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 31,
U 453 CN 34.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 put out from Salamis at 1600 on 14 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593.
4) Salamis: U 81.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Nile Delta, Alexandria as far as Benghazi, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0736/14 July 15 miles northwest of Cape Senat, 5 merchant ships, 2 landing craft (infantry), 1 escort vessel, course eastsoutheast.

2) 0740/14 July CJ 7913 4 destroyers, westerly course, half speed.

3) 0745/14 July CJ 8736 5 freighters, 2 landing craft (infantry), 1 escort vessel, easterly course, high speed.

4) 1444/14 July CJ 7934 3 freighters, 2 landing ships (tank), easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1515/14 July Cape Spartel convoy of 26 freighters, 4 tankers, 10 escort vessels, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1035/14 July CN 3147 12 transports, course 20°.

2) 1040/14 July CN 3176 4 probable destroyers, course 10°.
CN 3149 2 probable destroyers cruising off the coast.

3) 0100/15 July CN 3171 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, course 270°, moderate speed.

4) 0250/15 July CN 3273 about 50 ships, course and speed not given.

5) 0340/15 July CN 3173 about 40 ships, course 10°.

6) 0255/15 July CN 3297 about 100 ships, course and speed not given.

7) 0310/15 July CN 3544 5 large merchant ships, course 120°.
1 probable aircraft carrier in the Valetta area, otherwise no information available on the heavy units.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Over 30 American landing craft put out from Beirut for Cyprus in the night of 10/11 July.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 617 (Brandi), who put out on 19 June, was ordered to commence the return passage to Toulon, but to proceed as slowly as his remaining resources would permit. At the time of commencing his passage, the boat was to report his position by short signal. U 565, who since the night of 12/13 July had been making his return passage on the enemy traffic route, was requested to make a position report. Neither of the boats sent in a report.

The following enemy sighting reports were transmitted to the boats:

1311/14 July as in III.B.b.1.
2252/14 July as in III.A.d.
0437/15 July as in III.B.b.3.
0457/15 July as in III.B.b.4.
0508/15 July as in III.B.b.5.
0532/15 July as in III.B.b.6 and 7.

The latest report of the actions in the Sicilian campaign was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

The continuous enemy pressure on Sicily was stopped. The situation was tense. The withdrawal of transports and landing craft suggested that the majority of the landing divisions had been landed.

Further landing operations were anticipated.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CJ 78,
U 617 CH 74 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 75 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 35,
U 375 CN 31,
U 453 CN 34,
U 81 CO 29 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 373, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance west of 8° E, north of 37° 30' N.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Sicilian Channel, coast of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1025/15 July CJ 7935 2 freighters of 10,000 GRT each, westerly course. CJ 7931 3 freighters of 5,000 GRT each, 3 M.T.B.s, westerly course.

2) 1850/15 July CJ 7919 8 transports, a few small vessels, easterly course.

3) 1910/15 July CJ 7838 3 large passenger ships, 4-5 destroyers, westerly course.

4) 1837/15 July CH 9649 6 merchant ships not exceeding 10,000 GRT, 6 escort vessels, course 70°, low speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio intelligence there are shipping movements between Bizerta and Bone and probably from Algiers towards the Central Mediterranean.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1755/14 July Tres Forcas 4 large freighters with 4 corvettes, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1215/15 July south of Catania several enemy warships, northerly course, turning to the east.

2) 1520/15 July south of Empedode 18 warships, westerly course, high speed.

3) 1725/15 July CN 3381 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 5 destroyers, 15 merchant ships not exceeding 20,000 GRT, westerly course.

4) 0245/16 July CN 3519 1 destroyer, 20 ships, course 0°, high speed.

5) 0100/16 July CN 3612 1 aircraft carrier, 6 destroyers, 10 large naval vessels, course 280°, speed unknown.

6) 0010/16 July CN 3278 50 landing craft, 8 destroyers.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to the radio traffic, radio stations and fleet commands had obviously been set up on Sicily. Unidentified convoys in the Alexandria-Tripoli area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, there were altogether 100 steamers lying in Alexandria and Port Said, 25 in Western Cyprus.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Krieg) reported at 1433/15 July that he had passed to the south of 35°. The boat received as his operational area the sea area east of the meridian of CN 3147 off Cape Passero, and he was also notified that U 375 (Koenenkamp) and U 453 (Schlippenbach) were operating in the same area.

The majority of the Italian U-boats having been withdrawn, U 409 (Massmann) was ordered to extend his operational area as far as the western entrance of the Galite Channel.

U 565 (Franken), U 617 (Brandi) and U 375 (Koenenkamp) were requested to make a position report. The boats reported as follows:

U 565 at 2306 from CH 7678,
U 617 at 2334 from CH 7466,
U 375 at 0343 from CN 3432.

The following enemy sighting reports were transmitted to the boats:

1726/15 July as in III.A.b.1.
2026/15 July as in III.B.b.3.
0012/16 July as in III.A.b.4.
0502/16 July as in III.B.b.5.

The position of further minefields (in the Malta area) as well as a report on the situation in Sicily and off the island's eastern and south-eastern coasts was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

No important new events in the Sicilian campaign.

Enemy pressure on Catania has ceased.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 JULY, 1943

PG/30932

CONFIDENTIAL

16 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CJ 78,
U 617 CH 74 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 76 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 35,
U 375 CN 34,
U 453 CN 34,
U 81 CO 18 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance from Alexandria to Benghazi, Sicilian Channel.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1615 CJ 7814 30 ships, including some naval craft, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 2000/16 July 12 troopships put in to Gibraltar from the west.

2) 1310/16 July 1 cruiser of the "Dido" class put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1303/16 July CT 3215 3 cruisers, 2 destroyers, course and speed not given.

2) 1610/16 July CO 7187 4 probable small freighters, course 330°.

3) 1613/16 July 7 smaller units, probably freighters from Alexandria.

4) 1615/16 July CP 7265 1 freighter of approximately 6,000 G.R.T.

5) 1630/16 July CP 7361 3 probable freighters, northeasterly course.

6) 1636/16 July CP 7238 2 escort vessels, course 260°.

7) 1635/16 July CO 9255 1 destroyer, easterly course.

8) 1619/16 July CO 5981 10 medium-sized freighters, 8 escort vessels, course 310°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

During the night of 15/16 July and during the forenoon of 16 July, there was very active operational traffic between enemy units off the coast of Sicily.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

16 July 2 ships put out from Port Said making for Turkish ports.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

As actions are at the moment concentrated on the east coast of Sicily, it is anticipated that supplies will be brought up there in increasing

quantities, so that U 81 (Krieg) has now been ordered not only to operate in the operational area allotted to him yesterday but also in the area south of Syracuse as far as Cape Passero.

U 409 (Massmann) and U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) were requested to make a position report. U 453 reported at 0422 from CN 3417. No report was received from U 409.

U 407 (Brüller) reported from grid square 3273 that tubes 3 and 4 were out of action and that a stern torpedo (tube runner) was fired at a freighter. The boat requested permission to return to Pola to undergo repairs and take on more torpedoes.

Enemy sighting reports as in III.A.b. together with the German Air Force sighting report off Cape Passero were transmitted to the boats. The boats were also informed of the situation in and off Sicily.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

It must now be anticipated that the enemy will attempt to make a decisive attack in order to force a breakthrough to Messina.

According to photographic reconnaissance, there were ships lying in the following ports in the forenoon of 15 July:

Augusta:	1 freighter (10,000 G.R.T.), 98 landing craft, 7 escort vessels.
Syracuse:	8 freighters (55,000 G.R.T.), 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 7 landing ships (tank), 36 landing craft, 1 transport (15,000 G.R.T.), 6 escort vessels.
Cape Passero:	24 freighters (215,000 G.R.T.), 10 landing ships (tank), 38 landing craft, 19 escort vessels.
Gela:	23 freighters (160,000 G.R.T.), 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 6 destroyers, 68 landing craft, 2 guardboats.

(Signed) Kreisch.

17 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CJ 78,
U 617 CH 86 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 82 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 453 CN 34,
U 375 CN 34,
U 81 CN 32.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area around Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Sicilian Channel and Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1845/17 July CJ 7918 1 medium-sized freighter, easterly course.

2) 1850/17 July CJ 7838 5 warships, probably destroyers, westerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic, American units are probably operating in the Algiers-Oran area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) The 12 troopships in War Diary of 16 July, III.A.d. put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean, and continued their passage at 0700/17 July to the Atlantic.

2) According to an agent's report, a convoy put out from Oran on 18 July and arrived in Bone on the night of 20/21 July.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1609/17 July CP 8158 3 medium-sized steamers, course 89°.

2) 1615/17 July CP 8165 2 medium-sized steamers, course 150°.

3) 1724/17 July CP 7361 1 medium-sized steamer, course 120°.

4) 1754/17 July CO 7265 2 large, 9 medium-sized steamers, 4 patrol vessels.

5) 1825/17 July CN 3465 7 large merchant ships, about 8 escorting vessels, course 40°, moderate speed.

6) 1840/17 July CN 3283 6 large merchant ships, course 360°, speed not exceeding 10 knots.

7) 1845/17 July CN 3224 1 battleship and 6 ships, course 0°, moderate speed.

8) 0330/18 July CN 3283-3673 8 merchant ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., and 10 destroyers, course 330°, moderate speed.
CN 3295 2 merchant ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T. and 4 destroyers, course 0°, speed slight.
CN 3513 2 destroyers, course 0°, speed slight.

9) 1820 Valetta 2 battleships, the "Rodney" and the "Nelson", 2 aircraft carriers of the "Illustrious" class, 3 monitors of the "Robert" class, 4 cruisers, 20 destroyers.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

16 July 1 freighter of 8,000-9,000 G.R.T., 2 small ships, 2 French destroyers, 2 motorboats, put out from Beirut on a southerly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 409 (Massmann) was again requested to make a position report. The report was not received.

U 81 (Krieg) was ordered not to cross to the north of 37° N. (In compliance with an Italian request.)

U 407 (Brüller) was ordered to remain in the operational area, because the situation makes it imperative for all operationally ready boats to continue operating against the enemy.

U 617 (Brandi) intends to cross 42° N on 20 July at 0400.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1212/17 July as in III.A.d.2.
0056/18 July as in III.B.b.5.

The boats received a report of the situation in and off Sicily.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

The enemy has brought up reinforcements against our left flank in Sicily. The landing has its concentration further up the eastern coast of Sicily.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CJ 78,
U 617 CH 58 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 94 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 453 CN 34,
U 375 CN 34,
U 81 CN 32.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Sicilian Channel and of the western half of the Nile Delta as far as Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0735 CJ 7915 5 destroyers, 2 ships of 12,000 G.R.T. each, (cruisers or special service vessels), 5 M.T.B.s, easterly course.

2) 1530/18 July Bizerta 4 transports, 1 escort vessel, southeasterly course, speed slight.

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c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1630/18 July Gibraltar 2 landing craft transport vessels of the "Princess Josephine Charlotte" class, with troops on board, put out from Gibraltar into the Mediterranean.

2) 0315/18 July 48 ships put out from Gibraltar into the Mediterranean.

3) 0430-0600/18 July Ceuta 55 ships, easterly course.

4) 1900/18 July Tres Forcas convoy of 94 freighters, 1 tanker, 4 destroyers, 6 corvettes, making for the Mediterranean. (Probably a combination of the convoys of 2 and 3.)

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0725/18 July CN 3145 2 cruisers, course 270°, moderate speed.

2) 1655/18 July CO 1451 1 destroyer, course 320°, high speed.

3) 1725/18 July CO 4896 7 freighters not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 7 freighters not exceeding 6,000 G.R.T., about 7 escort vessels, course 300°, speed slight.

4) 2210/18 July CJ 9947 1 cruiser, 7 destroyers, course 45°.

5) 1430/18 July CP 8182 2 large and 3 small ships, southerly course, high speed. 3 large ships, course 280°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to radio intelligence, the cruisers and units of the "Warspite" Group, formerly stationed in Malta, were operating off the east coast of Sicily.

2) Numerous directional bearings made in the Cape Passero sea area point to the steady, strongly escorted stream of supplies being carried to the east coast of Sicily.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, civilian ships are forbidden to enter the ports of Morfu, Limassol and Famagusta on Cyprus.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 409 (Massmann) was requested, for the third time since 16 July, to make a position report. No report was received. Grave concern is felt for the boat.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) and U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) were requested to make a situation report as soon as possible. U 375 reported at 2350 on 18 July in 3188 misses on an eastbound convoy. According to U 375 enemy traffic is running on the 200 meter line with very little protection. The boat observed M.T.B.s in the Malta Channel. U 453 reported that he has commenced his return passage solely because he has exhausted his supply of torpedoes.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1032/18 July } as in III.A.d.2.
1309/18 July }
1704/18 July as in III.A.d.3.
0144/19 July as in III.A.d.1.

The boats received a report of the situation in and off Sicily.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

1) In Sicily, heavy enemy pressure continues on both flanks. Further strong landings continue to take place, particularly on the east coast.

The great numbers of landing craft and transports in Valetta harbor are particularly noticeable.

2) U 375 and U 453 were requested to send a situation report as it is surprising that the boats lying there have been so unsuccessful.

The situation report should reveal whether there are particular conditions prevailing unknown to Command. The following information is gathered from the reports sent in by the two boats:

1) There is traffic.
2) Attacks are possible.
3) Anti-submarine activity is not particularly strong. This confirms the impression of the situation prevailing here.

The following is decided on: The boats are to remain in their operational area because successful operations are anticipated.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 409 CJ 78,
U 617 CH 67 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 94 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 31,
U 81 CN 32,
U 453 CN 34 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and the coast of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0915/19 July CJ 7921 2 destroyers, westerly course, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0230/19 July CN 3148 2 freighters, southerly course, high speed.

2) 0240/19 July CN 3145 7 units, stopped.

3) 0305/19 July CN 3184 20-25 units, no details of speed or course.

4) 1630/19 July CO 9215 22 medium-sized steamers, 8 escort vessels, 3 destroyers.

5) 1839/19 July CN 3213 1 battleship, 1 freighter.

6) 1750/19 July CN 2389 3 probable cruisers, 2 destroyers, westerly course.
CN 2623 3 aircraft carriers, westerly course.

7) 1935/19 July CN 3257 5 cruisers, course and speed not known.

8) 2325/19 July CN 3259 5 merchant ships (8,000 G.R.T.), 7 destroyers, about 10 boats, northerly course, speed slight.

9) 2330/19 July CN 3512 4 merchant ships not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 6 destroyers, 10 boats, southerly course, speed slight.

10) 2350/19 July CN 3438 3 destroyers, 6 boats, northerly course, speed slight.

11) 0015/20 July CN 3145 1 destroyer, 3 escort vessels, 5 boats, course 240°, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing special to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, the aircraft carrier "Indefatigable" was sighted in the Eastern Mediterranean. In view of our previous experiences of agents' reports from the Eastern Mediterranean, this report seems improbable.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) was ordered to proceed to Pola and was again requested to make a situation report. U 453 reported moderate convoy traffic, with landing craft and destroyer escorts. In the operational area, the boat ascertained accurate location from the land, whereas there was none from the air. On 18 July, U 453 fired an unsuccessful fan of two against a destroyer in CN 2389.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

2310/19 July as in III.B.b.7.
0715/20 July as in III.B.b.5, 8 and 9.

The boats were informed of the situation in and off Sicily.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

As U 409 (Massmann) has not yet made a position report after having been requested three times to do so, the boat must be presumed lost.

VI. General situation:

1) Owing to the probable loss of U 409 and the departure of U 565 (Franken) there are no boats left in the Western Mediterranean, where the traffic is again heavy as it has been before; it is therefore intended to send the next operationally ready boat (U 371 on 22 July) to the Western Mediterranean.

2) In Sicily, Agrigant and Empedode were occupied by the enemy. Enemy artillery action has since noon on 18 July been increasing in strength along the whole front.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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20 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 617 CH 36 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 95 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 31,
U 81 CN 32,
U 453 CN 33 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 617 put in to Toulon at 1115 on 20 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Sicilian Channel and of the sea area from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1015/20 July 7917 1 medium-sized freighter, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1725/20 July off Avola 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 1 destroyer, 18 large vessels, 9 merchant ships (65,000 G.R.T.)

2) 1812/20 July CO 6769 convoy of 25 vessels, including 7 freighters (7,000-10,000 G.R.T.), 9 freighters (5,000-6,000 G.R.T.), 8 escort vessels, course 280°, moderate speed.

3) 2230/20 July CJ 9924 numerous units, northerly course, speed 22 knots.

4) 2310/20 July CJ 9974 2 destroyers, 1 merchant ship not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., northeasterly course.

5) 0005/21 July CN 3515 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 12 large landing craft (3,000-4,000 G.R.T.), course 330°.

6) 0020/21 July CN 3259 2 destroyers, course 180°.

7) 0030/21 July CN 3313 2 destroyers, course 210°.

8) 0145/21 July CK 7441 6 unidentified ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 565 (Franken) was requested to report his position. The report was not received.

U 453 (v.Schlippenbach) intends to be at the Entrance Point Adriatic at 1500 on 22 July.

The following enemy sighting reports were transmitted to the boats:

0257/21 July as in III.B.b.1.
0416/21 July as in III.B.b.4, 5, 6 and 7.

The number of ships in Valetta and Augusta harbors, as well as the approximate position of the front line in Sicily, was passed on to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 565 9630 (homeward bound),

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 32,
U 81 CN 31,
U 453 CN 33 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593, 617.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Sicilian Channel, of the sea area from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0807/21 July CH 9738 1 destroyer, course 80°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1600/21 July 1 large British tanker with an anti-torpedo net, 2 American submarine chasers put out from Gibraltar on an easterly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1000/21 July CJ 9974 1 merchant ship, 2 destroyers, course 50°.

2) 2250/21 July CN 2353 approximately 20 ships.

3) 2300/21 July CN 2347 approximately 30 ships.

4) 2325/21 July CN 3537 approximately 60 ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

17 July Beirut 1 tanker, 1 Greek destroyer, 1 motorboat, southerly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The route for passage through the Adriatic was passed on to U 453 (v.Schlippenbach).

U 565 (Franken) was requested to make a position report. At 0020, U 565 reported from CH 5863 that he has commenced his return passage because his periscope and Junkers compressor have broken down and that he intends to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0700 on 23 July.

U 81 (Krieg) reported a success (see V.a).

V. a) Successes:

On 21 July at 1156 U 81 sank a troopship of 12,000 G.R.T. in the harbor of Syracuse and scored two hits on the net barrage.

b) Losses:

U 97 (Lieut.(j.g.) Trox) is provisionally reported missing with effect from 17 June. (Naval War Staff, 2nd Division/C-in-C U-boats (Operations) G 5457 A5 dated 14 July.)

VI. General situation:

As heavy traffic is once again running in the Western Mediterranean, operations against it would be indicated. The best results should be obtained not by having an unbalanced massing of U-boats in the Sicilian battle area, achieved by clearing all the other areas of the Mediterranean of boats, but by operating at several different points where enemy traffic happens to be heavy.

It is, therefore, intended to have U 371 (Mehl), who will be putting out on 22 July, operate in the sea area off Philippeville-Bone because heavy enemy traffic has been running there recently and also in view of the fact that this area is being covered by our own air reconnaissance, whereas, owing to the shortage of aircraft, air reconnaissances are carried out rarely over the western part of the Western Mediterranean.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 565 CH 68 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 31,
U 81 CN 32,
U 453 CK 77 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put out from Toulon at 1800 on 22 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 593, 617.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Sicilian Channel, and of the sea area from the Nile Delta to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1840/22 July CJ 7926 6 ships which could not be identified more closely, stationary.

2) 1845/22 July CJ 7915 3 medium-sized freighters, 2 destroyers, westerly course, half speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio intelligence there is an Algiers-Malta convoy in the Mediterranean.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1530/22 July Gibraltar 14 ships, 4 minesweepers, 1 destroyer, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1655/22 July CN 3279 9 medium-sized merchant ships, course 0°.

2) 1655/22 July CN 3516 1 large merchant ship, course 170°, moderate speed.

3) 1719/22 July CN 3172 6 large merchant ships, 3 small ships, course 10°, high speed.

4) 1719/22 July CN 2396 3 large ships, course 10°, high speed.

5) 1725/22 July CN 2367 3 large, 2 small units, course 230°, high speed.

6) 1726/22 July CN 2353 2 medium-sized units, course 60°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 10 July 15 ships, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers put in to Haifa from Port Said.

2) 19 July 1 American aircraft carrier carrying about 60 aircraft, 8 merchant ships, 6 torpedoboats, 4 American submarines, 1 flotilla of M.T.B.s put out from Benghazi for Malta.

Like all agents' reports from the Eastern Mediterranean, these cannot be relied on.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) was requested to report his position. The boat reported at 0414/23 July from CN 3282.

U 81 (Krieg) reported a success and has commenced his return passage to Pola as he has used all his torpedoes.

The boats received reports of the following enemy movements:

2303/22 July as in III.B.b.3.
0050/22 July as in III.A.d.

The boats received reports of the situation in Sicily and on the Eastern Front.

V. a) Successes:

At 1714 on 22 July, U 81 (Krieg) scored two hits on a freighter of 5,000 G.R.T. 15 miles southeast of Syracuse. She was not observed to sink but having sustained 2 hits, it can be assumed that she probably did.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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23 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 565 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 371 CH 63 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 31,
U 81 CK 77 (homeward bound),
U 453 CK 44 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 505 put in to Toulon at 0815 on 23 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 593, 617.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Sicilian Channel.
Reconnaissance from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A) Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1852/23 July CH 9663 8 merchant ships, 4 or 5 escort vessels, course 90°.

2) 1820/23 July CJ 7911 4 freighters, 1 destroyer, stationary.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1430/23 July Gibraltar 9 freighters, 1 tanker, 2 destroyers, 3 corvettes.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0315/23 July CN 3611 5 ships, course 280°.

2) 0340/23 July CN 3538 9 large ships, course 320°, moderate speed.

3) 1245/23 July east of Malta 6 medium-sized naval vessels, course 330°, moderate speed.

4) 1250/23 July CN 2118 1 battleship, stationary.

5) 1345/23 July CN 3231 5 destroyers, 3 corvettes, 1 M.T.B., 1 minesweeper, 3 auxiliary naval vessels, 43 landing craft (tank), 5 motor-boats.

6) 1227 23 July 3 miles east of Mersa Scirocco, 4 freighters, 3 escort vessels, northeasterly course.

7) 1345/23 July CN 3231 5 destroyers, 3 corvettes.

8) 1230/23 July Licata 15 medium-sized merchant ships, 10 large landing craft, stationary.

9) 0245/24 July CJ 8882 7 ships, course 0°.

10) 0250/24 July CN 3379 7 ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Having been seconded to Supermarina, U 371 (Mehl) received as his attack area the area west of the meridian of CJ 7724 concentrating on the east.

U 81 had the route for passage through the Adriatic transmitted to him.

The following reports of enemy movements were passed on to the boats:

2212/23 July as in III.B.b.3.
0333/23 July as in III.B.b.6.
0457/24 July as in III.A.b.1.
0555/24 July as in III.A.d.

A report of the situation in Sicily and on the Eastern Front was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

U 407 (Brüller) scored a hit on 1 probable cruiser at 1337 on 23 July in CN 3254.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 77.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 31,
U 453 CJ 23,
U 81 CK 44.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 453 put in to Pola at 1000 on 24 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 593, 617, 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and the coast of Cyrencaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1235/24 July off Jijelli 2 M.T.B.s, easterly course, high speed.

2) 1815/24 July CJ 7558 1 merchant ship, westerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0407/24 July CN 3243 1 destroyer, northeasterly course, high speed.

2) 1755/24 July off Syracuse 4 freighters, 1 destroyer, making for the harbor.

3) 1820/24 July off Licata 18 merchant ships, 4 destroyers, course 270°, high speed.

The heavy naval vessels were identified as follows by the German Air Force:

Valetta: the "Rodney", the "Nelson", 2 aircraft carriers of the "Illustrious" class.
Mersa Scirocco: 2 battleships probably of the "Warspite" class.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was requested to report his position. The boat reported at 0400/25 July from CN 3188.

U 371 (Mehl) has commenced his return passage to Toulon as the port muffler valve was leaking badly. The boat intends to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0600 on 26 July.

A summary of the situation on the different fronts was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

The report received during the night that an enemy landing had been made near Melito (south of Cape dell Armi) was later amended to a probable withdrawal of agents by torpedoboats.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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25 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 66 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 34,
U 81 CJ 34 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 put in to Pola at 1300 on 25 July.
U 371 put in to Toulon at 0700 on 26 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596, 453.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 593, 617, 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and from the Nile Delta to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1650/25 July CJ 9711 1 probable cruiser, course 90°, speed slight. 1 small naval vessel, course 200°.

2) 1650/25 July CJ 8935 1 probable destroyer, northerly course. 5 probable destroyers, course 200°.

3) 1850/25 July CJ 9711 50 units, easterly course.

4) 0225/26 July CJ 9524 16 probable landing craft, northerly course.

5) 0232/26 July CJ 9555 3 destroyers, westerly course, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) According to an agent's report, an important convoy put out from Western Morocco for the Mediterranean carrying Canadian and colored troops.

2) 0330/25 July Gibraltar 4 steamers, 2 probable destroyers, easterly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Nothing to report.

A report of the situation was passed on to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

As a result of the change of regime in Italy, C-in-C South has ordered the first degree of alarm.

Unimportant documents have been destroyed. Preparations have been made to destroy other documents. Articles of a secret nature and other equipment have been packed to await eventual shipment. Official business continues as usual.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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26 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A) Western Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

B) Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 34.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 596, 453, 81.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 593, 565, 617, 371.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0735/26 July CJ 9135 3 large ships, course 0°, high speed.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

2) 0706/26 July CJ 9568 3 small naval vessels.

3) 0700/26 July CJ 9824 1 freighter, 1 probable escort vessel, course 90°.

4) 0910/26 July 5 miles northwest of Bizerta, 1 transport, northeasterly course, high speed.

5) 1245/26 July CJ 6495 8 small ships, northerly course, speed slight.

6) 2000/26 July CH 7837 1 cruiser, 2 M.T.B.s, 5 freighters, easterly course, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0100/27 July Straits of Gibraltar 6 troopships, 5 escorts, westerly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1450/26 July CO 4425 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers, 8 freighters, course 90°, moderate speed.

2) 1900/26 July off Derna 1 escort vessel, 1 patrol vessel, 2 freighters, westerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio intelligence, there was a convoy in the Syracuse zone in the evening escorted by cruisers, and another in the afternoon probably between Tripoli and Malta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

c) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) was ordered to extend his operational area to the north as far as the latitude of Catania. U 407 was later ordered to proceed to Salamis to undergo repairs there, for as a result of damage sustained from depth charges, the boat can only do deep diving with restrictions.

During the course of the day, reports of the situation on the different fronts as well as of the situation in Sicily were transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

In Sicily, the enemy launched heavy attacks against our northern flank; the situation on the remaining front was unchanged.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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27 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CN 32,
U 375 CN 34.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put out from Toulon for the Western Mediterranean at 2100 on 27 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 565, 593, 617.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 593: 2355/27 July CH 3625 1 submerged submarine.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1025/27 July CJ 7921 3 freighters, westerly course, moderate speed.

2) 1458/27 July CJ 8936 3 freighters, 2 destroyers, 2 small vessels, northerly course, moderate speed.

3) 1817/27 July CJ 8739 5 merchant ships, several escort vessels, easterly course.

4) 2320/27 July CJ 4427 1 ship, nationality and course not identified.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0200/27 July Ceuta large units, probably troopships and 2 destroyers, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0701/27 July CN 3148 2 fast motor minesweepers, southerly course.

2) 0716/27 July south of Gozo 1 merchant ship of 10,000 G.R.T., course and speed not identified.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) Radio traffic between Alexandria, Algiers and Bizerta suggests that preparations for new operations are in progress.

2) The two radio messages transmitted from Malta in the late afternoon of 26 July to Battleship Division Command and to Aircraft Carrier and Cruiser Commands probably indicate that there are important units of the fleet in the waters of the Central and Eastern Mediterranean.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

1) U 593 (Kelbling) reported an enemy submarine as in III.A.a.

2) As it is still difficult to obtain a clear picture of Italian internal political affairs it would seem wise to move the boats out of Italian ports as quickly as possible. U 81, 596 and 453 are lying in Pola. According to enquiries made at the U-boat base, the repairs being carried out on U 81 and U 453 should take about a week. The date of completion for U 596 is 5 August. As a result of these facts and considerations, Pola received the following orders:

U 453 and U 81 are only to undertake a rapid overhaul and all repairs that are not urgently required will be postponed. They are to be equipped in such a way that they could put out at very short notice if specially ordered. After supplies etc. have been taken on, the crews will be allowed some time off.

U 596 is to be made ready as quickly as possible. At the same time Salamis was notified that it will be probably very shortly required to accommodate up to 3 boats.

Of the 2 boats in Spezia, U 616 will be putting out on 28 July, whereas U 410 will probably be ready for operations on 7 August.

3) An extract from the situation report of the various sectors of the front in Sicily and Italy was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

1) Captain U-boats Italy was informed by C-in-C South of special measures as well as of orders from C-in-C Navy which will not be dealt with in the War Diary.

2) The following teleprint message was received from C-in-C U-boats:

"Immediate for C-in-C Navy. Inform C-in-C Navy and C-in-C U-boats (Operations) through Naval Headquarters (Wolfsschanze) of operational plans for U-boats ready to operate in the next 10 days."

Captain U-boats Italy replied as follows:

"Up to and including 6 August the following will be ready for operations: 7 boats of which I intend to have 3 operate in the Western Mediterranean, 3 off Sicily and 1 off Cyrenaica. The first 3 boats ready for operations are to be used first of all for operation "Junge"."

These decisions have been made as a result of the following considerations:

Air reconnaissance reveals that ships, covering forces and landing craft are being withdrawn from the coast of Sicily as is proved by the fact that the boats off Sicily have not obtained any successes. The situation, therefore, no longer justifies boats operating in this sea area exclusively. On the other hand, reports from agents and air reconnaissance revealed that heavy traffic was once again running in both the Western and Eastern Mediterranean; this, together with the fact that Malta is heavily occupied by transports and landing craft, suggests that the enemy is about to launch new operations.

Whilst allowing a few boats to remain off the coast of Sicily, it is thought advisable to send U-boats to operate in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean again.

(Signed) Kreisch.

28 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 14 (homeward bound),
U 375 CN 34.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 616 put out from Spezia at 1900 on 28 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and the Nile Delta as far as the sea area of Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1425/28 July CJ 7935 10 landing craft (tank), 350 G.R.T. each, westerly course, moderate speed.

2) 1425/28 July CJ 9832 20 small ships, easterly course, speed slight.

3) 1430/28 July CJ 7698 6 M.T.B.s, southerly course, high speed.

4) 1625/28 July CJ 7681 20 probable landing craft (infantry), westerly course, speed slight.

5) 1500/28 July CJ 8937 9 large and 1 small ship, course 90°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) intends to cross 35° N to the north at 2000 on 29 July and to be at the rendezvous off Salamis at 0600.

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was granted freedom of action to the north as far as the latitude of Catania.

A report of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

C-in-C South cancelled the first degree of alarm at 2350 on 28 July.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 (outward bound),
U 616 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 27 (homeward bound),
U 375 CN 35.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put out from Toulon at 1600 on 29 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1525/29 July CH 9554 9 merchant ships not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, course 80°.

2) 1855/29 July northeast of Bizerta 1 destroyer, southerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1100/27 July Cape Tres Forcas 7 large ships, probably freighters, making for the Mediterranean.

2) 1230/29 July Gibraltar approximately 53 medium-sized laden steamers, 1 medium-sized transport, 3 destroyers, 3 gunboats, 1 minelayer.

3) 2000/29 July Gibraltar 10 steamers, making for the Mediterranean.

4) 2000/29 July Gibraltar 22 medium-sized steamers, easterly course.

5) 1800/29 July 1 aircraft carrier of the "Illustrious" class and 4 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the east.

6) 1000-1100/29 July Ceuta 60 ships, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1615/29 July CO 5941 8 freighters, 1 tanker, 4 escort vessels, easterly course, low speed.

2) 1800/29 July Susa 6 fairly large, 9 small merchant ships, putting in to port.

3) 1830-2015/29 July 2½ miles east of Avola 6 large and 8 small ships.
10 miles southeast of Augusta 10 large and 28 smaller ships, southerly course.
7½ miles northeast of Augusta 5 ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) received port entering instructions for Salamis.

A report of the situation was passed on to the boats.

The following reports of enemy movements were passed on to the boats:

1426 as in III.A.d.6.
1902 as in III.A.b.1.
0029 as in III.A.d.2.
0458 as in III.B.b.3.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Our aircraft report that there is now far less enemy activity off the coast of Sicily and also that merchant shipping tonnage in Malta has fallen by more than half. On the other hand, heavy shipping traffic is once again running through the Straits of Gibraltar from the Atlantic. Convoy traffic has also considerably increased in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is, therefore, once again of the utmost importance that U-boats should operate in the Western Mediterranean as well as off the coast of Cyrenaica.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593,
U 616 CH 69 (outward bound),
U 371 CH 63 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CK 89 (homeward bound),
U 375 CN 35.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 407 put in to Salamis at 0900 on 30 July.
U 371 put in to Toulon at 0700 on 31 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, from the Nile Delta to Ras Amer.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0916/30 July CJ 8936 1 destroyer, course 150°.

2) 0918/30 July off Palermo 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 1 probable landing ship (tank), 3 landing craft (infantry), 2 minesweepers.

3) 1631/30 July CJ 7478 5 transports not exceeding 25,000 G.R.T., 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, course 90°.

4) 1658/30 July CH 9523 2 destroyers, course 270°.

5) 1705/30 July CH 9525 5 destroyers, course 100°.

6) 0235/31 July CJ 8919 1 ship.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0900/30 July CN 2338 7 landing craft, course 330°, moderate speed; 12 landing craft and escort vessels, course 150°, moderate speed.

2) 1635/30 July CO 5822 1 medium-sized freighter, 1 gunboat, easterly course, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

28 July Mersin: Greek steamers "Manoula" and "Palaestina".

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 371 (Mehl) has commenced the return passage to Toulon and intends to be at the rendezvous at 0530 on 31 July.

The position of our minefields off Palermo and a summary of the situation were passed on to the boats at sea.

Reports of enemy movements as in III.A.b.3-5 were passed on to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing special to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

CONFIDENTIAL

31 July 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593,
U 616.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 375 CN 32.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 453 put out from Pola at 1530 on 31 July.
U 371 put out from Toulon at 1830 on 31 July.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 371, 458, 565, 617.
4) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

a) Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

b) Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1545/31 July CJ 8935 5 troopships, 50,000 G.R.T., course 90°.

2) 1546/31 July CJ 8836 5 merchant ships of 10,000 G.R.T. and 6 ships of 5,000 G.R.T. each, mean course 90°, moderate speed.

3) 2115/31 July CH 9157 10 boats.

4) 0205/1 August CJ 9724 about 5 large ships, westerly course, moderate speed.

5) 0220/1 August CJ 9718 3 small ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1815/30 July Gibraltar: 2 British freighters of approximately 6,000 G.R.T. each, 1 "Agathe" class escort, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1440/31 July CP 7255 1 freighter, 1 escort vessel, course 260°, moderate speed.

2) 1441/31 July CP 7264 4 freighters, 2 escort vessels, course 90°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

29 July Beirut: 4 ships were sighted coming from the south; 2 of them put in to port while the other 2 proceeded to the north escorted by 1 motorboat and 1 other ship.

e) By naval forces:

There are escort forces in CJ 9858 (Strait of Messina), 2 destroyers, northerly course, moderate speed.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was requested to report his position. No report was received.

Summaries of the situation in Sicily, abroad and at home were transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

Synopsis for July 1943

I. During the first week of July, the enemy continued to make preparations for an offensive against Europe. The transfer of landing craft from North African ports and the concentration of troops on the north coast of Tunisia, including airborne and paratroop units, suggested that:

1) the landing would probably start as early as July,

2) as had already been presumed earlier, the enemy would try to invade Europe via Sicily.

Both assumptions have been confirmed. On 9 July, the Axis powers recognized the first signs of the start of an offensive against Sicily. It has been established that neither the movement of at least 4 battleships and 2 aircraft carriers eastwards through the Sicilian Channel nor the exceptionally heavy shipping concentration in Malta were spotted by air reconnaissance, and that the enemy was able to bring up, unnoticed throughout the first stage of its journey, a large fleet of landing craft.

The plans of the enemy were soon made evident. The main points were as follows:

a) The simultaneous arrival of all available landing craft together with those assembled in the areas of Tunisia and Malta.

b) The fleet of transports was to follow on immediately behind.

c) The harbors no longer occupied were to be filled with landing craft and transports from the Western Mediterranean harbors further to the west.

d) The landing to be made on a continuous coastal strip with all the forces of the first wave being used. There were to be no isolated, smaller offensives on a number of points along the Sicilian coast, but all forces were to be concentrated on the area in question.

e) The fleet of landing craft and transports was to be covered by light and medium naval forces.

f) Wing protection was to be provided by heavy naval forces.

g) The traffic in the triangle formed by Sardinia, Sicily and the north coast of Tunisia was to be protected from Italian surface forces by heavy naval forces.

h) Withdrawal of landing craft for further operations.

The enemy decided to carry out the operation on the coastal strip between Licata and Augusta.

II. In connection with the operations of our own boats, the following conclusions were reached from a study of the points listed in I.a)-h) and also from the fact that the available landing craft in use made it obvious that further simultaneous operations against other points were not to be expected immediately as the landing craft not in operation at the moment would have been insufficient for this task:

a) U-boat operations had to be concentrated at landing places chosen by the enemy.

b) Once the area named in a) had been occupied in sufficient strength, the boats were to operate south of Sardinia off the North African coast, against subsequent traffic.

c) Boats available beyond there were to operate off the coast of Cyrenaica between Derna and Benghazi against any reinforcements which might be putting out from the east.

As a result of the operational areas being heavily occupied during the second half of June, only 6 of the 17 boats available were at sea when the landing began. Of these, 2 boats were in the western part of the Western Mediterranean east of Gibraltar and 2 boats in the center of the Western Mediterranean. 1 boat was in the Tyrrhenian Sea bound for the Eastern Mediterranean. 1 boat was lying off the coast of Cyrenaica between Derna and Benghazi; he had used up most of his torpedoes and as a result of damage sustained from depth charges, the depth of his diving was restricted.

There would have been little point in bringing up the 2 boats operating east of Gibraltar as these boats had reached the limit of their endurance and would have had to proceed dead slow over the long distance.

The boats in the center of the Western Mediterranean were to be withdrawn as far as possible to the east in order to operate against the supply traffic south of Sardinia, off the African coast. It proved impossible to carry out this plan, because

1) U 409 was lost,

2) U 371 had to commence his homeward passage on 10 July.

The boat outward bound in the Tyrrhenian Sea and the one lying off the coast of Cyrenaica were put into operation off the coast of Sicily.

2 boats put out from Toulon on 12 and 13 July respectively. These, together with the boat which put out from Salamis on 14 July, were destined for the Sicilian area. Of the boats that put out from Toulon, one was lost in the Strait of Messina.

III. Although Command was now roughly able to guess the point where the enemy would probably attack as well as the rapidly approaching moment when he was likely to start operations, it proved impossible to occupy an area that was only suspected, and one that would only become of importance to our U-boats at a time yet to be determined by the enemy. For to occupy an area that would only become an operational area after an indefinite period of time had elapsed, meant practically speaking that the effective U-boat warfare being carried out in the Mediterranean would have had to be abandoned for an uncertain period. It was, therefore, decided not to occupy the Sicilian sea area in advance.

The 42,000 G.R.T. of shipping sunk during the period from 1 to 10 July in the Western Mediterranean, in my opinion, justified the operation even when surveyed in retrospect, and indeed despite the fact that it was unfortunate that no boats were on the scene when the landings began, i.e. at the most favorable moment. The first boat only reached the enemy landing area on 11 July.

The results so far achieved by our boats during the Sicilian campaign can only be described as being singularly poor. For in the first instance other operational areas offered the following advantages:

a) The large number of targets including heavy naval units.

b) Negligible patrols and attacks on U-boats.

c) The absence of location gear operating from the land.

d) Owing to the large number of vessels, the location gear of aircraft and naval forces was unable to operate.

These advantages were bound to diminish daily. The main drawbacks to the advantages of operating in this area were as follows:

a) The short approach route of the enemy.

b) The obstacles provided by our own mines off:

1) the Sicilian coast,

2) around Malta,

3) in the Sicilian Channel.

c) Operating in shallow water.

To these must now be added the patrolling of the area which has been organized, and intensified attacks on boats.

IV. During the course of the month, the enemy gained control of most of Sicily. All captured harbors and suitably situated landing points were used to the full to supply troops and to maintain fighting efficiency. In addition, the coastal strips still in our hands were bombarded by medium and heavy naval units at sea.

Supply traffic ran as follows:

1) In large convoys through the Western Mediterranean along the routes frequented. They were probably covered by another battleship (probably American) and cruisers brought up for that purpose.

2) In smaller convoys along the coast of Cyrenaica through the Eastern Mediterranean until they were level with Benghazi and then to Malta.

In addition to these operations, preparations for the launching of new landing operations could be detected although it was still impossible to surmise conclusively from which direction the attack would come. It is believed that this attack will be launched against Calabria.

According to the latest reports available, merchant shipping traffic in the eastern part of the Eastern Mediterranean off the coasts of Syria, Palestine and Egypt has increased.

Although a survey of the harbors in this part of the Mediterranean revealed them to be heavily occupied by merchant shipping, no preparations for a landing operation could be detected. Alexandria, Port Said and Suez were particularly heavily occupied.

V. The following considerations in connection with the subsequent operation of our U-boats result from the information given above:

a) Traffic will also be stopping in the future in the area around Sicily and repeated appearances of medium and heavy naval units must also be anticipated. Although it has been established that the amount of traffic in operation is now less than it was during the first fortnight after the commencement of the landing and although it has become very difficult to carry out operations, it would seem worthwhile to put a few boats into operation.

b) Enemy traffic in the Western Mediterranean is more likely to increase than to decrease, for in order to keep up the supply of war materials required for the fighting and to meet the needs of his troops stationed in the Mediterranean area, the enemy will be choosing the shortest route between the port of loading and the port of destination.

It must also be anticipated that merchantmen and damaged units will be returning in numbers equal to those used to carry out supplies.

c) Most of the war materials being sent out from Egyptian ports will be dispatched to Sicily via Malta or else further into the Eastern Mediterranean should it be decided to undertake a landing operation there.

The occupation of the sea area, mainly off the coast of Cyrenaica, must take into account the number of boats available. It should prove as rewarding as before.

d) Although the evidence in our possession shows that results were to be expected there, the area off the coast of Cyrenaica and Cyprus will now have to be abandoned owing to the small number of boats available. It will be occupied in August by 1 boat whose Commander and first watchkeeping officer have been changed so that they cannot therefore be immediately called on to operate in the difficult areas of the Western Mediterranean and off the coast of Sicily.

e) The reasons given in the War Diary, dated 7 July, prevent us from attacking the enemy by means of a minelaying operation off the heavily occupied harbors of Alexandria and Port Said.

VI. As a result of the development of the situation in Sicily, the following problem must now be considered in addition to those listed above. The loss of Sicily will make it impossible to pass through the Strait of Messina, which even now is very difficult, if not suicidal, as indeed has already been proved by the loss of U 561 and the constant threat of British M.T.B.s and fighter-bomber attacks. At the moment, the route through the Sicilian Channel is considered to be the safer of the two, though even this does not provide an easy passage.

We know the position of our own minefields in the Channel and for all practical purposes it can be assumed that some of these - principally those in the center of the Channel - have now disappeared. Italian U-boats have passed through the Channel from east to west.

Through radio intelligence and through the sailing directions issued by the enemy to Italian repatriation ships and to Red Cross ships, routes have been discovered that are still comparatively safe to follow. It is not certain how long these conditions will prevail. Apart from the 4 boats at the moment in the Eastern Mediterranean, it would seem indicated to transfer all subsequent boats from the Western Mediterranean.

The longer the transfer is postponed, the greater the difficulties will be, for as soon as the enemy has the time and materials he will complete the minefields laid by the Axis powers.

Given a sufficient number of forces, it has been proved that the enemy could very successfully be resisted in the Eastern Mediterranean.

This consideration leads to the following conclusions:

a) that boats should be transferred from the Western Mediterranean to the Eastern Mediterranean now, and

b) that boats should be transferred from the Atlantic in order to make up the numbers lately sadly depleted by sinkings.

VII. The report made by the two Commanders who were operating in the area due east of Gibraltar during June and the early days of July showed that the unsuccessful nature of this undertaking could be ascribed neither to the appearance of special and hitherto unknown circumstances nor to difficult operational conditions. The two boats were simply unlucky in their undertaking. Opportunities of attacking battleships and aircraft carriers were ruined by unexpected occurrences - for instance the formation would turn sharply away just as they were about to open fire, or else they found themselves out of range, etc.

The reports of the Commanders show that:

a) The area east of Gibraltar is definitely less heavily defended than many other operational areas.

b) The boats can remain there over a considerable period of time without experiencing undue strain.

c) There were opportunities for attacks.

On the strength of these reports it would seem indicated to have one or if possible two boats operate in the area as soon as there are sufficient boats available.

VIII. Details of new enemy anti-submarine measures have not yet been received. Most Commanders are continually reporting that they suspect the existence of location gear either on the Balearic Islands themselves or on vessels in close proximity to them.

These suspicions are partly based on rough bearings. This point has been separately discussed elsewhere.

IX. The number of boats in July was the following:

Date	In the Western Med.	In the Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In Port	Total
1	5	2	2	1	7	17
2	5	1	-	3	8	17
3	5	1	-	3	8	17
4	5	1	1	3	7	17
5	4	1	-	3	9	17
6	4	1	1 0700	3	8	17
7	4	1	1	1	10	17
8	5	1	1	-	10	17
9	4	1	1	1	10	17
10	4	1	2	1	9	17
11	3	2	2	1	9	17
12	3	2	2	1	9	17 (with U 561)
13	3	2	1	-	10	16
14	3	3	-	-	10	16
15	3	3	1	-	9	16
16	3	3	1	-	9	16
17	3	4	-	-	9	16
18	2	4	-	1	9	16 (less U 409)
19	2	3	-	2	9	16
20	2	3	-	2	9	16
21	2	3	-	1	10	16
22	1	3	-	2	10	16
23	-	2	1	3	10	16
24	1	2	-	2	10	15
25	-	2	-	2	11	15
26	-	2	-	-	13	15
27	-	1	-	1	13	15
28	-	1	1	1	12	15
29	1	1	1	1	11	15
30	1	1	2	1	10	15
31	2	1	-	-	12	15

In the various periods the average disposition of the boats was:

From	In the Western Med.	In the Eastern Med.	Outward & homeward bound	In Port
1-10	4·5	1·1	2·8	8·6
11-20	2·7	2·9	1·4	9·2
21-31	0·7	1·7	1·7	11·1

Daily average for the month:

	In the Western Med.	In the Eastern Med.	Outward & homeward bound	In Port
	2·6	1·9	2·0	10
(which equals	16·2%	11·9%	12·5%	62·5%

The following successes were obtained in July 1943:

Serial No.	Boat	No.of ships sunk	G.R.T.	No.of ships torpedoed	G.R.T.
1	U 81	1 transport	12,000		
		1 freighter	5,000		
2	U 371	1 tanker	10,000		
		1 freighter	8,000		
3	U 375	1 freighter	8,000		
4	U 407			1 cruiser (possible)	
5	U 453	1 freighter	8,000		
6	U 593	1 freighter	8,000		
		7 merchant ships	59,000	1 cruiser (possible)	

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 AUGUST, 1943

PG/30932

1 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593,
U 616,
U 371 CH 63 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 375 CN 32,
U 453 CJ 38 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 put out from Pola at 1330/1 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 81, 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
4) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, the coast of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1110/1 August	CJ 9485	10 unidentified units, course 90°.
2) 0950/1 August		4 freighters, 5 escort vessels, easterly course, off Bizerta harbor.
3) 1658/1 August	CJ 8893	5 small ships, course and speed not known.

4) 1730/1 August CJ 8935 small surface vessels, mean course 120°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

At the moment an aircraft carrier of the "Illustrious" class is lying in dock in Gibraltar with starboard side damaged (the gash is about 4 meters long). Cause: direct hit from a torpedo.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1820/1 August 1 freighter of 5,000 G.R.T., 3 landing ships (tank) putting out from Augusta.

2) 1828/1 August off Syracuse 4 ships in line abreast, northerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was for the second time requested to make a position report. No report was received. Instructions of the route to be followed through the Sicilian Channel and a summary of the situation were transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Between 1400 and 2200/1 August the 1st degree of alarm was ordered by C-in-C South.
In view of the present situation, the route through the Strait of Messina is no longer safe, for it is being constantly threatened by enemy air attacks and M.T.B.s. The route through the Sicilian Channel should be used in preference. The minefields in the

center of the Channel were laid over two years ago and because of the currents prevailing there and the relatively deep water, it is more than likely that most of them have disappeared by now. The route transmitted to the boats has been so plotted that they will only have to sail through a single minefield where the mines were laid at a depth-setting of 3 meters in June 1941. To ensure a safe passage, the boats are to sail through it submerged at a depth of 50 meters.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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2 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593,
U 616,
U 371.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 375 CF 32,
U 453 CK 72 (outward bound),
U 81 CJ 62 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 73 put out from Toulon for the Western Mediterranean at 2000 on 2 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 73, 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
4) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and the Nile Delta as far as Ras Amer.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1747/2 August 6 large landing craft, making for Palermo harbor.

2) 1815/2 August CJ 7931 60 freighters, easterly course.

3) 1845/2 August CJ 8939 2 large merchant ships, easterly course, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 453: CK 7527 8 enemy aircraft.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0345/2 August CJ 8923 5 to 8 merchant ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., course 90°, speed slight.

2) 1518/2 August CO 9228 12 medium-sized freighters, 7 escorting vessels, course 100°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

31 July the Greek steamer "Thinasio Nomikos" put out from Iskanderun.
2 or 3 August the following steamers were ready to put out: the Norwegian steamer "Fernplanet", making for Port Said laden with 6,000 tons of chrome, and the Greek steamer "Margarita" making for Beirut in ballast.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (v. Schlippenbach) received as his attack area the area off the coast of Sicily between Taormina and Licata and the area around Malta. He was instructed to evade anti-U-boat activities by constantly changing the position of his attack areas.
U 375 was again requested to report his position. The gravest concern was felt about the boat as it had failed to report after having been requested to do so three times.
The area between the latitude of Taormina and 37° 35' N and between 15° 20' and 16° E was closed to the boats because the Italian Navy was carrying out anti-submarine measures there.
A summary of the situation on the different fronts was transmitted to the boats.
The report of the enemy sighting as in III a b) 2) was transmitted to the boats.
The sailing of U 458 (Diggins) (scheduled for 2 August) had to be postponed owing to a case of dysentry on board.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

1) Naval Group South had repeatedly urged German Naval Command Italy to allow E.M.S. (periscope mines) also to be laid by our own U-boats in the Eastern Mediterranean. Group South announced that this operation would bring the following advantages:

a) When the enemy discovers the mines laid by the U-boat in his previous operational area, he will begin carrying out very vigorous anti-U-boat measures even though the boat will have already left the operational area by then.

b) Should the seeming periscope be eventually rammed the ramming vessels will at the very least be damaged.

2) The attitude of Captain U-boats to this was as follows:

to 1) a) We do not agree with Group South that we would gain from this proposed operation. It would be of no advantage to Captain U-boats, if while a certain area was temporarily unoccupied, a highly intensified anti-submarine hunt was carried out, for this patrol would eventually be rewarded when another boat started to operate

in this area. We consider that it would be far more valuable if the anti-submarine hunt were discontinued, once the operational area became unoccupied.

to 2) a) The enemy has considerable experience in anti-U-boat patrol; he will soon discover that the mines are dummies and he will not sustain the losses and damage that are anticipated.

3) The following remarks are made in connection with the suggestion that U-boats should carry out minelaying operations:

a) It would be very difficult to find accommodation for mines in a boat fully equipped for operations against the enemy. Normal equipment alone always took up all available space on a U-boat and now that the stock of ammunition has been increased in an effort to strengthen anti-aircraft defenses, and that double the former quantity of potash cartridges and additional life saving gear have been issued, available space has been reduced to less than a minimum.

b) During the process of bringing the mines up from inside the boat through the conning tower hatch to the upper deck, the boat would be unable to dive for a certain time thereby creating an intolerable situation in view of the strong air patrols operating over the whole of the Mediterranean.

c) As the U-boats are constantly having to submerge to great depths it would be impossible to stow the mines on the upper deck because they were not designed to stand up to intense hydrostatic pressure.

d) In general the following apply:

Because the enemy air force is making U-boat operations very difficult and because the number of boats has declined very sharply, the boats must not involve themselves in any risk or operation not directly necessary to the prosecution of U-boat warfare.

e) It is therefore considered inadvisable that U-boats should carry out minelaying operations.

4) There are, on the other hand, no objections to periscope mines being laid in the areas off the east coast of Tunisia not patrolled by our own U-boats and also in the area inside the 200 meter line off Alexandria as far as Port Said. This type of mine could be very useful there, particularly if it were to cause the enemy to intensify his anti-U-boat measures. The mines would have to be dropped by aircraft.

(Signed) Kreisch.

3 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593,
U 616,
U 371,
U 73 CH 63 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 33 (outward bound).
U 81 CK 75 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
4) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the Algiers sea area.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1255/3 August 11 landing ships (tank), 1 destroyer, 3 guardboats, easterly course, putting out from Palermo.

2) 1258/3 August CJ 8936 several merchant ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., 2 guard-boats, course 90°.

3) 1334/3 August CJ 8854 1 destroyer, course 10°.

4) 1600/3 August CJ 8762 2 merchant ships not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers, northeasterly course, speed slight.

5) 1915/3 August CJ 9732 several units, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Radio traffic in the Algiers - Malta area together with the movements observed suggests that a special enemy operation is either being prepared or carried out.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report a damaged aircraft carrier (probably the "Formidable") is said to be undergoing temporary repairs in Gibraltar which should last about 8 weeks. She will then proceed to Philadelphia to be repaired there. Altogether she will be out of action for about 4 months.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0735/3 August CP 6177 1 freighter of approximately 5,000 G.R.T., 1 freighter of approximately 3,500 G.R.T., southerly course.
CP 6417 1 freighter of approximately 1,000 G.R.T.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Kreig) received as his attack area, the area between the meridians of CO 4665 and 5585.

U 73 (Deckert) was ordered to proceed from CH 6925 via CJ 7219 and CJ 8731 to CJ 8595. It is intended to have the boat operate off the north coast of Sicily.
Further attack areas were allotted as follows:

U 593 (Kelbling) off the north coast of Sicily between the meridians of CJ 8934 and 9735.
U 371 (Mehl) between the meridians of CJ 7865 and CH 9665.
U 616 (Koitschka) in the adjoining grid square to the west as far as the meridian of CH 9445.
At 0511/4 August the boats received reports on the enemy as in III A b) 1) - 5).
The boats also received a summary of the situation on different fronts including the home front.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593,
U 616,
U 371,
U 73 CJ 74 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 34,
U 81 CO 19 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
4) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0848/4 August CJ 9495 1 large freighter.

2) 1140/4 August CJ 9728 2 destroyers, course 80°, high speed.

3) 1605/4 August CJ 9722 2 destroyers, westerly course, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0925/4 August Gibraltar: 13 medium-sized steamers escorted by 8 light units and 2 tugs, easterly course.

2) a) A battleship of the "King George V" class is expected to dock in Gibraltar to undergo repairs and to have the barrels of her medium caliber guns changed.

b) The "Nelson" is supposed to be going to Britain to have her heavy guns repaired.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

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b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1145/4 August CJ 9883 1 battleship, 2 destroyers bombarded Taormina.

2) 1238/4 August CN 3257 3 destroyers, course 350°, high speed.

3) 1230/4 August CN 3534 2 special freighters, 2 destroyers, 1 landing ship (tank), 2 landing craft (infantry) 45°, high speed.

4) 1900/3 August 30 miles southeast of Syracuse, 10 large freighters, 2 destroyers, southerly course.

5) 1214/4 August Valetta harbor: 4 battleships (the "Rodney", the "Nelson" and probably 2 of the "Warspite" class), 1 aircraft carrier of the "Illustrious" class, 4 cruisers, 22 destroyers, 5 submarines.

6) 0740/4 August CN 9735 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, northerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1430/4 August the Norwegian steamer "Fernlande" put out from Alexandretta.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 73 (Deckert) intends to be in CJ 8731 at 0500 on 6 August.
The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1020/4 August as in III B b) 4).
1149/4 August as in III A d) 1).

1448/4 August as in III B b) 6).
1820/4 August as in III B b) 2).
0345/5 August as in III B b) 5).
1908/4 August as in III B b) 1).
2229/4 August as in III A b) 3).

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats at sea.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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5 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CJ 85,
U 616 CH 96,
U 371 CJ 77,
U 73 CJ 75.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 35,
U 81 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
4) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily from Alexandria to Benghazi, Malta.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1712/5 August CH 9446 30 large merchant ships, a number of escorting vessels, course 270°, moderate speed.
CH 9467 12 light naval forces, course 270°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to repor
e) By naval forces:)

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 453: 1127/5 August CN 3273 1 battleship, 6 destroyers, course 200°.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0705/5 August CO 4157 40 medium-sized merchant ships, 10 escorting vessels, course 150°.
2) 1215/5 August CJ 9881 2 cruisers and 5 destroyers shelled the coast.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 73 (Deckert) received orders not to cross to the east of the Cape Carbonaza (Sardinia) - Cape San Vito (Sicily) line until further notice. Reason: Italian cruisers and destroyers are carrying out an operation against Palermo from Maddalena during the night of 6/7 August.
For the same reason U 593 (Kelbling) received orders to withdraw from the coast and to remain unobserved.
Until German U-boats are once again permitted to operate in the operational area off the north

coast of Sicily, U 73 receives CJ 8810 and 8820 as his attack area.
At 2300/4 August U 593 reported from 7612 that he has commenced return passage to Toulon because the boat has sustained considerable damage through gunfire from an enemy fighter and also because the depth of diving is now restricted.
U 453 (von Schlippenbach) reported a battleship and 6 destroyers at 1127/5 August, in CN 3273. An unsuccessful fan of four was fired at the port escort and 2 torpedo detonations heard approximately 8 minutes later. The damaged enemy unit reported by the Italian radio intercept service was probably the one involved in this attack. The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1054/5 August as in III B b) 1).
1414/5 August as in III B b) 2).
2126/5 August as in III A b).

An extract from the situation report together with details of the number of ships in enemy-occupied Sicilian and Maltese ports was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

In Sicily Catania was evacuated.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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6 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CJ 72 (homeward bound),
U 616 CH 96,
U 371 CJ 77,
U 73 CJ 88.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 32,
U 81 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 410 put out from Spezia at 0200 on 7 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Spezia: U 410.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Toulon: U 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
4) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1630/6 August CJ 8939 7 merchant ships not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 5 guardboats, westerly course.

2) 1900/6 August CJ 7934 3 medium-sized ships, westerly course.

3) 1704/5 August Algiers: 2 battleships, class not identified, 1 probable battleship of the "Texas" class, probably the "Lorraine" also.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

The following naval units were in the Mediterranean with the large convoy which passed Ceuta on 29 July at about 1100 (as in War Diary, dated 29 July, III A d) 6): the aircraft carrier "Implacable", the battleship "Duke of York" of the "King George V" class, the American heavy cruisers "Chester" and "Quincy", the British

cruisers "Suffolk" and "Shropshire", the light American cruisers "Fargo", "Galveston" and "Buffalo", 6 American, 6 British anti-submarine torpedoboats.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 81: 0955/6 August CO 5476 eastbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1010/6 August CO 5732 3 freighters, 2 escorting vessels, course 270°.

2) 1725/6 August 14 miles north of Tobruk 1 tanker, easterly course.

3) 0305/7 August CN 3587 5 - 8 ships, course and speed not known.

4) 0345/7 August CN 3284 probably 25 - 30 ships, course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

At 0955 on 8 August in CO 5476, U 81 (Kreig) heard 4 hits in the course of an attack on an eastbound convoy but he observed no results. Details are being asked for. U 81 requested permission to return as the commander and crew are nervous and need a rest. After the two previous operations, the boat lay in port first for 10 and then for 7 days and this time it was only supposed to be putting out for a short operation which caused less urgently needed repairs to be postponed. As the boat will need quite considerable dock repairs, U 81 was ordered to proceed to Pola for a refit.
U 593 (Kelbling) intends to cross the 42° N at 0000 on 8 August and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0800.
The following reports of enemy movements were passed on to the boats:

2034/6 August as in III A b) 1)

2140/6 August as in III A b) 3)
2340/6 August as in III B b) 1).

An excerpt from the situation report was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

U 81 (Kreig) see under IV.

b) Losses:

According to a message from Naval High Command General Navy Department Naval Defense (1A 18314 dated 6 August), 2 officers and 18 more members of the crew of U 97 (Trox) are prisoners of war in British hands.

VI. General situation:

1) The enemy has prescribed a route through the Sicilian Channel for the passage of the Italian repatriation ships coming from East Africa through the Mediterranean. This route is very similar to the one we plotted for the use of our own boats. It always was considered to be the safest and simplest route but as it passed through one of our own minefields laid over two years ago with mines set at minus 3 meters, the boats were instructed to proceed submerged to a depth of 50 meters in areas less than 200 meters deep.

2) The routing instructions now issued by the British Government to the Italian repatriation ships lead to the following considerations:

a) As the enemy must now anticipate that the Axis Powers will be using the route through the Sicilian Channel for U-boats, it is highly likely that he will guard this route which he selected for the repatriation ships, and made public from the U-boats by placing deeply laid mines there. On the other hand it is believed that mines will not be laid for surface vessels as the enemy will be wanting to keep this area open for his Tunisia - Sicily traffic.

b) The fact that the enemy is not taking the repatriation ships through the deep channel of the Sicilian Channel leads to the following conclusions: either the areas mined in their time by the Axis Powers for surface vessels are still effective, or the enemy has himself laid mines in this area, or he himself intends to use this route and therefore does not

wish to impede his own progress. As radio intercept service picked up various routing directions, all avoiding the deep channel, it is presumed that there are mines there. It would therefore be unwise to pass through the Channel on the surface. It is unlikely that there are deeply placed enemy anti-U-boat nets there. It would, therefore, be possible to pass through the deep channel submerged, but the boats would have to dive under our own minefields laid for surface vessels.

3) After weighing up all the pros and cons the following routing direction is considered to be the safest:

From Point	A	38° 30' N, 11° 30' E,
to	B	37° 45' N, 11° 30' E,
to	C	37° 30' N, 11° 32' E,
to	Delta	37° 19' 30" N, 11° 26' 30" E,
to	E	37° 12' 30" N, 11° 40' 30" E,
to	F	37° N, 11° 48' E,
to	G	36° 52' 30" N, 12° E,
to	H	30° 33' N, 12° 40' E.

Where the depth of the section of the route between C and Delta is less than 200 meters, the boats must, for safety, proceed at a depth of 70 meters and between the points 37° 25' 30" N, 11° 25' 30" E and 37° 22' N and 11° 32' 30" E, they will have to dive under one of our own minefields where the mines have lower antenna at 30 meters. Whether this minefield is still in existence is very uncertain as it was laid so long ago. The rest of the route can be followed either on the surface or submerged according to the situation.
The boats received the foregoing instructions.

(Signed) Kreisch.

7 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CJ 47 (homeward bound),
U 606 CH 96,
U 371 CJ 77,
U 73 CJ 8820,
U 410 CJ 16 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 435 CN 32,
U 81 CO 43 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1830/7 August CJ 9735 5 warships, easterly course.

2) 0145/8 August CJ 8697 3 large ships, course 280°, moderate speed.

3) 0240/8 August CJ 8912 4 probable merchant ships, course 90°, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0900/7 August the Italian liners "Vulcania" and "Saturnia" put out from Gibraltar in to the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1900/7 August CN 3229 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, northerly course.

2) 1900/7 August CJ 9889 2 cruisers, southerly course.
Cape Passero: 7 freighters, 25 landing craft.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Kreig) was requested to provide details of the attack on 6 August. U 81 reported a fan of four fired at a group of 10 overlapping steamers of medium size and 4 torpedo detonations 7½ minutes later. Width of spread 150 meters. The boat intends to be at Point Adria at 1300 on 8 August and received instructions for the passage through the Adriatic to Pola.
U 616 (Koitschka), U 73 (Deckert) and U 453 (v. Schlippenbach) were asked to report their positions. The three boats reported as follows: U 616 at 0119 from CH 9288, U 73 at 0325 from CJ 8818 and U 453 at 0401 from CN 3523.

The following reports of enemy sightings were transmitted to the boats:

0321/8 August as in III A b) 2)
0444/8 August as in III B b) 1) and 2)
1836/7 August as in III A d).

A summary of the situation in Sicily, Russia and at home was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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8 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 616 CH 92,
U 371 CJ 77,
U 73 CJ 88,
U 410 CH 63 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 35,
U 81 CK 78 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put in to Toulon at 0900 on 8 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 380, 431, 458, 565, 617.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the Algiers sea area.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Cyrenaica and the sea area of Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 371: 1545/7 August CJ 7737 eastbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0650/8 August CJ 9717 3 large ships, easterly course, 2 ships of 5,000 G.R.T. each, westerly course, high speed.

2) 1345/8 August 6 fairly large, 6 smaller ships, 7 miles southwest of Cape Orlando, off the river mouth.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1330/8 August Gibraltar: 15 ships, 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 2 gunboats, 1 coastal patrol vessel, 1 submarine chaser, easterly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0955/8 August CN 2163 eastbound convoy, 32 medium-sized freighters, course and speed not identified.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

7 August 4 steamers put out from Iskanderun for Beirut on the night of 7/8 August.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Now that German U-boats have again been granted permission to operate in the area off the north coast of Sicily (because Italian naval forces have now finished operating in the area), U 73 (Deckert) received as his attack area the area off the north coast of Sicily between the parallels of CJ 8934 and 9735. U 410 (Fenski) was ordered to proceed to CJ 8595 via CJ 7519 and CJ 8731. He is to operate off the north coast of Sicily; the attack area will be announced later. U 371 (Mehl) reported a success (see V a). Routing instructions for the passage through the Sicilian Channel (as in War Diary, dated 6 August, para. VI) were transmitted to the boats together with a summary of the situation in Sicily, Russia and on the Home Front.

The following reports of enemy sightings were transmitted to the boats:

1337/8 August as in III A b) 1)
1737/8 August as in III B b)
0003/9 August as in III A d).

An enemy reconnaissance aircraft reported a U-boat at 1455 in 45' N (the degree figure was not given), 15° 3' E, course 90°, speed 8 knots. It is probably U 453 (v. Schlippenbach).

V. a) Successes:

At 1545 on 7 August in CJ 7737 (15 miles northeast of Cape de Fer), U 731 (Mehl) sank a freighter of 5,000 G.R.T., belonging to an eastbound convoy and probably scored another hit.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 92, U 371 CJ 77,
U 73 CJ 86, U 410 CH 69 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 35,
U 81 CK 44 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 431 put out from Toulon at 1900 on 9 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 380, 431, 458, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, the Nile Delta as far as Cape Ras Amer.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

1833/10 August CJ 7737 westbound convoy, cruisers.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0840/9 August CJ 7921 5 M.T.B.s, southeasterly course.

2) 1625/9 August CJ 8334 4 light cruisers, 4 destroyers, course 75°, moderate speed. 2 cruisers, 7 large ships outside Palermo harbor. 1 mile outside Marsala harbor.

c) By radio intercept service:

Active radio traffic between Casablanca, Oran and Algiers suggests great convoy activity.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) An agent in Tangiers reported the impending arrival of a squadron of the American fleet in the Mediterranean; several aircraft carriers will join the squadron to strengthen it.

2) 0940/9 August Tangier: 1 freighter of 5,000 G.R.T., 1 probable transport of approximately 4,000 G.R.T. with two funnels, 1 destroyer.

3) 1720/9 August Tangier: 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, making for the Mediterranean, put in to Gibraltar at 1900/9 August.

4) 1445/9 August Tangier: 24 freighters of 5,000 - 7,000 G.R.T., 7 freighters of 2,000 - 4,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers 4 guardboats, making for the Mediterranean. 9 of these ships put in to Gibraltar at 1845/9 August.

5) 1815/9 August Gibraltar: 5 freighters, 1 transport, 1 destroyer, 4 corvettes making for the Mediterranean joined the convoy reported under 3).

c) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0744/9 August CN 3251 4 freighters, course 170°, moderate speed.

2) 0745/9 August CN 3257 3 merchant ships,
5 small ships,
making for Syracuse.

c) By radio intercept service:

There are several convoys between Alexandria and Malta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 371 (Mohl) reported that he fired an unsuccesful fan of four at a cruiser in CJ 7737 at 1833 on 10 August; 4 detonations were heard so that the torpedoes probably hit units of the convoy. The possibility of end of run detonators must not be excluded. The boat has commenced return passage to Toulon with the periscope out of action and intends to be at the rendezvous at 1100 on 11 August.

The following reports of enemy movements were passed on to the boats:

1810/9 August as in III A b) 2),
0030/10 " as in III A b) 2),
0313/10 " as in III A d).

A summary of the situation in Sicily and Russia was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

U 371 (Mohl) see under IV.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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10 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 92,
U 73 CJ 86,
U 410 CJ 75 (outward bound),
U 371 CJ 74 (homeward bound),
U 431 CH 63.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 35,
U 81 CJ 26 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 put in to Pola at 1230 on 10 August.
U 596 put in to Pola at 1400 on 10 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 458, 380, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 596.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily from Alexandria to the Benghazi sea area.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0200/10 August CJ 9855 1 cruiser.

2) 0020/10 August CJ 8934 4 ships.

3) 0750/10 August CJ 8688 4 cruisers, 4 destroyers, westerly course, high speed.

4) 1600/10 August CJ 8934 24 ships, 8 escort vessels, northwesterly course.

5) 1855/10 August CJ 7931 4 tank-landing craft, 350 A, westerly course.

6) 1900/10 August CJ 7829 1 heavy cruiser, westerly course, zigzagging.

7) 0305/11 August CJ 9493 5 ships.

8) 1300/11 August CM 7674 35 units, easterly course, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1645 - 1745/9 August Ceuta: 28 freighters,
3 destroyers,
4 corvettes,
4 guardboats.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0830 - 0910/10 August CJ 9894 1 cruiser, northerly course.
CN 3219 4 small coasting vessels,
CN 3219 1 escort vessel, 1 freighter, northerly course.
CN 3216 5 small coasting vessels, southerly course.

2) 1800/10 August CN 3251 30 - 40 units, northerly course, CJ 9873 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, southerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

After the departure of U 371, U 410 (Fenski) was ordered to operate in the former operational area of U 371 off the coast of North Africa between the meridians of CJ 7865 and CH 9665 instead of off the north coast of Sicily as originally intended.
U 431 (Schoeneboom) has commenced his return passage because his Junkers compressor has broken down. He intends to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0700 on 11 August.
U 455 (v. Schlippenbach) has commenced return passage to Pola owing to miscellaneous damage.
Reports on the enemy were transmitted to the boats as follows:

0841/10 August as in III A d),
1010/10 August as in III A b) 3),

0008/11 August as in III A b) 8),
0100/11 August as in III A b 4) and III B b) 2),
0402/11 August as in III A b) 6).

A summary of the situation in Sicily, Russia, the Far East and at home was transmitted to the boats.
U 458 (Diggins) was to have put out on 2 August. This date will probably have to be put back to 14 August owing to an epidemic of dysentry in the boat. In answer to enquiries made of 29th U-boat Flotilla in Toulon as to whether this period could not be shortened, it was stated that it would be impossible because of the risk of infection and the weakened condition of the crew.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The internal political situation in Italy makes it imperative to find means of providing alternative U-boat bases for those of Pola and Spezia. Although the dockyard at Toulon is at present able to hold the required number of boats it must be taken into account that:
a) it also lies within the Italian sphere of action,
b) it is still liable to air raids,
c) it would be impossible under present circumstances for U-boats in the Eastern Mediterranean to reach Toulon.

Owing to the development of the military situation it is now very dangerous to pass through the Strait of Messina, whereas though not without its difficulties, the Sicilian Channel can still be used at present, but only by boats with full diving capacity. Should it ever be suggested to use the Strait of Messina, the above would apply there also. It therefore seems essential to expand the U-boat base of Salamis so that three boats could be repaired and also completely overhauled in the dockyard at the same time. In order to gauge the material and labor requirements involved, Captain U-boats Italy (Unit Engineer Officer) organized conferences on 2 - 4 August with Admiral Aegean (Dockyard Control Staff), Deutsche Werke Kiel, Deutsche Werke Salamis and with the U-boat base of Salamis. Because Salamis is at the moment unable to carry out major repairs (changing engines, batteries, torpedo tubes, extensive structural repairs), Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, quartermaster department - U-boat section (in Qu AU Most Secret

1984/43 dated 8 August) offered to expand Salamis so that 3 boats could be accommodated there at the same time. The essential material requirement to be concentrated on is the expansion of the Spare Parts Depot so that it can stock spare parts and accessories such as spare engines, batteries, torpedo tubes and constructional sheet metal. It is estimated that about 100 more workmen will be required. It was requested that the material requirements and buildings for the accommodation of the workers should be completed sufficiently to allow them to be brought in as quickly as possible to help with all other necessary preparations.
It must, in addition, be noted that the dockyard of Salamis still lacks any anti-aircraft defenses. But there are at least 2 fairly large tunnels in the rocks which are used as air raid shelters and where stores are also kept. They are bomb proof and could be fitted out as workshops. Whether the existing air raid precautions should be increased is a problem that must be dealt with elsewhere.
The living quarters in Salamis will be able to accommodate three crews quite easily and they are adequately protected from air attack.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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11 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 92,
U 73 CJ 86,
U 410 CJ 74,
U 371 CH 36 (homeward bound),
U 431 CH 33 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CN 33 (homeward bound),
U 596 CJ 62 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 431 put in to Toulon at 0800 on 11 August.
U 371 put in to Toulon at 1200 on 11 August.
U 380 put out from Toulon at 1800 on 11 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 458, 380, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 81.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and from Nile Delta to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

1) U 73: 1943/11 August CJ 9716 1 American cruiser of the "Brooklyn" class, 2 destroyers.

2) U 380: 2355/11 August CH 3653 1 surfaced submarine.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0908/11 August CH 9176 20 - 25 merchant ships, course 200°.

2) 1030/11 August CJ 9723 4 destroyers, westerly course, 2½ miles astern 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers.

3) 1554/11 August CJ 9721 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, westerly course, high speed.

4) 1330/11 August CJ 9882 1 cruiser, 4 escort vessels, westerly course.

5) 1603/11 August CJ 9721 1 heavy cruiser, 1 destroyer, westerly course, high speed.

6) In addition fairly small naval units and landing craft were continually sighted during the course of the day off the north coast of Tunisia, in the Sicilian Channel and off the north coast of Sicily.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to radio traffic there are convoys running between Algiers and Bizerta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0900/9 August Alboran: 18 ships, 3 escorts, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Small naval units and landing craft sighted several times in the sea area south and east of Sicily.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic in the morning there were two convoys or formations in the Benghazi area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 73 (Deckert) was asked to report his position.
U 73 reported a success (see V a).
U 453 (von Schlippenbach) intends to be at Entrance Point Adriatic at 1400 on 12 August and received instructions for the passage through the Adriatic.
U 380 (Roether) reported an enemy submarine as in III A a) 2).
The boats received reports of important enemy sightings as well as extracts from the situation report.

V. a) Successes:

At 1945 on 11 August in CJ 9716, U 73 (Deckert) fired a fan of four torpedoes equipped with non-contact firing units at an American cruiser of the "Brooklyn" class, 2 hits and sinking noises were heard. It can be assumed that the ship was definitely sunk.

b) Losses:

U 409 (Massmann) is temporarily reported missing with effect from 16 July 1943. (Naval War Staff, Second Division/C-in-C U-boats Operations G 8039 A5 dated 10 August).

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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12 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 95,
U 410 CJ 74,
U 73 CJ 97,
U 380 CH 39 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CK 77 (homeward bound),
U 596 CK 72 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 431 put out from Toulon at 1400 on 12 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 371, 431, 458, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 81.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0745/12 August CH 9736 2 large naval units and 1 destroyer were shelling the coast under strong fighter cover.

2) 1550/12 August CJ 8361 4 merchant ships, course 60°, moderate speed.

3) 1015 - 1155/12 August 4 small units 1½ miles northwest of Cape Gallo.
1 destroyer, 1 mile north of Cape Zaffarano, easterly course.
1 cruiser and 3 destroyers 3½ miles west of Cape Cefalu, 10 miles northnorthwest of Cape Orlando, westerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 2130 - 2200/12 August Gibraltar: 1 large steamer, 45 medium-sized steamers, 4 large tankers, 1 destroyer, 8 gunboats coming from the Atlantic, making for the Straits.

2) According to an agent's report the aircraft carrier "Indomitable" is in dock in Gibraltar (see War Diary, dated 3 August, III A d).

3) 0245/13 August Gibraltar: 3 freighters, 1 escort vessel, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 453: 0104/13 August CK 4873 1 submarine.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0645/0810/12 August CN 3212 1 probable light cruiser, making for Catania, stopped.

2) 0750/12 August CN 3254 7 merchant ships, CN 3254, northerly course.

3) 1700/12 August CO 5572 15 medium-sized freighters, 6 escorting vessels, westerly course, moderate speed.

4) 0245/13 August CN 3314 1 merchant ship not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 2 escorts, probably destroyers.

c) By radio intercept service:

0744/12 August CN 2637 convoy or formation was attacked by aircraft.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 596 (Nonn) was ordered to proceed eastwards from CO 5115 via CO 5395 and received as his attack area the area east of 31° E.
U 410 (Fenski) and U 616 (Koitschka) were requested to report their positions. At 0153 U 616 reported from CH 9275. U 410 did not report.
U 453 (v. Schlippenbach) evaded a fan of four fired by an enemy submarine as in III B) a).

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1234/12 August as in III A b) 1).
2052/12 August as in III A b) 2).
0554/13 August as in III A d) 1) and 3).

A summary of the situation in Sicily, in Russia and at home was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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13 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 92,
U 410 CJ 74,
U 73 CJ 97,
U 380 CJ 71 (outward bound),
U 431 CH 63 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CK 45 (homeward bound).
U 596 CO 12 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 371, 458, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 81.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1500/13 August CH 7494 large convoy of 350,000 - 400,000 G.R.T., 8 destroyers and corvettes.

2) 1823/13 August CH 9663 1 tanker of 12,000 - 14,000 G.R.T., 3 destroyers, westerly course.

3) 1835/13 August CJ 7578 8 medium-sized freighters, course 100°.

4) 0640/0805/13 August CJ 8934 4 destroyers or cruisers, westerly course.
CJ 9728 4 merchant ships not exceeding 2,000 G.R.T., course and speed not known.

5) 1750 - 1925/13 August Cape Cefalu 6 transports not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., 1 cruiser, 2 torpedo boats, easterly course.
CJ 9711 5 destroyers, easterly course.

6) 1015/13 August CJ 8871 1 transport, course 30°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0620 - 0750/13 August 5 medium-sized merchant ships, 2 escort vessels, 5 miles eastnorth-east of Augusta. 3 medium-sized warships, southwesterly course, 7½ miles eastnortheast of Syracuse (CN 3251). 3 medium-sized warships, northeasterly course, 6 miles southeast of Syracuse (CN 3282).

2) 1725 - 1855/13 August 9889 1 light cruiser stopped; 2 destroyers and 4 escort vessels cruising around.

3) 1015/13 August CJ 8871 1 transport, course 30°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic there is a convoy on the Benghazi route probably bound for Malta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Roether) intends to be in CJ 8731 at 1000/15 August.
U 410 (Fenski) was asked for the second time to report his position. No report was received.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1301/13 August as in III A b) 4).
2034/13 August as in III A b) 1).
0147/14 August as in III A b) 5).
0545/14 August as in III A b) 2) and 3).

A summary of the situation was also transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

14 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 95,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 73 CJ 97,
U 380 CJ 74 (outward bound),
U 431 CJ 71 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 26 (homeward bound).
U 596 CO 52 (outward bound).

b) U-boats outward and homeward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 453 put in to Pola at 1232 on 14 August.
U 458 put out from Pola at 2000 on 14 August.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 371, 458, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 81.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0850/14 August CJ 7932 1 light cruiser of the "Brooklyn" class, 2 destroyers, westerly course.

2) 1817/14 August CJ 9475 1 probable cruiser formation, course 75°, high speed.

3) 1820/14 August CH 8294 eastbound convoy of 40 ships (possibly the large convoy first sighted yesterday).

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0900/14 August Gibraltar: 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers put out in to the Mediterranean; at 1800 and at 1920 they put in to Gibraltar again.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0810/14 August CN 3213 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, making for Taormina. 3 units making for Catania.

2) 1346/14 August putting out from Augusta and turning away to the south.

3) 1415/14 August Navy at Messina reported 2 cruisers, 3 steamers between 10,000 and 20,000 G.R.T., bearing 195°, 15 miles from Messina; the cruisers were shelling the coast.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, 1 aircraft carrier carrying 40 aircraft, 2 torpedoboats, 3 submarines, 2 M.T.B.s, 1 oil tanker were proceeding from Beirut to Alexandria on 8 August. It is difficult to credit this report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 410 (Fenski) was asked for the third time to report his position. No report was received.
Grave concern is felt for the boat.
U 380 (Roether) received as his attack area the area off the north coast of Sicily between the meridians of CJ 8694 and 9725; U 73 (Deckert) the adjoining area eastward as far as the meridian of CJ 9576.
After having been requested to do so, U 73 reported details of the attack made on the American cruiser of the "Brooklyn" class on 11 August.
U 431 (Schoeneboom) was instructed that he will operate off the northern coast of Sicily, this cancels his sailing orders to proceed through the Sicilian Channel. The boat was ordered to proceed via CJ 8595. U 431 intends to be in CJ 8739 on the morning of 16 August.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1038 and 1232/14 August as in III A d).
1107 and 1907/14 August as in III A b) 1).
2216/14 August as in III A b) 3).

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.
The Italian Navy has cancelled the anti-submarine hunt east of Taormina (see War Diary dated 2 August) and intends to have their own U-boats operate there.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

U 561 (Lieutenant (j.g.) Henning) was reported missing with effect from 12 July 1943. (Naval War Staff, Second Division/C-in-C U-boats (Operations) G. 8045 A 5 dated 12 August).

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 95,
U 73 CJ 97,
U 380 CJ 85 (outward bound),
U 431 CJ 87 (outward bound),
U 458 CH 39 (outward bound),
U 410 CJ 77.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CO 66 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 371, 565, 593.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0145/15 August CJ 9572 2 merchant ships, course 80°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0845/15 August 2 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 6 destroyers put out from Gibraltar into the Mediterranean. At 1600 and 1700 they put in to Gibraltar again.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1030 - 1210/15 August east of Augusta, 1 battleship, making for Catania.

2) 1150/15 August CJ 9858 1 heavy cruiser, 1 light cruiser, easterly course.

3) 1150/15 August CJ 9815 1 destroyer.

4) 1150/15 August CN 3254 4 M.T.B.s, northerly course.

5) 1910/15 August CJ 9884 3 torpedoboats, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

10 August. A fairly large British tanker and a Greek steamer the "Elpi", put in to Iskanderun.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 431 (Schoeneboom), U 380 (Roether), U 73 (Deckert), in that order from west to east received as their attack areas, the area between the meridians of CJ 8694 and 9576 in strips of equal width running from north to south.

A report of enemy movements was transmitted to the boats:

1341/15 August as in III A d).

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Because we now more than suspect that instead of using his own location activity, the enemy is making long-range target approaches, picking up the radiation of U-boat radar interception receiving sets, C-in-C U-boats has forbidden boats in all sea areas to use the receiver.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 AUGUST, 1943

PG/30932

16 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 616 CH 95,
U 73 CJ 98,
U 380 CJ 97,
U 431 CJ 87 (outward bound),
U 458 CH 69 (outward bound),
U 410 CJ 77.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 east of the meridian of 31° E.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as the sea area of Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, the coast of North Africa from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0246/16 August CH 9460 convoy of 50 ships, easterly course.

2) 1338/16 August CH 9662 40 ships, easterly course.

3) 1659/16 August CJ 7746 convoy.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0830/16 August 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier put out from Gibraltar bound for the east. She put in again at 2100 on 16 August.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0320/16 August CJ 9816 30 merchant ships including patrol vessels, course 280°.

2) 1445/16 August CN 3254 11 medium-sized, 1 large merchant ship.

3) A noticeably large number of warship units were sighted during the course of the day in the seas around Sicily, especially off the east coast; there were several cruisers amongst them and at 1445 on 16 August 1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 4 steamers were also sighted, all bound for the south.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 458 received the order to proceed to the attack area in CN 26 via CJ 7519 and CJ 8731 and then along the route through the Sicilian Channel transmitted to the boats and bases on 8 August.

U 596 was warned that enemy aircraft were continually to be anticipated over his entire operational area (east of the meridian of 31° E).

U 616 reported a success (see V.a) and also that he had commenced his return passage because the oxygen supply was exhausted. The boat was ordered to proceed to Toulon.

U 410 (Fenski) reported his position by short signal from CH 9663. U 410 had been requested

to make a position report on 12, 13 and 14 August. No report had been previously received.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1114/16 August as in III.B.b.1.
1432/16 August as in III.A.b.1.
1740/16 August as in III.A.b.2.

The boats received a summary of the situation.

V. a) Successes:

U 616 (Koitschka) reported that a hit was observed on 15 August at 2050 against a fairly large naval vessel and that he heard 2 hits on unidentified units in CH 9537.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

According to the report received from an agent who was supposed to be very reliable, the enemy was making preparations for a landing on Sardinia and Corsica.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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17 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 98,
U 380 CJ 97,
U 410 CH 96,
U 431 CJ 86,
U 458 CJ 76 (outward bound),
U 616 CH 66 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 east of the meridian of 31° E.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 407 put out from Toulon on 17 August at 1600.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 565, 593, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1134/17 August CJ 7916 16 medium-sized freighters, easterly course.

2) 1135/17 August CJ 8779 1 convoy, westerly course.

3) 1755/17 August CH 9592 6 merchant ships (5-10,000 G.R.T.), 2 patrol vessels, course and speed not known.

4) 1800/17 August CH 9655 convoy, 44 units, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0900/17 August 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 6 destroyers put out from Gibraltar, bound for the Mediterranean. At 1845/17 August the formation put in to Gibraltar again after having carried out firing practices east of Gibraltar.

2) 1345/17 August 1 "Dido" class cruiser, 1 French destroyer of the "Aloyan" class put

in from the Atlantic.

3) 1400/17 August 2 aircraft carriers of the "Illustrious" class and 6 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) Naval units, including a cruiser, were repeatedly sighted off the north and east coasts of Sicily.

2) 1 battleship, possibly another battleship, and 7 cruisers were sighted in the outer harbor of Augusta.

3) 1 aircraft carrier and 3 battleships were lying in Malta.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic there were several convoys between Alexandria and Malta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report there were 2 Greek steamers in Mersin which were ready to put out.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

C-in-C U-boats again forbids boats to use the "Metox" radar interception set (see War Diary of 15 August). It is intended to introduce a new apparatus (Hagenuk) which works without emitting radiation. Two of these should arrive in Toulon by 19 August and a further one on 23 August. U 371 (Mehl) will be ready to put out on 18 August but is being kept back in order to have the new apparatus installed. U 407, on the other hand, will be putting out from Salamis on 17 August as planned because it takes a long time to have the new apparatus installed and the boat would have to be withdrawn from operations for too long a period. It is, moreover, possible to operate in the Eastern

Mediterranean without the apparatus because the air patrol is not very heavy there; the order is, therefore, one which can certainly be carried out during a transition period.

Boats at sea are forbidden to use "Metox" and are requested to report should it prove impossible to continue operating in the attack area without using it. Should this be the case, it is planned to withdraw the boats.

The plan to put U 458 (Diggins) into operation in the area west of Malta, which is heavily patrolled from the air, has been abandoned. Instead, U 458 is to be put into operation in the sea area east of Derna and U 407 (Brüller), who had been intended for that area, is to operate east of the meridian of 31° E. U 407 is ordered to proceed to CO 6395 via CO 5295. The boat reported from CO 2974 that he crossed 35° N at 0457 on 18 August. Reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats. They also received a summary of the situation.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The Sicilian Campaign ended today.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 95,
U 380 CJ 97,
U 431 CJ 89,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 458 CJ 88 (outward bound),
U 616 CH 33 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 407 CO 52 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 616 put in to Toulon on 18 August at 0905 after his third operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 565, 593, C17.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and from Alexandria as far as Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1200/18 August CJ 8762 3 ships, course 230°.
CJ 8841 1 ship, course 170°.

2) 1820/18 August CJ 8891 3 units, probably cruisers, course 240°, high speed.

3) 0250/19 August CJ 8858 5 merchant ships not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., course 80°, speed slight.

4) 1838/19 August CH 8672 4 merchant ships of 8,000 G.R.T., course 60°, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio intelligence there was brisk convoy traffic running along the North African coast.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0800/18 August 1 "Illustrious" class ship and 4 gunboats put in to Gibraltar from the east.

2) 1430/18 August 1 "Carlisle" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the east.

3) 1616/18 August Cape Spartel: 58 ships, including 42 freighters, 16 escort vessels, bound for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1318/18 August CN 3256 landing craft of about 4,000 G.R.T., course 320°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 73 (Deckert) was requested to make a position report. The boat reported at 2247 from CJ 9584.

U 458 (Diggins) was ordered to proceed to CO 4695 via CN 2965, CN 6139 and CN 6322 and to proceed from there to the attack area between the meridians of CO 6875 and CP 7165 by following the enemy traffic route to the east. On reaching CN 26, U 458 was to report his position by short signal. The boat was being diverted round the effective location radius of Malta in order to lessen the risks caused by the ban on the use of radar interception.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1156/18 August as in III.A.d.1.
2200/18 August as in III.A.d.3.
0029/19 August as in III.A.b.4.
0721/19 August as in III.A.b.3.

The boats received a summary of the situation.

An enemy reconnaissance aircraft reported a U-boat in CJ 7166 at 1918 on 18 August. We had no ways of proving that this was one of our own boats, but perhaps U 410 (Fenski) had been withdrawn very far to the north or else U 458 (Diggins) had covered more of his passage into the Eastern Mediterranean than was thought.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 95,
U 380 CJ 97,
U 431 CJ 89,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 458 CN 26 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 407 CO 36 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and off the coast of North Africa.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1000/19 August CH 5352 1 passenger ship, course and speed not known.

2) 1000/19 August CH 5386 1 merchant ship of 5,000 G.R.T., course and speed not known.

3) 1627/19 August CH 7485 45 merchant ships, 10 patrol vessels, course 90°, speed 10 knots.

4) 0410/20 August CJ 7835 1 destroyer, course 294°, high speed.

5) 1838/19 August CJ 8672 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, course 60°, high speed.

6) 0146/20 August CJ 9822 2 destroyers, course 270°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 0420/20 August a convoy - probably westbound - reported an aircraft shadower 22 miles north of Tabarca.

2) According to radio traffic there were several British and American units at sea.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0915/19 August 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers put out from Gibraltar under escort, bound for the Mediterranean.
1715 put in again.

2) 1315/19 August 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 2000/19 August a convoy between Alboran and Tres Forcas as in War Diary of 18 August, III.A.d.3.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1305/19 August CJ 9885 1 heavy cruiser and 2 light cruisers, 2 destroyers, 2 patrol vessels, southeasterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The attack area of U 596 (Nonn) and U 407 (Brüller) was to be in the area east of the meridian of 31° E, with U 596 to the north and U 407 to the south of the parallel of CP 5375.

The boats were notified of the waiting positions of the 2 Italian U-boats lying at the northern and southern entrances respectively of the Strait of Messina.

In addition, proclamations from the Fuehrer and from C-in-C South, made in connection with the cessation of hostilities in Sicily, were transmitted to the boats.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1156/19 August as in War Diary of 18 August, III.A.d.3.
1321/19 August) as in III.A.d.1.
0008/20 August)
0005/20 August as in III.A.b.3.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

20 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 95,
U 380 CJ 97,
U 431 CJ 89,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 458 CN 26 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and the coast of North Africa from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1805/19 August Cape de Fer: 1 aircraft carrier, 4 destroyers, easterly course (put out from Gibraltar on 18 August at a speed of 20 knots).

2) a) 0720/20 August CH 7597 about 40 ships, course 70°, speed 10 knots.
b) 1640/20 August CH 8461 the same convoy as at 0720.

3) 0745/20 August CN 2155 8 medium-sized freighters, course 240°.
CN 2152 7 medium-sized freighters, course 60°.

4) 1147/20 August CH 8289 1 freighter of 8,000 G.R.T., westerly course.

5) 1203/20 August CH 8385 1 destroyer, westerly course.

6) 1208/20 August CH 8394 1 destroyer, westerly course.

7) 1242/20 August CH 9584 1 cruiser, westerly course.

8) 1745/20 August CJ 8739 2 ships, westerly course.

9) 1140/20 August CJ 8861 probably 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers, westerly course, high speed.

10) 1805/20 August CJ 8912 3 medium-sized ships, 6 patrol vessels, westerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

1910/20 August sea area of Oran: aircraft shadowing the formation.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0800/20 August Gibraltar: the "Illustrious" class aircraft carrier, which had been in dock since the beginning of August, put out of dock (the "Indomitable").

2) 0930/20 August 2 "Illustrious" class aircraft carriers, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier and 8 destroyers put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean, presumably for gunnery exercises.

3) 1034/20 August 1 "Illustrious" class aircraft carrier (the "Indomitable") put out from Ceuta for the Atlantic.

4) 1730/20 August 1 "Illustrious" class aircraft carrier and 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier put in from the Mediterranean.

At the moment we have the following information of the disposition of enemy naval forces:

4 battleships (the Rodney, the Nelson, 2 of the "Warspite" class (probably the Warspite and the Valiant), 3 monitors, 1 aircraft carrier (probably the "Formidable") in the Malta-Sicily-Bizerta area. 2 or 3 battleships (2 "King George V", possibly 1 "Texas" class) in Algiers. 2 aircraft carriers of the "Illustrious" class put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic on 17 August, one of them put out again, bound for the Mediterranean; 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers have been in Gibraltar since 9 August. According to an agent's report, the aircraft carrier "Implacable" passed through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean on 29 July, but she has not been reported since then; she is, therefore, possibly in Oran or Mers el Kebir. Furthermore, the aircraft carrier "Indefatigable" is said to have moved from Beirut to Alexandria on 8 August; this is the ship which, according to an agent's report, came through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean on 2 July. It can be assumed from these facts that there are at least 3, but not more than 5, modern aircraft carriers of the "Illustrious" class, together with 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, ready for operations in the Mediterranean.

5) According to an agent's report received on 19 August, units of the French naval forces, including the battleship "Richelieu", put out from American ports and made for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0820/20 August CO 4559 13 merchant ships and 6 light naval vessels, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:
d) By G.I.S. stations:
e) By naval forces:
} Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Roether) was requested to make a position report. The boat reported at 0407 from CJ 9725.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1240/20 August as in III.B.b.
1324/20 August as in III.A.d.2.
0330/21 August as in III.A.d.4.
0505/21 August as in III.A.b.2.

A report of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The Fuehrer awarded the Knight's Cross to Lieutenant (s.g.) Kelbling (commander of U 593).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 98,
U 380 CJ 97,
U 431 CJ 89,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 458 CN 26 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put out from Toulon at 2300 on 21 August.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 455.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and from Alexandria as far as Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1654/21 August CH 8438 51 merchant ships, 8 patrol vessels, course 70°, speed 10 knots.

2) 1840/21 August CJ 7694 2 formations composed of 11 ships and small naval vessels, easterly course.

3) 1850/21 August CJ 7916 2 large ferries bound for Le Galite.

4) 0740/21 August CJ 7938 4 medium-sized freighters, westerly course.

5) 0750/21 August CJ 9729 3 destroyers, 4 M.T.B.s, westerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

2040 CH 8514 1 convoy was located by radio traffic.

d) By radio intercept service:

20 August Tres Forcas: 52 large freighters with convoy protection bound for the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0330/21 August CN 3281 2 ships, 1 probably a destroyer, course 350°, speed not known.

2) 0645/21 August CO 5853 23 medium-sized freighters, 1 passenger ship, 6 patrol vessels, easterly course, speed 8-10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

20 August the tanker "Ampertco" put out from Iscanderun in ballast, bound for Haifa. 1 large Norwegian ship put in. The Greek ship "Petros-Houlandris" (4,693 G.R.T.) put in to Mersin from Port Said.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 458 (Diggins) was requested to make a position report and reported from CN 2377 at 0520 on 22 August.

In compliance with instructions from Naval War Staff, U 73, 380 and 431 are at the moment lying off the northern coast of Sicily. Now that Sicily is completely occupied by the enemy, this area now offers few prospects of success as an attack area. Captain U-boats therefore proposes to send U 73, which put out on 2 August, to Toulon to have the "Hagenuk" apparatus installed there. U 380 is to be left operating off the northern coast of Sicily and U 431 is to be sent to operate at the northern entrance of the Sicilian Channel.

Once this proposal was approved of, U 73 (Deckert) was ordered to commence the passage to the west via CJ 8695 and 8731. U 380 (Roether) received as his attack area, the area between the meridians of 8685 and 8594 and between the parallels of 8645 and 8912. U 431 was requested to make a position report, the report was not received.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats.

1605/21 August as in III.A.b.4 and 5.
2027/21 August as in III.B.d.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

It has been established by the Italian Navy that an overwhelmingly large proportion of available enemy transports and landing craft are in Bizerta. This heavy concentration suggests that an offensive against Corsica and Sardinia is being planned.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 86,
U 380 CJ 86,
U 431 CJ 89,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 371 CH 39.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CN 26 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 431 (Schoeneboom): 1649/22 August 8613 2 "Aurora" class cruisers, 3 destroyers.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1330/22 August CJ 8879 5 ships, course 120°, low speed.

2) 1410/22 August CJ 7927 2 large merchant ships, easterly course, no escort vessels.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1730/22 August 1 "Dido" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the west.

2) 2200/22 August Straits of Gibraltar: convoy of about 60 freighters and 6 escort units, bound for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0628/22 August CO 9217 about 15 freighters, 2 probable tankers, escorting vessels, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 410 (Fenski) and U 431 (Schoeneboom) were requested to make a position report. No report was received

from U 410.

U 431 reported a success (see V.a).

In order to have a boat in operation in the area north of the Sicilian Channel, U 73 (Deckert) received the area between the meridians of CJ 8586 and 8485 and between the parallels of CJ 8545 and 8738 as his attack area until a report was received from U 431. Having received a report from U 431, this boat received the attack area that had been transferred to U 73, and U 73 was ordered to commence his return passage to Toulon.

The report of enemy movements as in III.B.b together with a summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) reported that he fired a fan of four on 23 August at 1649 (radio time) in CJ 8613 against a formation of 2 "Aurora" class cruisers and 3 destroyers; one of the cruisers was hit and then stopped. 5 minutes later the U-boat heard another detonation.

b) Losses:

U 205 (Bürgel) was reported missing for the last time with effect from 17 February 1943. 42 members of the crew, including the commander, were taken prisoner on 17 February. 7 men were unaccounted for. (Naval War Staff, Second Division, C-in-C U-boats, Ops. G 8634 A5, dated 21 August 1943.)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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23 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 85,
U 380 CJ 86,
U 431 CJ 86,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 371 CH 66.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CP 53 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 380: 1925 CJ 8687 westbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1320/23 August 6 merchant ships of 2-4,000 G.R.T. each, westerly course, put out from Bizerta without escort vessels.
10 ferries, easterly course.
2 M.T.B.s, northerly course.

2) 1524/23 August CH 9282 1 M.T.B., easterly course.

3) 1832/23 August CH 7573 50 transports, 8-10 escort vessels, easterly course, moderate speed.

4) 1848/23 August CH 7648 6 aircraft carriers, 2 cruisers, 8 escort vessels, easterly course, high speed. This is an improbable sighting as, according to an Italian report, the auxiliary aircraft carrier put in to Gibraltar again at 1900.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) About 0100/23 August 50 freighters, 12 escort units passed Ceuta, bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 11 freighters and 1 auxiliary cruiser joined this convoy from Gibraltar.

3) 0600/23 August Punta Carnero: 15 transports, 4 destroyers, 3 corvettes, bound for the Mediterranean.

4) 0945/23 August Gibraltar: 1 "Illustrious" class aircraft carrier, 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 1 "Dido" class cruiser, 8 destroyers, bound for the Mediterranean.
1900/23 August put in to Gibraltar again.

5) 0800/23 August 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.
The large Alboran convoy consisting of 79 freighters, 1 cruiser, 10 escort units, reported - as in the report from Tres Forcas - the formation of transports (see 3) to be northwest of Tres Forcas. At 1700 the two convoys joined forces and continued their passage through the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1200/23 August 2 small units, westerly course, east of Taormina.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic there were two convoys in the Cyrenaica area, one of them westbound.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 371 (Mehl) was informed that his attack area was to be the area between Algiers and Bougaroni, but that he was first to operate against the large convoy approaching from the west.

U 410 (Fenski) and U 596 (Nonn) were requested to make a position report. The boats did not report.

U 380 (Roether) reported a success (see V.a).

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1242/23 August as in III.A.d.1 to 5,
2320/23 August as in III.A.b.3 and 4,
U 73 (Deckert) was ordered to operate against these units,
0056/24 August as in III.A.b.1.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

On 23 August at 1925 in CJ 8687 (25 miles northwest of Palermo) U 380 (Roether) sank a freighter of 6,000 G.R.T. belonging to a westbound convoy.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 76,
U 380 CJ 86,
U 431 CJ 85,
U 410 CJ ?,
U 371 CH 94.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CO 42.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and from Alexandria as far as Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0723/24 August CH 7683 80 ships, 1 heavy cruiser, course 90°.

2) 0737/24 August CH 8275 15 ships not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers, 7 escort boats, course 90°, low speed.

3) 0930/24 August CJ 8874 2 ships, probably destroyers, course 80°, moderate speed.

4) 1000/23 August CH 9434 16 transports, 3 patrol vessels, easterly course, moderate speed.

5) 1210/24 August CN 2146 26 fairly large transports, course 80°, moderate speed.

6) 1212/24 August CN. 2151 2 fairly large ships, course approximately 260°, moderate speed.

7) 1213/24 August CN 2119 2 fairly large ships, probably merchant ships, course approximately 190°, moderate speed.

8) 0745/24 August CJ 7574 6 large transports, 10 small naval units, westerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0705/24 August CN 3229 3 M.T.B.s, southerly course.

2) 1650/24 August CN 3251 1 destroyer, course 0°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 596 (Nonn) and U 410 (Fenski) were requested to make a position report. U 596 reported at 1955 on 24 August from CP 2385 and U 410 at 0228 on 25 August from CH 7763.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1344/24 August as in III.A.b.1 and 2.
1725/24 August as in III.A.b.5.

1733/24 August)
0034/25 August) as in III.A.b.4.
1744/24 August as in III.A.b.3.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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25 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CJ 74,
U 380 CJ 86,
U 431 CJ 84,
U 410 CJ 77,
U 371 CH 94.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CO 46.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Corsica and Sardinia. The coast between Alexandria and Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 410: 0810/25 August 2 troopships of the "Empress of Australia" class (21,833 G.R.T.), course 70°.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0853/25 August CJ 8873 3 merchant ships, course 20°, low speed.

2) 1035/25 August sea area of Oran: 3 transports (each between 15 and 20,000 G.R.T.), southwesterly course. 2 cruisers, 3 destroyers, northeasterly course.

3) 1441/25 August CJ 7825 1 convoy, easterly course.

4) 1830/25 August off Bizerta harbor: 8-10 ships, course and speed not known.

5) 1852/25 August CJ 8856 1 light cruiser, stationary.

c) By radio intercept service:

0410/25 August CJ 7735 air attack on an enemy formation, course 273°, speed 14 knots.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report about 250 ships were to pass Gibraltar on 26 August to take part in landings to be made in Italy during the night of 28/29 August.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0655/25 August CN 3927 2 merchant ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., course 270°, moderate speed.

2) 0814/25 August 26 ships put out from Syracuse.

3) 1130 - 1305 3 small and 3 medium-sized warships, 1 mile east of Augusta, westerly course.

4) 1600/25 August CJ 7882 4 warships, southerly course.

5) 0815/25 August CN 2232 1 merchant ship not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:
d) By G.I.S. stations:
e) By naval forces:
} Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 410 (Fenski) reported a success (see V.a).

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats together with the experiences of the commander of U 593 (Kelbling), whose operational area was between Algiers and Bougie during June and July.

Because the new radar interception set (Hagenuk), which was to be installed in U 617 (Brandi), was found to be out of order, the sailing of the boat - planned for 24 August - had to be postponed. A spare part (transformer) was being flown from Germany.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1340/25 August as in III.A.c.
2307/25 August as in III.A.b.2.

V. a) Successes:

After having fired a fan of four against 2 overlapping steamers of the "Empress of Australia" class (21,833 G.R.T.) on 25 August at 0810 in CJ 7737, U 410 (Fenski) heard 3 hits after 7 minutes 6 seconds, 8 minutes 30 seconds and 8 minutes 38 seconds respectively. In view of the lengthy running time, it is surmised that the last two explosions were end-of-run explosions, but the first one was probably a hit.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

26 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 96,
U 380 CJ 86,
U 431 CJ 85,
U 410 CJ 78,
U 371 CH 94.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and Sardinia and the North African coast from Alexandria to Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 410: 2116/26 August 7826 eastbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1315/26 August CJ 7829 3 medium-sized freighters, easterly course.

2) 1330/26 August CJ 7934 7 independently routed enemy merchant ships, easterly course.

3) 1345/26 August CN 2117 10 medium-sized freighters, stationary.

4) 1656/26 August CH 9475 20 merchant ships, stopped.

5) 1735/26 August CJ 8721 1 freighter of 10,500 G.R.T., 1 freighter of 3,500 G.R.T., course 280°, high speed.

6) 1737/26 August CJ 8912 1 destroyer, course 110°.

7) 1805/26 August CJ 8923 2 light cruisers, 1 destroyer, course 110°.

c) By radio intercept service:

2125/26 August CJ 7828 convoy reported an air attack.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0900/26 August 1 "Illustrious" class aircraft carrier, 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 5 destroyers, 1 gunboat put out from Gibraltar, bound for the east. The formation put in again at 1630.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1632/27 August CO 4135 1 ship, moderate speed, course 90°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following attack areas were allotted to the boats:

U 371 (Mehl) the area between Algiers and Cape Sigli.
U 73 (Deckert) the area between Cape Sigli and Bougaroni.
U 410 (Fenski) to the east of U 73 as far as the meridian of CJ 7865.

It was intended to recall U 73 within the next few days; the boat was informed of this.

U 407 was requested to make a short weather report between 0200 and 0500. The boat reported at 0253 on 27 August from CP 5380.

U 410 (Fenski) reported a success (see V.a) and requested permission to commence his return passage to Toulon because he only had two stern torpedoes left; he received orders to proceed to Toulon.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1240/26 August)
2323/26 August) as in III.A.d.
2314/26 August as in III.A.c.
0210/27 August as in III.A.b.6 and 7.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

U 410 (Fenski) reported: "On 26 August at 2116 in CJ 7826 a fan of four was fired against 4 overlapping steamers of 6-7,000 G.R.T. each belonging to an eastbound convoy and 3 hits were scored. 2 steamers sank immediately, 1 was on fire when we left." It was assumed that the third steamer was destroyed.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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27 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 96,
U 380 CJ 86,
U 431 CJ 84,
U 371 CH 94,
U 410 CJ 75.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CO 59.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0300 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Sardinia and from Alexandria as far as Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0655/27 August CJ 7935 30 merchant ships and escort vessels, easterly course.

2) 0753/27 August CJ 9818 2 small units, 4 M.T.B.s, westerly course.

3) 0755/27 August CJ 7921 1 British M.T.B., course and speed not known.

4) 1215/27 August CJ 7835 1 freighter, 4 M.T.B.s, westerly course.

5) 1600/27 August 3 tankers, 4 freighters, 1 hospital ship, put out from Bizerta bound for the east.

6) 2350/27 August CN 2216 10-15 ships, course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0930/27 August 1 "Illustrious" class aircraft carrier, 6 destroyers put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0810/27 August CJ 9891 2 torpedoboats, southwesterly course.

2) 1335/27 August CN 3224 2 merchant ships, 2 destroyers, northerly course.

3) 1548/27 August CK 7784 1 light cruiser, course 210°, high speed.

4) 0400/28 August CN 3251 probably 5-10 ships.
CN 3257 probably 2-3 ships, course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

When U 410 broke off his operations, the operational area between Algiers and the meridian of CJ 7595 was divided as follows:

U 371 (Mehl) between Algiers and Cape Bougaroni.
U 73 to the east as far as the meridian of CJ 7595.

U 73 had commenced his return passage because the multi-unit hydrophones (listening set) had failed; he intended to cross the parallel of 42° N on 29 August at 0000 and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0700.

In answer to a request from Captain U-boats, the 2 boats operating off the coast of northern Sicily

(U 431 and U 380) were released by Naval War Staff on condition that 2 more boats were put into operation there as soon as possible.

When U 73 broke off operations, the attack areas were therefore allotted as follows:
U 431 (Schoeneboom) allotted the area that had been intended for U 73 (see above) and as a result, U 380 (Roether) occupied in addition the operational area of U 431 (between the meridians of CJ 8586 and 8485 and between the parallels of CJ 8545 and 8738).

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1212/27 August as in III.A.d.
1517/27 August as in III.A.b.1.
1832/27 August as in III.A.b.4.
0432/28 August as in III.A.b.6.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CJ 85,
U 431 CJ 84,
U 371 CH 95,
U 73 CH 69 (homeward bound),
U 410 CJ 74 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CO 92.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 617 put out from Toulon at 2100.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 617.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily and Sardinia.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 380: 0900/28 August CJ 8913 convoy, bound for Palermo.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0710/28 August CN 2117 1 merchant ship of approximately 6,000 G.R.T., easterly course.

2) 0950/28 August CH 8335 1 battleship, 4 destroyers, 2 merchant ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T. each, course 90°, low speed.

3) 1035/28 August CH 9515 2 merchant ships not exceeding 1,000 G.R.T. each, low speed.

4) 1420/28 August CN 2125 4 medium-sized freighters, 3 escort vessels, south-westerly course, moderate speed.

5) 1427/28 August CJ 8834 2 probable M.T.B.s, course 110°, high speed.

6) 1445/28 August 1 probable M.T.B. cruising off Palermo.

7) 1555/28 August CH 8357 6 small freighters, 1 patrol vessel, course 50°, low speed.

8) 1705/28 August CH 9373 2 large freighters, each of 2,000 G.R.T., 1 destroyer, easterly course.

9) 1850/28 August CJ 7924 1 large, 1 medium-sized freighter, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

1713/28 August CH 9532 convoy, course and speed not known.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1230/28 August 8 British troopships put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean with an escort.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Apart from an agent's report stating that Suez was full of troops and that embarkations were carried out throughout the day of 24 August, there was nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 371 (Mehl) and U 458 (Diggins) were requested to make a position report. The reports were not received.

U 380 (Roether) reported a convoy as in III.A.a.

U 617 (Brandi) put in again because the "Hagenuk" had failed; he intended to be at the rendezvous off Toulon on 29 August at 1030.

U 410 (Fenski) intended to cross 42° N to the north on 30 August at 0000 and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0600.

A summary of the situation and the following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1443/28 August as in III.A.b.2.
2010/28 August as in III.A.b.7.
2025/28 August as in III.A.d.
2227/28 August as in III.A.b.8.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

It had to be ascertained whether the harbor of Augusta really was heavily occupied with landing craft and transports. In view of the constant heavy fighter cover it was suspected that there was also a large shipping concentration in Malta. No reconnaissance in connection with this had been carried out in the last few days.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CJ 86,
U 431 CJ 75,
U 371 CH 95,
U 73 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 410 CH 63 (homeward bound),
U 617 CH 36 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 407)
U 458 CO 91.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 617 put in to Toulon on 29 August at 1210, put out again at 2000.
U 73 put in to Toulon on 29 August at 0800 after his 13th operation against the enemy.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Sardinia, the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0205/29 August CJ 8699 20 ships, course and speed not known.

2) 1419/29 August Cape Senat: 1 light cruiser bound for Le Galite.

3) 1431/29 August from Bizerta: 4 freighters, 2 medium-sized cruisers, 3 stationary destroyers, 1 coastguard boat, zigzag course.

4) 0055/29 August CJ 7596 6 ships, course and speed not known.

5) 1635/29 August CH 9513 1 transport of approximately 10,000 G.R.T., with escort vessels.

6) 1840/29 August CJ 7862 1 light cruiser, course 230°.

7) 1930/29 August CH 7463 1 battleship, 1 light cruiser, course 90°.

8) 0455/30 August CN 3227 10-15 ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 2030/28 August the French ship "Sidi Brahim" of 2,439 G.R.T. with troops on board and 2 guardboats put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 0900/29 August 1 "Illustrious" class aircraft carrier, 4 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 2 "Dido" class cruisers, 10 destroyers put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.
The formation put in again at 1900.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 596: 0750/29 August CP 6149 1 freighter, 1 corvette, course 90°.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0350/29 August CN 3221 1 ship, course and speed not known.

2) 1140/29 August CN 3273 a few ships, course 0°.

3) 1750/29 August 1 freighter, northerly course, off Augusta.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, the troops that were embarked at Suez on 24 August (see War Diary of 28 August, III.B) were disembarked again on 26 August.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

We surmised that a landing operation on the Calabrian coast was being planned, for not only were the harbors of eastern Sicily more heavily occupied but landing craft were being concentrated in Bizerta and Malta. Although the conditions under which operations were being carried out had grown more difficult - because the radar interception set failed - it was hoped that U-boats would be able to operate in support of resistance to an enemy landing. In view of the general situation the only boats that could be used for this operation were the three at present operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was, however, one objection to putting U 596 into operation: the commander of this boat was on his first operation and the task of operating off the east coast of Sicily would make heavy demands on him. U 596 (Lieutenant (j.g.) Nonn) was therefore to remain in the east and received the whole area east of the meridian of 31° E.

The other 2 boats were put into operation as follows:

U 458 (Diggins) received an area between the parallels of CK 7478 and 7778 and the meridians of CJ 9956 and CK 7754.
U 407 (Brüller) received the area off the east coast of Sicily west of the meridian of CN 3264, between the parallels of CJ 9885 and CN 3288. The boat was in this area during the previous operation.

The decisive factors in choosing the operational areas were that:

a) livelier location activity was not anticipated in the areas mentioned,

b) the boats would be favorably placed there.

U 458 was requested to make a position report for the second time. No report was received.

U 596 reported a success (see V.a).

New instructions were transmitted to the boats in connection with putting in to Toulon, together with a summary of the situation.

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1159/29 August as in III.A.d.1.
1219/29 August as in III.A.b.4.
1253/29 August)
0029/30 August) as in III.A.d.2.
2136/29 August as in III.A.b.2.
2316/29 August as in III.A.b.7.
0400/30 August as in III.A.b.5.

V. a) Successes:

On 29 August at 0750 in CP 6149 (20 miles northnortheast of Beirut), U 596 (Lieutenant (j.g.) Nonn) sank a freighter of 4,000 G.R.T. During this operation the boat also sank 4 transport sailing vessels by gunfire.

b) Losses:

U 375 (Koenenkamp) was provisionally reported missing with effect from 1 August, 1943. The boat put out from Toulon on 10 July. The boat last reported on 25 July from CN 3188. The fate of the crew was unknown.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CJ 85,
U 431 CJ 78,
U 371 CH 96,
U 617 CH 39.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596)
U 407) east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 458 CO 67.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 410 put in to Toulon on 30 August at 0800.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 565, 593, 616, 410, 73.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Sardinia and the Tyrrhenian Sea.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 431: 0341/30 August CJ 7824 westbound convoy, 4 steamers, 1 tanker, 3 destroyers.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0740/30 August Cape Blanc: 2 individually routed ships, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio traffic there was convoy activity between Algiers and Bizerta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0730/30 August Gibraltar: 3 American steamers of medium tonnage, easterly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0846/30 August CN 3256 4 transports of 6,000 G.R.T. each, 3 escort boats, making for Syracuse.

2) 0848/30 August 1 medium-sized ship and 1 small naval unit lying off the coast north of the port of Messina, both stationary.

3) 0853/30 August CN 3231 7 transports of 3,000 G.R.T. each, 3 escort boats, bound for Catania.

4) 1115/30 August CO 4825 1 troopship, 4 freighters, 3 patrol vessels, course 70°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Agents had been almost daily reporting an aircraft carrier and several auxiliary aircraft carriers which put out from Gibraltar bound for the east, presumably for gunnery exercises; a boat operating in this area should, therefore, have been very successful. In compliance with instructions from Naval War Staff that 2 boats should be operating north of Sicily, U 617 was proceeding to the Central Mediterranean to operate off the coasts of North Africa and northern Sicily respectively. U 380 was operating there at the moment. In the event of an enemy landing on Sardinia, the boats in this area would have been quickly available. Because we did not consider a landing on Sardinia

to be likely within the next few days, Captain U-boats requested Naval War Staff to release U 617 for operations east of Gibraltar. The following factors should have favored this plan: the phase of the moon was favorable (new moon 30 August) and U 617 had a particularly reliable commander (Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi) who had gained valuable experience during his last operation in the area east of Gibraltar. After having been released by Naval War Staff, U 617 received orders not to proceed to CJ 7175 as instructed in his departure order but to occupy the area due east of Gibraltar. The boat was granted freedom of action against all targets including submarines.

U 458 (Diggins) was requested to make a position report by short signal for the third time since 28 August. No report had been received. Grave concern was felt for the boat. After the departure of U 407 (Brüller) from the Eastern Mediterranean, U 596 (Nonn) was granted freedom of action against submarines in his operational area (east of the meridian of 31° E).

U 431 reported a success (see V.a) and commenced his return passage with his one remaining stern torpedo and was ordered to proceed to Toulon. U 431 intended to cross 42° N on 1 September at 0100 and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0700.

When U 431 left his operational area off the North African coast, between Cape Bougaroni and the meridian of CJ 7625, U 380 was ordered to occupy it.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

On 30 August at 0341 in CJ 7824, U 431 (Schoeneboom) sank a steamer of 8,000 G.R.T. belonging to a westbound convoy and at 0530 in CJ 7815 he torpedoed a tanker of 10,000 G.R.T. and heard 2 hits. The tanker was probably sunk.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

The number of transports in the harbors of Augusta and Syracuse was noticeably high. At the moment there were 20 transports of 7,000 G.R.T. each in Augusta and 7 transports of 6,000 G.R.T. each in Syracuse. These facts only strengthened our suspicions that southern Italy and not Sardinia would be the next enemy landing objective. 400 enemy troops were landed to the east of Melito (Calabria) on 29 August, presumably to

form a bridgehead for a large-scale landing operation. The plan was frustrated.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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31 August, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CJ 76,
U 371 CH 96,
U 617 CH 67 (outward bound),
U 431 CH 66 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 east of the meridian of 31° E,
U 407 CP 45,
U 458 CO 46.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 410, 565, 595, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sicily, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 371: 1517 and 1545/31 August CH 9628 1 anti-aircraft cruiser.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0730/31 August CJ 7926 2 probable heavy cruisers, westerly course.

2) 1700/31 August CH 8458 2 independently routed merchant ships of 7,000 G.R.T. each, course 270°, moderate speed.

3) 1720/31 August CH 7692 2 merchant ships of 4,000 G.R.T. each, 2 patrol vessels, course 300°, moderate speed.

4) 1805/31 August 10 medium-sized merchant ships, stationary, outside Bizerta harbor.

5) 1830/31 August CJ 7475 20-25 merchant ships and a tanker with escort vessels, course 300°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0930/31 August 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, 3 destroyers, 1 minesweeper, 1 gunboat put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 1530/30 August 1 "Dido" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 2000/30 August Tres Forcas: about 30 ships bound for the Mediterranean.

4) 0900/31 August the battleships "Revenge" and "Resolution" put in to Gibraltar presumably from the west.

5) 1830/31 August 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, 3 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the east. Another auxiliary aircraft carrier, escorted by a destroyer and 2 gunboats, put out bound for the east.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0900/31 August CJ 9881 3 probable battleships, 9 destroyers, course 350°, high speed.

2) 0910/31 August CN 3253 9 ships, northerly course.

3) 1025/31 August CN 3213 3 ships, northerly course.

4) 1200/31 August 1 battleship formation 15 miles north of Catania, southerly course.

5) 1455/31 August 4 landing craft, 2 small beached boats, 4 miles east of Melito.

6) 1800/31 August 1 cruiser, 1 light unit, 2 miles north of Catania, southerly course.
4 destroyers off Catania, northeasterly course.

7) 0115/1 September CN 3243 4 probable destroyers, stopped.

c) By radio intercept service:
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 458 was requested to make a position report for the fourth time. No report was received.

U 380 (Roether) reported an unsuccessful fan of four against a westbound convoy in CJ 8916 on 29 August.

After having fired 9 torpedoes without scoring any successes, U 371 (Mohl) commenced his return passage to Toulon with his listening set and attack periscope out of order.

U 407 (Brüller) reported from CP 4856 that the state of one of his batteries, together with spontaneous noises, made him question the wisdom of operating in the operational area off the east coast of Sicily which had been allotted to him (War Diary of 29 August).

The following reports of enemy movements were transmitted to the boats:

1151/31 August as in III.B.b.1.
1330/31 August as in III.A.d.4.
1556/31 August as in III.A.d.1.
1907/31 August as in III.A.b.1.
0032/1 September as in III.A.b.2 and 3.
0125/1 September as in III.A.b.4 and 5.
0223/1 September as in III.A.d.5.

A summary of the situation was transmitted to the boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The Italian Navy estimated that there were about 1,000 landing craft in the Central and Western Mediterranean which were distributed as follows:
about 60% in Bizerta,
about 22% in Augusta - Syracuse,
about 18% not definitely located,
but probably mostly in Malta and in the African ports east of Cape Bon. In the opinion of the Italian Navy, the landing craft were so distributed that attacks could simultaneously be launched on southern Italy from the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas. The launching of an attack against Sardinia and Corsica was considered highly improbable at the moment.

The assumption that the enemy would simultaneously launch an attack from 2 different points (Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas) was supported by the fact that 2 more battleships had put in to Gibraltar. Consequently there were at the moment 8 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 4 auxiliary aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean, including Gibraltar. Never in this war had such a concentration of heavy units been seen in the Mediterranean. It was, however, also possible that the battleships, which had just arrived, had been brought in as reserves to replace any heavy units that might be damaged.

(Signed) Kreisch.

Synopsis for August 1943

I. Sicily was entirely occupied by the enemy who had concentrated his main efforts there during the first half of the month. Enemy heavy and medium-sized units had the task of supporting the land fighting by bombarding the coastal strips still in Axis hands. The light units carried out patrol, escort and convoy duties. It was noticed that the ships used to supply the troops in Sicily were transferred from the coast of southern Sicily to that of northern Sicily, principally to the port of Palermo. On the other hand, the conglomeration of supplies in the ports of Augusta and Catania subsided. Heavy and medium-sized units were based at these two ports during the first half of the month. As a result of supplies being taken to ports on the coast of northern Sicily, a further number of small landing craft, used for landing supplies on the coast of southern Sicily, was released. They were withdrawn and transferred to Maltese, Tunisian and Algerian ports.

The whole of Sicily was in enemy hands on 17 August. Preparations for further landing operations could be seen. They were as follows:

a) Most of the landing craft still remaining in Sicilian ports were withdrawn.

b) Damaged units were removed from the Mediterranean theater.

c) Units were brought up from other sea areas to replace those that were either out of action or heavily damaged.

d) Men and materials were being brought up in ever increasing numbers (principally from the west).

II. It was still difficult to determine where the enemy would launch his next landing operation. But during the second third of the month it seemed that it would be towards Sardinia and Corsica. At that time, this assumption was based on the following facts:

a) There were very few landing craft lying in the Sicilian harbors.

b) There were concentrations of landing craft in Bizerta and eastern Algeria. (The majority - about 60% - of the landing craft in the Mediterranean were there.)

c) 4 auxiliary aircraft carriers were brought up, which suggested that the operation would be

carried out in an area where fighter aircraft would be unable to operate from an airfield.

d) Agents constantly reported that landings on Sardinia and Corsica were being planned.

e) About 5 divisions of Free French forces were standing by in Algeria and Tunisia (possibly destined for Corsica).

It is also possible that the enemy carried out these measures to prevent the real direction of the attack from being discovered, or else that his objective was Corsica and Sardinia right up to the end of the Quebec Conference, for it was only during the last third of the month that the enemy's movements suggested that the operation would be launched against Calabria as originally surmised. The reasons that led to this assumption were as follows:

1) The landing craft which had been mostly lying in Bizerta were dispatched to various North African ports further to the east.

2) There were landing craft in Augusta, Syracuse and Catania.

3) The enemy air force intensified its attacks on supply communications on the Italian mainland, especially in Calabria.

4) A strong force of 400 men launched a landing operation against the southern tip of the Italian mainland to carry out intensive reconnaissance and to form a bridgehead.

5) The same area was bombarded by heavy naval forces.

III. From the information in I and II it was decided that the U-boats should be disposed as follows during the first third of the month:

1) Western Mediterranean:

Operations had to be concentrated in the sea area east of Algiers and off the coast of northern Sicily in order to attack

a) the supply traffic which was being used to supply the landing operation preparations concentrated in the area of Algiers, Bone, Bizerta and Tunis,

b) the supply traffic for the forces in Sicily, which made for the coast of northern Sicily.

Because it would have been very difficult to transfer boats from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Western Mediterranean and vice versa through the Sicilian Channel, boats already in the Eastern Mediterranean had to be left there.

2) Eastern Mediterranean:

a) Operations were to be concentrated in the area off the coasts of eastern and southern Sicily and west of Malta against the supply traffic which had already decreased.

b) Once the area named in a) was occupied by 2 - 3 boats, a boat was to be put into operation in the Benghazi - Derna area.

3) Attempts to act on this information were, however, considerably handicapped.

a) In view of the small number of boats available, a very high percentage of them had to be detailed for the undertaking which Naval War Staff, 1st Division had entrusted to us (Operation "Eiche").

b) Operationally ready boats were unable to put out as scheduled because they first had to have new location gear installed.

The result of the first point was that 3 boats had to be withdrawn from this fruitful operational area.

The result of the second point was that one boat (U 371) put out after 3 days' delay and another boat (U 617) put out after 5 days' delay.

c) Because the boats already out at sea were forced to operate without the help of the location gear, the only operational areas that could be selected for them were those which were not usually subjected to heavy enemy air patrols.

For instance, the decision made in c) had the following result: a boat that was to operate in the southern half of CN 33 and CN 26 was withdrawn to the east of the location radius of Malta and received as his attack area an area in the Arabian Gulf. This boat left the Western Mediterranean via the Sicilian Channel and was subsequently lost.

4) As the facts listed in II, 1) -5) revealed that the launching of an offensive on Calabria was imminent - a state of affairs which was growing more and more obvious - it was decided that the boats should operate in the following areas:

a) in the Eastern Mediterranean, despite the disadvantage mentioned in 3), c) and off the south and southeastern coasts of Calabria,

b) in the Western Mediterranean in the sea area between Sardinia and Sicily, as well as off the North African coast on the enemy supply route.

5) Owing to the reasons mentioned above, on 29 August 2 of the 3 boats operating in the Eastern Mediterranean were requested to occupy the operational area off the coasts of eastern Sicily and southeastern Calabria. As one of these boats is operating off the coast of Palestine and the other in the Arabian Gulf, the great length of their approach route to the operational area had to be taken into account. The third boat was not transferred to the west because the commander of this boat was on his first operation. In the interim it has been learned that a boat, which had been ordered to an operational area off the Italian coast, has been lost. Thus there will only be one boat available for operations against the offensive which should be launched against the Italian mainland within the next few days.

It would be unwise to change the operational areas of the boats lying in the Western Mediterranean because there is a boat on the enemy supply route between Cape Bougaroni and Le Galite. At the moment, there are no further boats available for operations against the landing operation planned by the enemy. In accordance with Naval War Staff's order (Operation "Eiche"), the boat which put out from Toulon on 29 August had to operate off the coast of northern Sicily. The release of this boat is requested to enable it to operate due east of Gibraltar. This request was granted.

The general reasons justifying a boat being put into operation in the area due east of Gibraltar will be found in the synopsis for July, para. 8. An additional reason is now provided by the fact that the aircraft carrier and the auxiliary aircraft carriers in Gibraltar put out daily for maneuvers, which they carry out to the east of Gibraltar. The undertaking is entrusted to the commander of U 617 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Brandi). This boat operated in the same area during June.

IV. Preparations for the enemy's landing operation are now so far advanced that it will probably be launched within the next few days. The information we have now acquired makes the direction from which the operation will be launched quite obvious. The enemy will begin the invasion of Europe by launching an offensive against the coasts of Calabria and, with a view to subsequent operations, his secondary objective will be an attempt to secure the Strait of Messina. More men and materials are being made available for this operation than for the one against Sicily. It is, therefore, quite possible that the enemy also plans to launch an offensive against Sardinia, Corsica or the Bay of Naples. The moment of this operation will depend on the progress of the operation against Calabria. In view of the above factors our own U-boats will operate as follows:

a) Against the beachheads of the landing operations (above all, off the coast of Calabria).

b) Against the enemy supply traffic running along the usual routes in the Western and Eastern Mediterranean, which will be supplying and replacing the war material used by the troops fighting in the new operational area as well as their forces in North Africa, Sicily, Palestine and Syria.

c) Should landing operations begin at other points, either simultaneously or later, the assignments in a) are to have priority over those in b).

V. Whereas up to the beginning of the Sicilian campaign, U-boat operations were of far greater importance in the Western Mediterranean, they are now becoming more and more important in the Eastern Mediterranean owing to the progress the enemy campaign has made.

The exposition made in para. VI of the synopsis for July suggested that it would be wise to transfer some boats from the Western Mediterranean to the Eastern Mediterranean. During the course of the last month, one eastbound boat passed through the Sicilian Channel. As this boat was lost, the number of boats in the Eastern Mediterranean was not increased. And, in view of the small number of boats available, it was impossible to transfer any further boats. With the number of boats available it is now impossible to carry out even the most urgent assignments.

The successes achieved during the month by these few boats operating under the most difficult conditions have once again proved that even when promising operational areas cannot be occupied, it is possible to inflict considerable damage on the enemy in the Mediterranean.

VI. Apart from the fact that by making use of the "Metox" apparatus the enemy was able to attack us with the aid of a weapon as yet unknown to us, we have not discovered the existence of any further new weapons. According to the report made by a boat which had to carry out part of his operation without using the radar interception set, our anxiety lest boats should find themselves unable to operate now that they had been forbidden to use the apparatus was unfounded. By adapting himself skilfully to the circumstances, the commander was able to carry out a successful operation in a heavily patrolled area. But this does not mean that we can draw the conclusion that an apparatus similar to the "Metox", but without its drawbacks, would not be of great advantage. The serious disadvantages of operating without a radar interception set are indeed revealed in the report of another boat which was taken by surprise by an aircraft twice in one night. The "Hagenuk" calibrator which is being introduced does not suffer

from the disadvantages of the "Metox". It is, however, still being held up by manufacturing difficulties, thus preventing the prompt delivery of the apparatus in sufficient number. This will result in the boats having to postpone the date of their putting out. With the small number of boats available, this measure will be very strongly felt.

VII. The number of boats in August was the following:

Date	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In Port	Total No.
1	2	1	2	-	10	15
2	3	1	2	-	9	15
3	3	-	3	-	8	14
4	3	1	2	-	8	14
5	4	2	-	-	8	14
6	5	2	-	1	8	14
7	3	1	1	2	7	14
8	3	1	1	2	7	14
9	3	1	1	1	8	14
10	3	1	1	2	7	14
11	3	-	1	3	7	14
12	3	-	2	1	8	14
13	3	-	3	1	7	14
14	3	-	3	1	7	14
15	3	-	4	-	7	14
16	4	1	2	-	7	14
17	4	1	1	1	7	14
18	4	1	2	1	6	14
19	4	1	2	-	7	15
20	4	2	1	-	7	14
21	4	2	1	-	7	14
22	5	2	1	-	6	14
23	5	2	1	-	6	14
24	5	3	-	-	6	14
25	5	3	-	-	6	14
26	5	3	-	-	6	14
27	5	3	-	-	6	14
28	3	3	-	2	6	14
29	3	3	-	3	5	14
30	4	3	-	-	7	14
31	2	3	1	1	7	14

In the various periods the average disposition of the boats was:

From	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In Port
1-10	3·0	1·1	1·3	0·8	8·0
11-20	3·5	0·6	2·1	0·8	7·0
21-31	4·2	2·7	0·4	0·5	6·2

Daily average for the month:

	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In Port
	3·6	1·3	1·2	6·7	7·0
(which (equals:	25·7%	10·7%	8·6%	5%	50%

VIII. The following successes were obtained in August 1943:

Serial No.	Boat	No. of ships sunk	G.R.T.	No. of ships torpedoed	G.R.T.
1	U 73	1 "Brooklyn" class cruiser			
2	U 81	-	-	-	-
3	U 371	1	5,000	1	?
4	U 375	-	-	-	-
5	U 380	1	6,000	-	-
6	U 407	-	-	-	-
7	U 431	1 "Aurora" class cruiser	8,000	1	10,000
8	U 453	-	-	-	-
9	U 458	-	-	-	-
10	U 593	-	-	-	-
11	U 596	1 4 transport sailing vessels	4,000	-	-
12	U 616	-	-	1 "Leander" class cruiser	-
13	U 617	-	-	-	-
14	U 410	3	21,000	1	21,833
		7(12)	44,000	2(4) 1	31,833?

Also 1 "Brooklyn" class cruiser,
1 "Aurora" class cruiser,
4 transport sailing vessels - sunk.
1 "Leander" class cruiser - torpedoed.

IX. Losses:

U 375 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Koenenkamp) was requested to make a position report on 31 July, 1 August and 2 August.

U 458 (Lieutenant (s.g.) Diggins) was requested to make a position report on 28, 29, 30 and 31 August. Neither of the boats has answered the request; their loss must be anticipated. We have no clues as to the cause of the losses

X. Appendix to the synopsis for July:

U 561 (Lieutenant (j.g.) Henning) and U 409

(Lieutenant (j.g.) Massmann) were lost in July. U 561 was torpedoed by an enemy M.T.B. whilst passing through the Strait of Messina. A small proportion of the crew, including the commander, were saved.

We have no clues as to the cause of the loss of U 409.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 OCTOBER, 1943

PG/30933

CONFIDENTIAL

16 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 74,
U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CH 96,
U 223 CH 33 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 223 put in to Toulon after his 3rd operation at 0900/16 October.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 380, 410, 565, 616, 593.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 371: 1228/15 October CJ 7729 westbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0700/16 October CH 8294 2 freighters 800 G.T. easterly course.
CH 8357 4 destroyers, course 260°, speed 17 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

-645-

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1400/16 October in Gibraltar harbor: the "Uganda" in dock, 8 destroyers, 34 small craft.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1525/16 October CP 4111 enemy formation of 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, northerly course, high speed.

2) 0350/16 October CK 7212 1 merchant ship, southerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

0955/16 October CK 4752 1 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 371 (Mehl) reported a success (see V a). The boats received an extract from the situation report.

V. a) Successes:

U 371 (Mehl) reported sinking a 6,000 G.R.T. freighter from a westbound convoy at 1228 on 15 October in CJ 7729 (10 miles north of Cape de Fer). Another freighter possibly sunk.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Lively operational and tactical radio traffic intercepted. Mainly what were probably stations in the Aegean took part in it, giving rise to the assumption that an operation is already in progress there, according to radio intercept service's interpretation.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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17 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 74,
U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CJ 77.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 380, 410, 565, 616, 593, 223.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 73: 2132/17 October CH 8511 1 large freighter, 1 destroyer.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0222/18 October CJ 5966 2 patrol vessels.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1400/17 October in Gibraltar harbor: cruisers in dock: the "Uganda", 1 "Honolulu" class.

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e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1445/17 October CP 4179 1 probable cruiser, course 20°, speed 22 knots.
1530 new course 340°.

c) By radio intercept service:

2132/17 October CO 3372 unit reported to Alexandria air attack on formation.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 73 (Deckert) was ordered to report his position.
U 371 reported in accordance with III A a).
The boats received an extract from the situation report and details of the positions of the ships bound for Oran to exchange wounded prisoners.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

1117 Captain U-boats back from duty trip to Berlin and Kiel.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 74,
U 73 CH 85,
U 371 CH 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 565, 616, 593.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Sardinia and Corsica, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 73: 2152/18 October CH 8375 2 freighters, 4 landing craft, westerly course.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0222/18 October CJ 5966 2 patrol vessels stopped.
2) 1355/18 October CJ 4376 2 minesweepers, 1 M.T.B., southeasterly course, 1 freighter 500 G.R.T., northerly course.
3) 1359/18 October CJ 8111 1 freighter 1,000 G.R.T., 3 escorts, southerly course, moderate speed.
4) 1405/18 October CH 7695 22 freighters approximately 150,000 G.R.T., 1 corvette, course 270°.
5) 1407/18 October CH 7699 2 cruisers, 3 guardboats, course 180°.

6) 1409/18 October CH 8465 1 liner approximately 20,000 G.R.T., course 230°.

7) 1410/18 October CH 8452 13 freighters, course 230°.

8) 1420/18 October CH 8438 23 warships, course 240°.

9) 1654/18 October CJ 6758 1 patrol vessel, course 60°.

10) 1403/18 October In Mers el Kebir harbor: 2 heavy cruisers, 6 destroyers, 18 freighters approximately 110,000 G.R.T., 2 liners totaling approximately 28,000 G.R.T., 2 tankers totaling approximately 16,000 G.R.T.

11) In Oran harbor and roads: 11 freighters totaling approximately 88,000 G.R.T., 1 tanker approximately 8,000 G.R.T.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1815/18 October from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean: 8 freighters in ballast, 3 patrol vessels.

2) 1830/17 October 4 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1600/18 October CJ 9979 7 medium-sized freighters,
CP 1544 1 M.T.B., course 280°.

c) By radio intercept service:

0709/18 October CO 3352 formation reported aircraft shadower.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) was ordered to report his position. No signal was received.
U 73 (Deckert) reported a success (see V a).
The boats received an excerpt from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

2112/18 October as in III A b) 4), 5), 7), 8).
0008/19 October as in III A d) 1).
0052/19 October as in III A b) 6), 10) and 11).

In addition the positions of the 4 ships carrying wounded prisoners ("Aquileia", "Sinaia", "Djenne" and "Gradisca") were passed on to the boats.

V. a) Successes:

U 73 (Deckert) at 2152 on 18 October in CH 8375 probably sank a 6,000 G.R.T. freighter.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 74,
U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CH 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 565, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean, inshore waters of Alexandria.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 431: 0306 - 0445/19 October CH 7496 - 7494 westbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1305/19 October CH 9438 7 destroyers, easterly course, speed 25 knots.

2) 1520/19 October CJ 1915 1 patrol vessel, southwesterly course.

3) 0450/20 October CJ 6774 1 ship, course 50°.

4) 1415/19 October CJ 9522 2 ships, moderate speed, course 350°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0800/19 October 3 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) a) 1500/19 October Cape Spartel: about 40 ships, bound for the Mediterranean.

b) 2220/19 October Ceuta: 30 ships bound for the Mediterranean. 9 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 gunboat from Gibraltar joined them.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

2315/19 October CO 3293 unit reported to Alexandria bombing attack by enemy aircraft.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) was ordered to report his position.
U 431 reported a success. He was returning.
U 73 at 0014 on 20 October sent a war distress signal (aircraft attack) from CH 8223.
The boat was ordered to report his position by short signal as soon as possible. At 2019 in 36° 52' N QR 51 E (not indicated) a

Gibraltar aircraft intercepted a surfaced U-boat, probably the same boat spotted by another aircraft at 0031/20 October in 36° 52' N QR 50 E/W (not indicated).

U 73's signal has possibly some connection with the sightings.

The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

1721/19 October as in III A d) 1),
0015/20 October as in III A b) 1),
0754/20 October as in III A d) 2) b).

V. a) Successes:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) at 0306 on 19 October in CH 7496 (10 miles west of Alboran) sank a freighter of 10,000 G.R.T. and one of 8,000 G.R.T. from a westbound convoy. At 0445 in CH 7494 (20 miles west of Alboran) from the same convoy the boat sank a freighter of 10,000 G.R.T. and torpedoed one of 12,000 G.R.T. which lay on fire stopped.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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20 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 76,
U 73 CH 82,
U 371 CH 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 565, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0845/20 October CJ 8661 merchant ships up to 3,000 G.R.T. (number not given), 13 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., 2 guardboats, northerly course.

2) 1240/20 October CJ 6786 6 small warships, type not identified, high speed, line ahead, course 150°.

3) 1400/20 October CJ 6619 1 M.T.B., high speed, northerly course.

4) 1414/20 October CJ 1928 1 merchant ship 6,000 G.R.T., course 350°, speed slight.

5) 1440/20 October CJ 4383 M.T.B.s, northerly course, moderate speed.

6) 1440/20 October CH 9475 50 ships, course 0°.

7) 1515/20 October CH 8174 1 merchant ship 10,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers, course 90°, high speed.

8) 1735/20 October CH 7581 60 freighters, 10 escorts, easterly course, speed 7 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1435/20 October CO 3113 1 merchant ship less than 2,000 G.R.T., 1 auxiliary ship.

2) 1605/20 October CP 4113 several destroyers and escort vessels, course 310°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 0009/21 October CO 3239 unit (according to our air reconnaissance 2 destroyers in the same position) reported air attack to Alexandria.

2) According to the interpretation of the radio intercept service the transmission of urgent operational radio messages to commands in the Aegean area and other unidentified participants gives rise to the assumption that an operation may possibly be starting in this area. The enemy forces of III B b) 2) strengthen this assumption.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) received orders to proceed via CH 8223. U 73 yesterday sent a distress signal of an air attack from this grid square.
U 73 (Deckert) reported at 0207/21 October from CH 8391 that the boat was attacked with bombs and depth charges in 8374 but suffered no damage.
The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

0126/21 October as in III A b) 6) - 8)

According to a radio intercept report, at 0140/21 October and 0200/21 October a Gibraltar aircraft was over a U-boat in a position which was not given exactly. Latitude was 37° 30' N at 0140, 37° 23' N at 0200. Longitude could not be deciphered.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The Fuehrer has awarded Lt. (j.g.) Schoeneboom (Commander of U 431) the Knight's Cross.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 92 (homeward bound),
U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CH 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 453 put out from Pola at 1615/21 October on his 12th operation.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 565, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0704/21 October CH 8481 42 freighters up to 10,000 G.R.T., course 60°.

2) 0652/21 October Bay of Oran 20 freighters.

3) 1418/21 October CH 7369 1 merchant steamer 8,000 G.R.T., course 260°, moderate speed.

4) 1425/21 October CH 7398 1 merchant steamer 4,000 G.R.T., course 270°.

5) 1445/21 October CH 8464 50 ships, 5 of them escorting vessels, easterly course.

6) 1500/21 October CH 8257 3 destroyers, course 220°.

7) 2320/21 October CJ 5956 1 ship, sailing alone.

c) By radio intercept service:

1015/21 October CJ 8210 Allied unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1445/21 October Punta Carnero; sailing from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean 1 French battleship of the "Richelieu" class, 2 destroyers.

2) 1415/21 October convoy of 49 freighters 6 - 7,000 G.R.T., 6 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, 9 tankers 6,000 - 8,000 G.R.T. passed Tangier bound for the Mediterranean.

According to a report from Ceuta part of the convoy put in to Gibraltar at 1700.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1520/21 October CP 1736 1 cruiser, 5 destroyers, course 330°, speed 30 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

2056/21 October CO 3268 unit reported to Alexandria bombing attack by enemy aircraft.

0218/22 October CO 3345 the same signal.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received an extract from the situation report and reports of enemy movements as follows:

1731/21 October as in III A b) 1),
2244/21 October as in III A d) 2),
2203/21 October as in III A d) 1),
0039/22 October as in III A b) 5) and 6).

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Captain U-boats' Command H.Q. moved with part of the Staff and subordinate Staff in the afternoon to Costabelle, east of Toulon.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 68 (homeward bound),
U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CH 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 37 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 565, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1155/22 October CH 8296 wreckage, barrels, beams, patches of oil.

2) 1200/22 October CH 8375 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, westerly course, speed slight.

3) 1218/22 October CH 8383 2 destroyers, course 310°.

4) 1447/22 October CJ 4853 1 merchant ship 1,000 G.R.T., course 0°, speed slight.

5) 1448/22 October CJ 4851 1 merchant ship 300 G.R.T., course 0°, speed slight, also 2 small barges.

6) 1515/22 October CJ 4263 1 merchant ship 1,000 G.R.T., course 80°, moderate speed.

7) 1520/22 October CJ 4372 1 merchant ship 1,000 G.R.T., course 160°, moderate speed.

8) 1545/22 October CJ 4358 1 torpedoboat course 190°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1530/22 October 2 laden freighters put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) Convoy, as in III A d) 2) 21 October, with 42 freighters, 7 tankers, 3 American destroyers, 3 American gunboats passed through to the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2310/22 October CO 3238 2 destroyers, course 220°, speed 25 knots.

2) 0050/23 October CO 3268 1 destroyer, course 180°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:)Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

2356/22 October as in III A b) 2) and 3).
0113/23 October as in III A d) 2).
Lt. (s.g.) Brandi, Commander of U 617 lost on the Spanish Moroccan coast on the night 12/13 September reported verbally to Captain U-boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The remainder of Captain U-boats's Staff and subordinate Staff moved from Toulon to Costabelle.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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23 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 66,
U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CH 96.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 63 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 565 put out from Toulon at 2300/23 October on his 15th operation.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 565, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 593.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhonian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Probing reconnaissance of Alexandria and Cyprus, reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1420/23 October CJ 5751 2 torpedoboats, northerly course.

2) 1355/23 October CJ 8118 2 apparent M.T.B.s, course 360°, high speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1115/23 October 1 "Amora" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1315/23 October 3 troopships, carrying troops, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 1545/23 October Ceuta; 13 freighters, 1 tanker, 1 troopship, bound for the Mediterranean.

4) 1315/23 October Ceuta; 3 transports, 2 freighters, 3 corvettes, bound for the Mediterranean.

5) 1530/23 October 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

6) 1630/23 October 1 minelaying cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1420/23 October CP 1581 2 probable escort vessels, course 290°, speed 25 knots.

2) 1445/23 October CP 4183 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, course 340°, speed 25 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

1451/23 October CP 4158 unit reported 1 aircraft shadowing

formation, course 329°, speed 20 knots.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) was requested to report his position. The boat commenced return passage from his operational area on 19 October in the Alboran sea area and has not yet reported his intention of crossing the 42° N parallel or time of arrival at the rendezvous off Toulon.

The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

2215/23 October as in III A d) 2) and 4),
0417/24 October as in III A d) 3).

1438/23 October one of our aircraft sighted one of our U-boats in CH 9126, course 0°. Reasons for believing it to be one of our U-boats are not known here. 2nd Flieger-division is being asked. Possibly it is U 73 who might have withdrawn comparatively far from his operational area. The idea that it is U 431 is not excluded if the boat were in this case unexpectedly behind on his return passage to Toulon.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 63,
U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CH 96,
U 565 CH 39 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CK 47.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1511/24 October CH 9445 2 corvettes.
2) 1512/24 October CH 9467 4 merchant steamers up to 3,000 G.R.T., 4 destroyers, southerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1600/24 October 1 "Aurora" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1900/24 October Gibraltar harbor report: 1 minelaying cruiser, 1 auxiliary cruiser. In dock 2 cruisers, in addition 13 destroyers, 37 small craft.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1310/24 October CK 7217 1 freighter, northerly course.

2) 1529/24 October CK 7423 1 tanker, course 200°.

3) 1358/24 October CK 7772 2 medium - sized warships, course 150°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) was requested to report his position. No signal was received.
U 453 (von Schlippenbach) reported the completion of his minelaying mission off Brindisi and received orders to return to Pola.
The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

2311/24 October as in III A b) 1) and 2),
2336/24 October as in III A d) 1).

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

25 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 431 CH 39 (?) (homeward bound),
U 73 CH 83, U 371 CH 96,
U 565 CJ 71 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CK 47 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1039/25 October CJ 6776 1 probable escort vessel, course 80°.

2) 1047/25 October CJ 6786 1 destroyer, 6 liberty ships (2 carrying landing craft), totaling 41,000 G.R.T., course 180°.

c) By radio intercept service:

0648/25 October CH 5260 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1520/24 October Cape Spartel; 1 "Delhi" class cruiser, bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 1750/24 October 1 auxiliary cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

3) 1815/25 October 2 freighters in ballast, 1 corvette put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1500/25 October CP 1819 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, northerly course, high speed.

2) 1612/25 October CP 1493 1 formation probably the one sighted in 1).

3) 1315/25 October CK 7428 2 freighters approximately 2,000 G.R.T. course 20°.

4) 1534/25 October CJ 6615 2 merchant ships 2,000 G.R.T. each, course 330°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0010/25 October Iskanderun: the British tanker "Ensis" put in to port.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (von Schlippenbach) was asked to report when he will cross the 42° N parallel and when he intends reaching Point H. U 453 reported 2400/25 October and 0700/27 October respectively. U 431 (Schoeneboom) was asked to report his position. No signal was received. After three unanswered requests the greatest concern is felt about the boat.
The boats received an extract from the situation report.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

According to teleprint message Naval High Command General Navy Office/Naval Defense 1 AH 22106/43 g. dated 23 October, 11 members of the crew of U 409 (Massmann) are prisoners of war in the United States of America.

VI. General situation:

According to the interpretation of our radio intercept service station, operational traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean together with the enemy formation sighted in III B b) 1) assumes an operation against the Aegean.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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26 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 83,
U 371 CH 96,
U 565 CJ 73 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 62 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put out from Toulon at 1700/26 October on his 14th operation.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 73: 1714/26 CH 8382 westbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1030/26 October 5 "Agathe" boats put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1720/26 October 1 "Honolulu" class cruiser, 1 destroyer put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:) Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

1457/26 October CN 3180 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
e) By naval forces:) Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

It was intended that the next operation of U 453 (Schlippenbach) would be a torpedo operation. U 453 on 25 October received orders by radio to take on a full load of torpedoes after reaching Pola. On the orders of Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) (1U (U-boats) 3178/43 Most Secret dated 26 October), U 453 is to carry out another minelaying operation off Bari. U 453 has been instructed accordingly by radio.

U 371 (Mehl) was ordered to report his position. U 371 reported having fired all his torpedoes.

He intends to cross the 42° N parallel at 1800 on 27 October and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0800 on 28 October.
U 73 (Deckert) received orders to report on the night 27/28 October whether he submerged from one of our aircraft at 1438 on 23 October in CH 9126. (See War Diary entry IV of 23 October). The 2nd Fliegerdivision replied, in answer to our query, that the boat in question was identified as ours by its silhouette. The query to U 73 and its answer will serve to clarify the whereabouts of U 431 whose loss must be presumed.
U 73 reported 2 misses on the convoy of III A a) and requested permission to return as he had only 2 stern torpedoes left. The boat received orders to make for Toulon.
The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as in III A d) 2).

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

27 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 59 (homeward bound),
U 371 CH 93 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 39 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 31 (homeward bound),
U 565 CJ 85 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 453 put in to Pola at 0915/27 October from his 12th operation.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 586.

-670-

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1200/27 October CJ 4289 1 freighter 2,500 G.R.T., northerly course.

2) 1230/27 October CJ 4384 3 torpedoboats, southwesterly course, high speed, 4 guard-boats, northerly course, moderate speed.

3) 1245/27 October CJ 6758 1 medium-sized merchant ship, course 0°.
6743 3 destroyers, course 330°.

4) 1320/27 October CJ 4661 1 patrol vessel, course 360°.

5) 0400/28 October CJ 9122 convoy consisting of about 30 to 40 ships, course 350°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0745/27 October Punta Carnero: French light cruiser from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

2) 1110/27 October Cape Spartel: convoy (so far 10 ships sighted) bound for the Mediterranean.
1730/27 October put in to Gibraltar.

3) 2100/27 October Europa Point: convoy of probably 20 ships bound for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1153/27 October CP 4769 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 probable infantry landing craft, course 160°, speed 20 knots.

2) a) 1225/27 October CP 1882 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer with air cover, northerly course, speed 20 knots.

b) 1400/27 October CP 1825 same formation, northerly course, speed 20 knots.

3) 1350/27 October CJ 9924 convoy: 3 large, 7 smaller merchant ships, course 30°.

4) 1357/27 October CJ 9898 convoy: 28 to 30 ships, course 30°.

c) By radio intercept service:
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 565 (Henning) was ordered to report his position by short signal on passing CN 29. U 565 reported a success (see V a). The boat has permission to attack all submarines.
U 371 (Mehl) and U 73 (Deckert) homeward bound were informed that U 593 (Kelbling) was sailing on 26 October. U 593 is proceeding via 6835 to the Western Mediterranean.
U 593 received as his attack area the area between the meridians in CH 7915 and 8375.
U 73 reported by short signal "No" that he did not submerge from one of our aircraft at 1438 on 23 October in CH 9126. (See War Diary entry IV of 26 October). It is not completely excluded that it was U 431 although there are very strong doubts that the aircraft concerned definitely identified the U-boat sighted as one of ours. This would be the only

information of U 431 since his signal of 19 October reporting a success and start of return passage.

V. a) Successes:

U 565 (Henning) probably at 2115 on 27 October in CJ 8845 sank a destroyer.

b) Losses:

U 458 (Diggins) is reported missing with effect from 2 October. The boat put out from Toulon on 14 August. Last signal from CN 2377 on 22 August. Loss possibly due to 2 destroyers. Fate of the crew is not known. 5 officers and 38 men were possibly taken prisoner. (See War Diary of Captain U-boats, 2 October, V b).

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 66 (homeward bound),
U 371 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 92 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 CN 22 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put in to Toulon at 0900/28 October after his 14th operation.
U 380 put out from Toulon at 1715/28 October on his 9th operation. Put in again at 2230/28 October.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1150/28 October CJ 5911 1 hospital ship, 1 merchant ship up to 10,000 G.R.T., course 150°, speed 7 knots.

2) 1420/28 October CJ 4385 1 motor gunboat, westerly course, high speed.

3) 2015/28 October CJ 6749 3 ships.

4) 2045/28 October CJ 6779 up to 10 ships identified, probably more, course probably north-easterly.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1210/28 October 5 British freighters with troops on board, 1 Italian transport, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 3 destroyers, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

1800/28 October 3 freighters in ballast, 1 French gunboat put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0730/28 October CO 1488 1 small warship, course 150°, moderate speed.

2) 1024/28 October CP 4731 4 probable destroyers, course 160°, high speed.

3) 1325/28 October CP 1596 3 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., 1 escorting vessel, course 300°, speed 10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

1600/28 October CP 1824 auxiliary unit reported to Beirut air attack on formation.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Roether) has interrupted his operation because of leaks in the pressure hull and is putting in to port again.
U 73 (Deckert) intends to cross the 42° N parallel at 0000 on 29 October and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0730.
U 593 (Kelbling) was notified of the possible arrival of new boats from the Atlantic. A ban on attacking submarines has been ordered for the whole of the Western Mediterranean.

The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

0947/28 October as in III A d) 3) dated 27 October, 1931/28 October as in III A d) 1).

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

U 617 (Lt. (s.g.) Brandi) is finally reported lost with effect from 12 September. The boat put out from Toulon on 28 August. Sunk by scuttling after being severely damaged by an aircraft off Melilla. Crew interned in Spain. (Naval War Staff 2nd Division/ C-in-C U-boats Operations G 10885 A5 dated 26 October.)

The Commander has already reached Germany.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 66 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 82.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 CN 22 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 616, 371.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats: Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0334/29 October CJ 1939 3 merchant ships up to 1,000 G.R.T., course 110°, speed 10 knots.

2) 1900/29 October CJ 6773 1 probable aircraft carrier, course not identified.

3) 2000/29 October CJ 6786 convoy, probably bound for Naples.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) Night of 28/29 October 4 auxiliary cruisers put in to Gibraltar.

2) 1800/28 October Alboran 1 battleship, 2 cruisers and more vessels, bound for the Atlantic.

3) Night 28/29 October 1 "Dido" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from an unknown direction, mine-laying cruiser in the harbor, (put out on an unidentified course).

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:) Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1447/29 October CJ 6610 British unit located.

2) 1307/29 October CP 1763 (indicated) unit reported to Alexandria aircraft attacked formation, course 10°, speed 20 knots.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received an extract from the situation report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 84.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 CN 25 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 73 put in to Toulon at 0815/30 October from his 14th operation.
U 380 put out from Toulon at 1015/30 October on his 9th operation.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 223, 380, 410, 616, 371.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

1) 0950/30 October CJ 6785 about 15 to 20 merchant ships, course 150° - 170°, strongly escorted.

2) 1005/30 October CJ 5929 3 minesweepers, course 140°.

3) 1115/30 October CJ 4637 4 torpedoboats, 3 guardboats, course 180°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1155/30 October Alboran, 25 miles south, 2 battleships, probably "Nelson" class, 6 destroyers, escorted by aircraft, bound for the Atlantic. The same formation was reported by Tres Forcas at 1200.

2) 1730/30 October 2 Italian light cruisers, 1 "Guiseppe Garibaldi" class and 1 "Duca d'Aosta" class, 2 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0940/30 October CP 4221 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, northerly course.

2) 1308/30 October CK 7437 20 medium-sized to large freighters, 5 escort vessels, course 220°.

3) 1343/30 October CP 1566 2 destroyers, 2 2 escort vessels, course 266°, speed 8 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

1345/30 October CP 1545 unit reported 1 aircraft shadowing formation, course 266°, speed 8 knots.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 565 (Henning) from CO 4131 reported details of his success on 27 October.
U 380 (Roether) was permitted to attack submarines. The boats received an extract from the situation report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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31 October, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 84,
U 380 CH 66 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 CO 41 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

Nothing to report.

c) In port:
(At 0800)

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 455, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1215/31 October CJ 4297 4 probable warships, easterly course.

2) 1249/31 October CJ 6742 3 merchant ships, bound for Naples.

3) 1235/31 October CJ 8368 3 merchant ships approximately 3,000 G.R.T. each, course 20°.

4) 1226/31 October CJ 5969 2 small warships, course 250°.

5) 1335/31 October CJ 1932 2 probable torpedoboats, 1 small transport, course 160°.

6) 2230/31 October CJ 5963 3 ships, course not known.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1130/31 October 1 light cruiser ("Delhi" class) put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

2) On the night of 31 October 1 "Dido" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from an unknown direction.

3) 1115/31 October Cape Spartel; 5 freighters 6,000 - 8,000 G.R.T., 1 tanker 6,000 G.R.T., 2 auxiliary warships. Convoy put in to Gibraltar.

4) 1315/31 October Cape Spartel; 59 freighters, 11 escorts, bound for the Mediterranean.

5) 1645/31 October 17 freighters, 1 tanker, 2 destroyers, 5 escort vessels putting out from Gibraltar.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1425/31 October CP 1557 1 probable freighter, course 120°.

2) 1555/31 October CP 1546 3 small warships in Turkish territorial waters.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Roether) received as his attack area the area in the Tyrrhenian Sea east of the meridian in CJ 8685 with a reminder that enemy traffic runs mainly north via 8695 and 9195 and vice versa.
U 565 (Henning) intends to cross the 35° N parallel to the north at 0600 on 2 November on his way to Salamis.
U 450 (Boehme), one of the boats breaking through from the Atlantic, reported from CH 7277.

Enemy reports of our U-boats:

1) Between 1320 and 1400 on 31 October a U-boat was attacked by a patrol vessel in the Straits of Gibraltar.

2) According to a radio intercept message, an enemy unit sighted a surfaced U-boat and survivors in the water at 2213 in CG 9583.

3) Gibraltar aircraft at 0022/1 November was over a U-boat in 35° 55' N. Longitude was not given.

In all three cases one or several U-boats breaking through from the Atlantic were concerned.
Of 5 boats intended for the Mediterranean, which sailed from ports on the west coast of France on 17 and 18 October, one (U 566) was sunk by aircraft on 24 October in CG 2839. So far there is no definite news of the whereabouts of the other three.

The boats received an extract from the situation report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

1729/31 October as in III A d) 3),
0012/1 November as in III A d) 4) and 5).

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

Synopsis for October 1943

I. Enemy activity in October was concentrated on the Central Italy area. The enemy tried in hard fighting to gain as much territory as possible as quickly as possible. He did not carry out any more landing operations.

As a result of the great demands made on enemy forces, enemy activity in naval warfare concentrated on reinforcements, reserves and supplies for Allied troops operating in the Mediterranean.

No preparations for fairly large scale landing operations were observed.

During the month the enemy withdrew the majority of his heavy forces and a smaller number of his landing craft from the Mediterranean. The reason for the withdrawal of the heavy units is the elimination of the Italian Fleet as a result of the capitulation of Italy. The simultaneous withdrawal of landing craft may mean that the Allies do not intend to carry out fairly large scale landings shortly. An accurate picture of the strength and distribution of landing craft and so of the enemy's intentions could not be obtained owing to the lack of air reconnaissance caused by the shortage of aircraft. But it may be definitely assumed on the strength of assessments that the landing craft still believed to be in the Mediterranean area are sufficient to land roughly 5 or 6 divisions without bringing up transports. According to estimations 30% of the total number of landing craft are in the Italian area.

II. The belief expressed in the synopsis for September in paragraph VI, that enemy traffic would concentrate in the Western Mediterranean on the route from Gibraltar - along the North African coast - north coast of Sicily - Salerno Bay, has been confirmed.
According to the number of boats available, U-boat operations were concentrated

a) in the Western Mediterranean in the area from Alboran to east of Algiers and
b) in the Eastern Mediterranean in the area from the Straits of Otranto to Cape Passero and between Benghazi and Derna on the coast of Cyrenaica.

In spite of the small number of boats, the few in the operational area (see "number of boats occupying operational areas" in VI) in October achieved the best sinkings to date. It is to be regretted that it was not possible to have

sufficient boats worth mentioning operate on the enemy from the middle of the month. The successes were therefore forced to diminish.

III. Two boats each carried out a special operation in the new moon period -

a) U 453 (Schlippenbach) carried out the operation mentioned in the synopsis for September under V a). Another similar operation off Bari was ordered. It is planned to have this completed shortly after the new moon period.

b) U 73 (Deckert) had orders to disembark an agent on the Algerian coast. Both missions were excellently carried out by the boats.

c) On 14 October Naval War Staff ordered one boat to be detailed for the Aegean. As the boat is to provide support for a special mission, but no boat in Pola will be ready to operate in time, U 565 in Toulon is assigned to the special operation. A disadvantage is that a boat is being withdrawn from the few in the concentration area of the Western Mediterranean. The Commander of U 565 is on his first operation and has a difficult task before him. In the meantime he has passed through the Sicilian Channel, sunk a destroyer north of the Channel and is proceeding to Salamis.

d) In the October new moon period 5 Atlantic boats are due to pass through the Straits of Gibraltar. Of these 5 boats U 566 (Hornkohl) was sunk as it approached. Our former experience, that the pre-requisite for this operation is unobserved approach, is confirmed. If this condition is fulfilled, the rest of the operation is no problem.

IV. In the coming month, conditions in the Mediterranean will not alter substantially. Paragraph VI of the synopsis for September will therefore still apply entirely to all points. It must be added that traffic was repeatedly spotted by air reconnaissance west of Sardinia and Corsica to Ajaccio and south of Sardinia to Cagliari. It is planned to have boats putting out from Toulon proceed south on the 200 meter line of the islands on their passage to the operational areas, in order to intercept any traffic there may be here.

It can also be seen for the coming month that the number of boats available is insufficient to occupy the areas where traffic runs continuously and which are likely to yield successes.

The ever recurring agent's reports of landing in the south of France are believed to be enemy decoy reports. On the other hand it is likely that comparatively

small commando raids will be made by the enemy on certain objectives in the coastal area.

A Balkan landing does not seem likely in the near future. The lack of air reconnaissances of ports in enemy hands, however, prevents us from obtaining a reliable insight in to enemy intentions.

Owing to the shortage of boats and the numerous tasks on hand, it is not possible to withdraw U-boats and hold them in readiness for attacks against the enemy whose future plans are merely suspected at present. Frequent air reconnaissance of Naples confirms the presence of landing craft to carry approximately three tenths of a landing division. There is a possibility that the enemy will start overhauling operations on the west coast of Italy from Naples. But as the time, as well as the area where the landing is planned, is completely in the air, and also the minefields along the coast make effective U-boat attacks very difficult, it is not intended at this time to have one U-boat occupy the area north of Naples as a precaution.

As has been already stated, the main battle areas in the coming month will be:

in the western area,
the enemy traffic route on the North African coast and the Sicily - Naples route,

in the Eastern Mediterranean,
the Malta - Straits of Otranto route on the south coast of Italy and the route from Alexandria - along the coast of Cyrenaica - to Malta on the Straits of Otranto.

V. Zaunkönig and Wanze have again proved satisfactory and assisted in the high number of sinkings. The majority of destroyers sunk would probably not have been hit but for "Zaunkönig". In one case a boat in the Alboran area reloaded after a successful attack on a convoy and carried out another successful anticipatory maneuver. We may also assume - the boat (U 431 - Schoeneboom) was lost on the return passage - that Aphrodite and Wanze played a decisive part in this. A few Commanders reported that they were approached accurately without location in spite of clear Wanze and Naxos.
No information regarding new types of enemy defensive and offensive measures has been received. The very strong sea reflections which are occuring again at present make it difficult for boats in the Western Mediterranean. According to our experiences last year this is chiefly the case in the sea area west of Algiers. U-boat operations must take this into account.

VI. The number of boats occupying operational areas in October was as follows:

October

	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound.	Homeward bound.	In port.	Total U-boats.
1.	4	2	1	1	5	13
2.	2	2	1	2	6	13
3.	2	2	1	2	6	13
4.	3	2	1	1	6	13
5.	3	2	1	1	6	13
6.	3	2	2	-	6	13
7.	4	1	1	1	6	13
8.	4	1	2	1	5	13
9.	5	1	-	2	5	13
10.	5	1	-	2	5	13
11.	5	-	-	2	6	13
12.	3	-	-	3	7	13
13.	3	-	-	2	8	13
14.	3	-	-	2	8	13
15.	3	-	-	2	8	13
16.	3	-	-	1	9	13
17.	3	-	-	-	10	13
18.	3	-	-	-	10	13
19.	3	-	-	-	10	13
20.	2	-	-	1	10	13
21.	2	-	-	1	10	13
22.	2	-	1	1	9	13
23.	2	-	1	1	9	13
24.	2	1	1	1	8	13
25.	2	-	1	2	8	13
26.	2	-	1	2	8	12
27.	-	-	1	4	7	12
28.	-	-	1	3	8	12
29.	1	-	-	2	9	12
30.	1	-	1	2	8	12
31.	1	-	1	1	9	12

Daily average in the periods:

From	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound.	Homeward bound.	In port.
1-10	3.5	1.6	1	1.3	5.6
11-20	3.1	0	0	1.3	8.6
21-31	1.4	0.1	0.8	1.8	8.5

Daily average for the month:

	2.6	0.6	0.6	1.5	7.6
i.e.	20.3%	4.7%	4.7%	11.7%	59.4%

VII. The following successes were obtained in the Mediterranean in October:

Boat	No. of merchant ships sunk.	G.R.T.	Warships sunk.	Days at sea.	Remarks.
U 73	1	6,000	-	26	
U 81	-	-	-	13	
U 223	2	18,000	1 destroyer	16	
U 371	1	6,000	2 destroyers	22	1 freighter 6,000 G.R.T., probably sunk.
U 380	1	8,000	1 destroyer	13	
U 410	3	24,000	-	3	2 freighters 17,000 G.R.T. torpedoed, probably sunk.
U 431	4	40,000	-	25	
U 453	-	-	-	7	minelaying operation.
U 565	-	-	1 destroyer	10	
U 593	-	-	-	11	
U 596	1	8,000	-	10	1 freighter 5,000 G.R.T. torpedoed, probably sunk.
U 616	3	10,000	1 destroyer	13	1 unidentified unit torpedoed.
12 U-boats	16	120,000	6 destroyers	169	4 ships totaling 28,000 G.R.T. and 1 unidentified unit torpedoed.

12 U-boats in 169 days at sea sank 16 ships totaling 120,000 G.R.T. and 6 destroyers and torpedoed 4 ships totaling 28,000 G.R.T. and 1 unidentified unit.
12 boats spent 169 days at sea.
1 boat spent 14.08 days at sea on an average.
12 boats sank 120,000 G.R.T.
1 boat sank 10,000 G.R.T. on an average.

Each boat on an average sank 10,000 G.R.T. in 14.08 days at sea i.e. 710.2 G.R.T. per day.

Effectiveness of boats operating:

In October 710.05 G.R.T. were sunk daily over a period of 169 days by 12 U-boats.

VIII. U 431 (Schoeneboom) was lost as he was returning. The boat was probably sunk by aircraft.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 NOVEMBER, 1943

PG/30933

1 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 84,
U 380 CJ 75 (outward bound),
U 450 CJ 73.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 CO 51 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1545/1 November — Bonifacio Straits, 1 motor torpedoboat.

2) 1610/1 November CJ 6752 — 5 destroyers in line ahead, northerly course.

3) 1740/1 November CH 7584 — approximately 60 freighters, course 90°, speed 7 knots.

(Convoys as in III A. d) 3) and 4) joined.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0800/1 November 1 "Dido" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 0900/1 November 1 French cruiser, probably the "Montcalm" class, passed Gibraltar from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

3) 1040/1 November Tres Forcas: 32 freighters, 4 destroyers, bound for the Mediterranean.

4) 1200/1 November Alboran: 29 freighters, 1 transport, 2 tankers, 5 destroyers, 2 probable cruisers, bound for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 450 (Böhme) received orders to make for Toulon via CH 9122, 6685 and 3916. The purpose of the recall was to receive from the Commander as quickly as possible his experiences on breaking through the Straits of Gibraltar for use in further U-boat attempts to pass from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

From 0400/2 November U 565 (Henning) is passed to the control of Admiral Aegean.

The boats received an extract from the Situation Report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

1406/1 November as in III A. d) 1),
0701/2 November as in III A. b) 3),
0647/2 November as in III A. d) 4),
0604/2 November as in III A. b) 2),
0611/2 November as in III A. d) 2).

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

C-in-C South summed up the naval situation in the Mediterranean as follows:

"On 30 October at midday a formation of 2 battleships, probably the "Nelson" and the "Rodney", was off Tres Forcas on a westerly course. Apparently the enemy is continuing to withdraw his battleships from the Mediterranean and to replace them with French battleships ("Richelieu" and probably also the "Lorraine"). There is no report of the battleship, presumably the "Warspite", sighted on 28 October north of Alboran on a westerly course, passing through the Straits of Gibraltar but reports from Gibraltar are at present scrappy. Also the Italian cruisers "Guiseppe Garibaldi" and "Duca d'Aosta", as well as the destroyers "Legionario" and "Oriani" were north of Alboran on a westerly course at midday on 30 October. It is presumed that they are bound for England to change their crews. The distribution of landing craft could still not be clarified any further. In particular air reconnaissance had not been successful for some time in obtaining opportunities of examining the ports of Bizerta, Palermo and Taranto, the main assembly areas for large-scale operations in Italy. The uncertainty regarding enemy intentions continues."

(Signed) Kreisch.

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2 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 84,
U 380 CJ 85 (outward bound),
U 450 CH 58 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 CO 29 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 453 put out from Pola at 1630/2 November on his 13th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean, inshore waters of Alexandria.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1130/2 November CH 8455 55 ships, course 60°, speed 7 knots.

2) 1545/2 November CJ 4236 3 merchant ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

1316/2 November CJ 5674 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) On the night of 2 November 1 French cruiser of the "Montcalm" class put in to Gibraltar.

2) 1830/2 November 5 destroyers, 3 corvettes, 5 M.T.B.s put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 1830/2 November 1 French cruiser of the "Montcalm" class put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

4) 1400/2 November Gibraltar harbor report:

1 "Dido" class cruiser, 1 "Fiji" class cruiser, 1 French cruiser, 2 Italian cruisers, 4 British auxiliary cruisers, 7 destroyers.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0805/2 November 4564 2 probable destroyers, course 180°, speed 30 knots.

2) a) 1230/2 November Bari harbor: 20 freighters totaling 97,000 G.R.T., 4 destroyers, several landing craft.

b) 1245/2 November Brindisi harbor: 9 freighters approximately 40,000 G.R.T., 8 small naval craft.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 565 (Henning) intends to be off the Salamis rendezvous at 0800 on 4 November.

U 593 (Kelbling) was ordered to report his position. No signal was received.

The boats received an extract from the Situation Report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

1928/2 November as in III A. b) 1),
0033/3 November as in III B. b) 2) a),
0030/3 November as in III A. d) 2).

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Situation in the Mediterranean on 1 November, 1943

1) Warships

According to information from Naval War Staff 3rd Division, the sighting reports of battleships off Alboran were false (see War Diary Captain

U-boats Para. VI of 1 November). Probably they were confused with the British or Italian cruisers which have put in to Gibraltar in the meantime. The following are believed to be in the Mediterranean: 2 battleships of the "Nelson" class, 1 of the "Warspite" class, 1 of the "Richelieu" class, also the "Lorraine" (not reliable).

The number of cruisers has been reduced to 13 with the withdrawal of 5 to the Atlantic since mid-September. Of these at least 2 are definitely incapable of operating after air attacks. 4 cruisers are believed to be in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Of approximately 65 destroyers, 6 are believed sunk, 6 severely damaged, so that 53 destroyers are at present able to operate, of which some 15 are in the Eastern Mediterranean.

2) Landing craft - Shipping space

Numbers: 153 landing ships (tank), 363 landing craft (tank)/landing craft (infantry). Distribution believed to be: approximately 35% in the Italian area, 20% in the Western Mediterranean, 15% in the Eastern Mediterranean, the remainder not known. Since the withdrawal of 80 landing craft (tank/landing craft (infantry) reported on 26 October, no further change was determined in the Mediterranean.

3) Convoys

Roughly 25,000 men were brought to the Mediterranean in 2 transport convoys on 21 and 23 October.

The monthly supply of war material from Britain and the United States of America was in the region of 1·8 million G.R.T. (every 3 convoys consisting of 35 to 40 and 50 to 60 ships each on an average) according to Naval War Staff 3rd Division's calculations, apart from transit traffic in the estimated region of 300,000 G.R.T., and served only as supplies and not additional stocks of war material in the Mediterranean area.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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3 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 84,
U 380 Palermo - Naples,
U 450 CH 68 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 37 (outward bound),
U 565 CO 26 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1145/3 November CJ 6728 convoy of 50 ships with escorts.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0830/3 November 4 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1615/3 November Gibraltar. After 4 auxiliary cruisers had put out with a convoy of 54 ships for the Atlantic 1 "Delhi" class cruiser could be seen in the harbor.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1040/3 November CJ 6285 2 probable destroyers, course 120°, high speed.

2) 0830/3 November CJ 6196 25-30 landing craft, 5.5 miles east of them 2 destroyers cruising.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

Nothing to report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received an extract from the Situation Report and at 2054/3 November were informed of the enemy sighting as in III A. b).

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

U 431 (Schoeneboom) is reported missing with effect from 23 October. The boat put out from Toulon on 26 September. Last signal was on 19 October from CH 7494 reporting a success. The fate of the crew is not known. (Naval High Command/Naval War Staff 2nd Division C-in-C U-boats (Operations) G 11139 A5 dated 1 November). The following information of the loss of U 431 was revealed after the Commander of U 73 returned and reported verbally:

1) On the night 19/20 October U 73 was bombed by an aircraft in CH 8374 at 0400. When U 73 sent off the distress signal the position was given as CH 8223 by mistake. Then U 431 received orders on the morning of 20 October to make for CH 8223 and look out for U 73.

2) On the following night at 0140 and 0200 on 21 October a U-boat was intercepted by an enemy aircraft in a not accurately given position, 37° 30' or 37° 23' N. This latitude corresponded to that in CH 8223 where U 431 would have been at that time. At this time U 73 was in CH 8368. It may be assumed that U 431 was the boat reported by the enemy aircraft. U 73, submerged in 8368 at 0032 and 0154 on 21 October, heard 5, then 3 bombs.

3) At 1438 on 23 October one of our aircraft sighted what was supposed to be one of our U-boats in CH 9126, course 0°, at a range of 2 kms. which submerged on being approached. It cannot be entirely excluded that this was U 431 although it is very doubtful that the aircraft concerned definitely identified the boat sighted as one of ours.

4) Synopsis

It is suspected that U 431 was destroyed in an aircraft attack on the night 20/21 October. The possibility that it was sunk on 23 October when submerging from one of our aircraft cannot be ignored altogether.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 84,
U 380 Palermo - Naples,
U 450 CH 66 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 63 (outward bound),
U 565 CK 89 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 565 put in to Salamis, his 15th operation interrupted, at 1030/4 November.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.

2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 593: 0047/3 November CH 8295 eastbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1130/4 November CJ 4629 3 destroyers, course 180°, 3 guardboats, course 0°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1830/4 November Europa Point: bound for the Mediterranean, 23 transports (1 of 25,000 G.R.T., 5 of 20,000 G.R.T., 14 of 14,000 - 18,000 G.R.T., 3 of 6,000 - 10,000 G.R.T.), 2 freighters, 9 American "Dunlop" class destroyers.

2) 1830/4 November 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 1715/4 November 1 French cruiser of the "Montcalm" class put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

4) 1630/4 November 9 American destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

5) 0745/4 November 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0835/4 November CP 4725 3 destroyers or escort vessels, course 160°, speed 20 knots.

2) 1230/4 November CK 7168 5 units, southerly course.

3) 1300/4 November CK 7444 20 units.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

According to radio intercept service an Algiers aircraft reported attacking an unmanned target at 1945 on 3 November. U 593, the only boat on the North African coast, was ordered to report by short signal the position of the attack if he were attacked by an aircraft at the time in question, in any case he was to report his position.

U 593 reported a success (see V. a) and that he was returning because his tubes were damaged in a depth-charge attack. U 593 drove off an air attack at 1915 on 3 November in 8355 and one at 1955 in 8353. Probably connected with the enemy report.

U 450 (Böhme) intends to cross the 42° N parallel on the evening of 7 November.

U 81 (Krieg), due to sail on 4 November, has been delayed until 6 November owing to failure of the quadruplet when firing after putting out.

The boats received an extract from the Situation Report and at 2043/4 November and 0108/5 November were notified of the convoy in III A. d) 1).

V. a) Successes:

U 593 (Kolbling) at 0047 on 3 November in CH 8295 sank a steamer of 7,000 G.R.T. from an eastbound convoy and on 30 October in CH 8295 fired a three-fan miss at the French battleship "Richelieu".

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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5 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 92 (homeward bound),
U 380 Palermo - Naples,
U 450 CH 66 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 66.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0653/5 November CJ 4845 convoy of 8 medium-sized freighters, 2 escort vessels, course 320°, moderate speed.

2) 1155/5 November CJ 8367 1 destroyer, 1 M.T.B., southerly course.

3) 1815/5 November CH 8512 convoy of 32 ships (transport convoy) course 80°, speed 12 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

2000/5 November Gibraltar harbor report:

cruisers: 1 "Fiji" class, 1 "Dido" class, 1 "Montcalm" class, 1 auxiliary cruiser.

7 destroyers, 47 small craft.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0653/5 November CO 4845 8 medium-sized freighters, 2 escort vessels, course 320°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 450 (Böhme) and U 593 (Kelbling) both returning to Toulon, were forbidden to attack submarines.

U 593 intends to cross the 42° N parallel at 0000 on 7 November and to be at the rendezvous at 0800.

The boats received an extract from the Situation Report and were informed of the enemy sighting as in III. A. b) 2).

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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6 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 66 (homeward bound),
U 380 Palermo - Naples,
U 450 CH 68 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 66.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 put out from Pola at 1400/6 November on his 16th operation.
U 565 put out from Salamis at 2130/6 November to continue his interrupted operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0700/6 November CH 9473 5 ships not exceeding 20,000 G.R.T., 16 ships up to 10,000 G.R.T., 5 destroyers, course 80°, hove to.

2) 0720/6 November CH 9446 3 ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers, course 200°, speed 10 knots.

3) 1250/6 November CH 9465 2 destroyers, course 90°, moderate speed.

4) a) 1300/6 November CH 9567 20 ships, 8 warships.

b) 1543/6 November CH 9647 22 ships, 8 destroyers.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1800/6 November CH 9661 2 aircraft attacked convoy, course 84°, speed 12 knots.

2) 1955/6 November CH 3620 British unit, probably submarine, located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0930/6 November 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1500/6 November the Italian cruisers "Duca d'Aosta" and "Guiseppe Garibaldi" and 2 Italian destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic for gunnery exercises, at 1800/6 November passed Tarifa bound for Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0835/6 November CP 4818 1 large 2-masted sailing ship, course 130°, speed slight.

2) 0928/6 November CP 4469 2 merchant ships up to 2,000 G.R.T., course 70°, moderate speed.

3) 0954/6 November CP 4242 1 probable destroyer, course 90°, high speed.

4) 1357/6 November CP 1544 3 destroyers or escort vessels, northerly course, speed 25 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

-704-

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 642 (Lt. (s.g) Brünning), breaking through the Straits of Gibraltar from the Atlantic, reported from CH 72 that he has had to return owing to the breakdown of his supplementary radar interception set (Naxos). U 642 received orders to make for Toulon via CH 9122, CH 6685 and CH 3916.

U 593 (Kelbling) and U 450 (Böhme) were informed of the unsuccessful attempt by an enemy submarine to torpedo a steamer at 1014 on 6 November 2.5 miles east of Toulon.

On the orders of C-in-C U-boats the radar interception set "Wanze" (Gustav I) which has been installed on the boats for some time, may no longer be used, as the set is not free from radiation according to our latest information and is therefore a danger to boats for enemy location activity. New improved sets ("Borkum") are being brought to Toulon and Pola by carriers and are on the way.

As an operation in the Tyrrhenian Sea without any opportunity of intercepting a locating enemy cannot be considered with the lively enemy locating activity, U 380 (Roether) has received orders to return to Toulon and to report his position when he sets off. No signal has been received.

U 81 (Krieg) who had put out from Pola at 1400 on operations, has received orders to put about to have the new set installed. U 81 intends to be at Point H at 0800 on 7 November. It is also considered very dangerous for U 565 to operate without the new radar interception set in view of the great enemy locating activity he reported in the Aegean. Admiral Aegean has therefore been informed that it is considered necessary to recall the boat which put out from Salamis at 2130 for the Aegean operational area.

The boats received an extract from the Situation Report and were informed of the enemy report in III. B. b) 4).

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

According to a report from London the following have been prisoners of war since 22 August, 1943: Lt. (s.g) Diggins (Commander of U 458), the Engineer Officer, Lt. (j.g) (E) Locke and 3 members of the crew.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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7 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 380 CJ 91 (homeward bound),
U 450 CH 63 (homeward bound),
U 642 CH 81 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 66,
U 81 CJ 31 (homeward bound),
U 565 CH 23.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put in to Toulon at 0900/7 November from his 14th operation.
U 81 interrupted his 16th operation, put in to Pola at 0900/7 November.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 616.
2) Pola: U 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1015/7 November CJ 7814 1 merchant ship not exceeding 10,000 G.R.T., 3 merchant ships not exceeding 5,000 G.R.T., 3 escort vessels, 3 landing craft to the west. Loose cruising formation, speed 10 knots.

2) The transport convoy (see War Diary 5 November III. A. b) 3) was attacked at 1800/6 November off Cape Bougaroni by our aircraft and 14 ships, totaling 15,000 G.R.T., and 2 destroyers were hit.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1055/7 November Tres Forcas: 1 "Warspite" class battleship, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers, bound for the Atlantic.

2) 1630/7 November 3 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 2100/7 November 1 "Fiji" class and 1 "Dido" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

4) 0300/7 November 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for an unknown destination.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0845/7 November CP 4465 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, southerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
) Nothing to
d) By G.I.S. stations:) report.
)
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Roether) reported his position from CJ 8432.

U 642 (Brünning) reported his position from CH 50 (position not clear) without being asked.

Admiral Aegean has informed us that U 565 (Henning) must remain in the operational area owing to the urgency of his mission. Captain U-boats considered the boat's return necessary because operating without a radar interception set caused additional danger to the boat. In Admiral Aegean's view location conditions in the Aegean are made more difficult owing to its geographical nature. During operations in the Aegean, Admiral Aegean has tactical control of the boat.

U 450 (Böhme) received freedom to attack submarines. This gives him an opportunity of attacking any enemy submarines observed off Toulon.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

In October the amount of shipping brought into the Mediterranean amounted to 2,850,000 G.R.T. (maximum as in Sicily operation in July, 1943). The amount leaving amounted to 1,801,000 G.R.T. On 6 November the amount was roughly 5,000,000 G.R.T., the maximum to date.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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8 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CJ 84 (homeward bound),
U 450 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 642 CH 59 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 66,
U 565 Aegean.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 450 put in to Toulon at 0945/8 November from his 2nd operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1145/8 November CJ 4397 3 small warships, course 150°.
CJ 4397 1 small warship, course 340°, speed 10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1155/7 November Alboran: British battleship towed by 4 tugs, bound for the Atlantic (escorted by 5 destroyers, 1 cruiser).

0630/8 November towed in to Gibraltar, identified as "Warspite" class.

2) 1830/8 November 1 "Montcalm" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0032/8 November CO 3249 2 destroyers.

c) By radio intercept services:

1018/8 November CO 3327 formation reported aircraft shadower.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report there is lively steamer and sailing ship traffic between Port Said, Beirut and Alexandretta and independently routed ships without escorts inside the three mile limit.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Roether) intends to cross 42° N at 0000 on 11 November and to be at the Toulon rendezvous at 0730.

U 453 (von Schlippenbach) reported at 1700/8 November that the boat was observed just before laying the mines (off Bari) and engaged in hydrophone pursuit. Strong patrols by naval and air forces off the harbor. This report is understood to mean that the Commander will try again to complete his mission. According to his operational order, he was to report by short signal "no" if the mission could not be completed. There is still no reason to interfere with his conduct (of the operation).

U 565 (Henning) received orders from Admiral Aegean to continue the operation and was informed of several enemy sightings in the Aegean.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CJ 75 (homeward bound),
U 642 CH 68 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 66,
U 565 Aegean.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 450, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2140/9 November CJ 6752 1 probable destroyer, course 200°.

2) 2215/9 November CJ 6798 2 ships, probably 1 merchant ship, one destroyer, course 200°.

3) 2225/9 November CJ 9162 3 ships, probably 1 merchant ship, one escorting vessel ahead and one astern, course 220°, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

0945/9 November 1 "Birmingham" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1230/9 November CJ 9668 2 freighters approximately 3,000 G.R.T., course 20°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Roether) and U 642 (Brünning), both returning to Toulon, have been forbidden to attack submarines. The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

10 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 63 (homeward bound),
U 642 CH 63 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 66,
U 565 Aegean.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 put out from Pola at 1400/10 November on his 16th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 450, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1000/10 November CJ 4293 1 probable minesweeper, southerly course, 2 patrol vessels, northerly course.

2) 1735/10 November CH 7482 1 convoy of 38 merchant ships, 10 escorts, 6 of them destroyers, in an all-round screen, course 100°, speed 8 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0815/10 November 36 freighters, also 3 tankers, 3 corvettes, 2 destroyers passed Europa Point bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 0800/10 November 9 freighters, 3 tankers, 1 net carrier, 4 minesweepers, 6 corvettes, 1 destroyer, 1 tug.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 0236/10 November CO 3613 enemy unit reported air attack.

2) 0006/10 November CK 9596 British unit, course 115°, speed 10 knots, reported bombing attack.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 642 (Brünning) intends to cross the 42nd parallel to the north at 0000 on 13 November and to be at the Toulon rendezvous at 0730.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

11 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 642 CH 69 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 66,
U 565 Aegean,
U 81 CJ 62 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 380 put in to Toulon at 0845/11 November from interrupted 9th operation.
U 407 put out from Pola at 0800/11 November on his 7th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 410, 450, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 407, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) a) 0707/11 November CH 7675 48 merchant ships, 7 destroyers, 4 guardboats, course 100°, speed 7 knots. (Presumably convoy of III. A. b) 2) in War Diary of 10 November.

b) 1239/11 November CH 7692 48 ships, course 75°, speed 7 knots.

c) 1425/11 November CH 8774 the same convoy, course 140°.

2) 1650/11 November CH 8454 convoy presumably the same as in 1) or part of it.

3) 1800/11 November 7575 convoy of 55 ships, 43 of them merchant ships, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier, 8 destroyers, 3 escorts, course 90°, speed 8 knots.

4) 1430/11 November CH 8457 3 merchant ships, 5,000 G.R.T. each, 4 escorts, stopped.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0245/0515 Ceuta sighted 63 laden, mainly large ships coming from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

2) 0900/11 November 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 1500/11 November CH 7511 convoy of more than 50 ships, 3 destroyers, bound for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0758/11 November CP 4738 1 probable destroyer, course 150°, high speed.

2) No time CK 7484 1 convoy of 52 units including covering forces and 1 probable submarine, southeasterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (von Schlippenbach) reported minelaying completed (off Bari) and received orders to make for Pola. U 453 intends to be at the Toulon rendezvous (Point H) at 0700 on 13 November.

U 565 (Henning) was informed by Admiral Aegean of enemy movements in the Aegean.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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12 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 642 CH 69 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 63 (homeward bound),
U 565 Aegean,
U 81 CK 44 (outward bound),
U 407 CJ 63 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0810/12 November 8435 convoy of 24 merchant steamers, course 80°, speed 7 knots.

2) a) 0915/12 November 7693 convoy of 45 merchant steamers, 8 destroyers, course 70°, speed 7 knots.

b) 1650/12 November 8435 convoy of 52 merchant steamers, 7 escorts, course 80°, speed 7 knots.

3) a) 1655/12 November CH 8427 convoy of about 40 ships, course 80°.

b) 1815/12 November CH 8436 about 50 merchant ships, course 80°, speed 8 knots.

Whether the sightings in 2) and 3) refer to the same convoy cannot be definitely decided but it is very probable.

4) 0735/12 November CH 8457 1 destroyer, 1 escort.

5) 0810/12 November CH 8432 1 tanker, 12,000 - 15,000 G.R.T., escorted by 3 destroyers, southerly course, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

British Mediterranean convoy according to a bearing was abreast of Algiers at midday. Probably a convoy coming from the Mediterranean bound for Gibraltar.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0930/12 November 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1130/12 November 1 "Birmingham" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

3) 1330/12 November 1 "Warspite" class battleship docked in Gibraltar, 1700 1 auxiliary cruiser out of dock.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1448/12 November CP 4289 apparently 1 guardboat, course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio evaluation a convoy from the Eastern Mediterranean probably bound for Algiers was in the Malta area on the afternoon of 12 November.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) received as his operational area the area between the meridians in CO 4676 and CO 5595, south of the parallel in CO 5422.

U 642 (Brünning) received permission to attack submarines after U 380 has put in to port.
The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 565 (Henning) was informed by Admiral Aegean of enemy movements in the Aegean.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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13 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 642 CH 33 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 31 (homeward bound),
U 565 Aegean,
U 81 CK 74 (outward bound),
U 407 CK 48 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 642 put in to Toulon at 0830/13 November after his 3rd operation.
U 453 put in to Pola at 0900/13 November after his 13th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616.
2) Pola: U 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0915/13 November CJ 8389 3 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., 10 landing craft, course 200°.

2) 0815-0915 13 November CJ 4375 1 nine-sweeper with sweep out.

3) 2145/13 November CJ 6781 6 merchant ships, 3 guard-boats, course 200°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1345/13 November 1 "Leander" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1815/13 November 11 freighters, 1 small tanker, all laden, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean, escorted by 1 auxiliary cruiser and 7 corvettes.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 453: CJ 3472 enemy submarine.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

1159/13 November CP 1470 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (von Schlippenbach) reported as in III. B. a) submarine located on 136 cm.

U 565 was informed of enemy movements identified in the Aegean.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

No boats.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean,
U 81 Straits of Otranto - Cape Passero area.
U 407 CO 13 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica-Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

b Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1020/14 November	CJ 5113	1 merchant ship not exceeding 3,000 G.R.T., course 350°, speed 10 knots.
2) 1242/14 November		Strait of Bonifacio, 2 small warships, making for Maddalena.
3) 1420/14 November	CH 7568	11 destroyers, 11 freighters totaling 190,000 G.R.T., 8 freighters totaling 56,000 G.R.T., westerl course.
4) 1425/14 November	CH 7674	1 "King George V" class battle ship and 3 destroyers, westerly course
5) 1445/14 November	CH 8447	7 freighters and liners totaling 50,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers and 7 escorts, course 80°.
6) 1440/14 November		10 landing ships (tank), 2 escorts putting in to Oran.

7) 1445/14 November CH 8471 20 merchant steamers, course 80°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to radio intelligence an eastbound American convoy lay between Bone and Bizerta on the morning of 14 November, part estimated to be bound for South Italy, part bound for the Eastern Mediterranean.

2) American convoy from the Central Mediterranean was in the sea area of Oran on the evening of 14 November.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1000/14 November 1 "Boise" class cruiser, 1 American destroyer put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

2) 1245/14 November 1 American freighter, 1 destroyer put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 1400/14 November 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

4) 1600/14 November 1 "Leander" class cruiser put out for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0735-0845/14 November CJ 6195 17 small warships, varying courses.

2) 2230/14 November CK 4792 2 small merchant ships, northwesterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Convoy from the Eastern Mediterranean was in the Malta sea area on the afternoon of 14 November.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

It is intended to dispose U 371 (Mehl), ready for operations on 15 November, for a few days off Ajaccio, the enemy's supply port on the west coast of Corsica before he operates on the North African coast. The boat will have an opportunity there and on his passage to the operational area on the North African coast east of Cape Bengut, of testing the efficiency of the radar interception set "Borkum". This set is a temporary solution until "Wanze G2", in which the shortcomings of "Wanze G1" (radiation) are supposed to be cut out, is installed. There is a fear that, because of the construction of "Borkum", aircraft locations of low signal strength will be swamped by land locations of greater signal strength so that locating aircraft near land where there are shore locating stations will not be observed in time. Only experience will show whether this fear is correct. If it is so, U 371 could probably not operate on the North African coast and would have to cease operations until the new set "Wanze G2" is installed, which would not have this suspected disadvantage of "Borkum".

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean,
U 81 Straits of Otranto - Cape Passero area.
U 407 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put out from Toulon on his 15th operation on 15 November.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Sardinia, Corsica, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1506/15 November CJ 4518 1 destroyer, 2 merchant steamers 3,000 - 4,000 G.R.T., course 20°, speed slight.

2) The battleship reported yesterday in III. A. b) 4) is believed to be of the "Richelieu" class.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0630/15 November 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1640/15 November Cape Spartel, 2 cruisers probably of the "Exeter" and "Birmingham" class, bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 1640/15 November 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

4) 1900/15 November the "Renown", 1 "Fiji" class cruiser and 3 destroyers passed Gibraltar from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Krieg) and U 407 (Drüller) as well as U 371 (Mehl) received permission to attack submarines.

U 565 (Henning) was informed by Admiral Aegean of enemy movements in the Aegean and was ordered to report his position. No signal was received.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and U 81 was informed of the shipping in Taranto.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Naval War Staff 3rd Division reported as follows on the present situation in the Mediterranean:

The troops and supplies so far brought by the enemy through the Straits of Gibraltar do not show any increase compared with the regular influx noted since the start of the African campaign. It is noted in detail:

On 4 November a convoy of troopships from America (with 23 transports) passed. Until then troopship convoys from the United States were observed in a four-weekly rhythm. As the American troopship convoy due on 1 October defaulted, the surprising strength of the November convoy can be explained. The supply convoy from England (passing on

10 November) consisting of 45 freighters and 6 tankers, which was joined by 9 freighters and 3 tankers from Gibraltar, as well as the supply convoy from the United States passing on 10 November consisting of 63 ships, which was joined by 5 from Gibraltar, belonged to the regular supply rhythm according to the time and their size.

Apart from these supplies brought directly into the Mediterranean area, additional supplies of war material for Casablanca are maintained in agents' reports, which cannot always be confirmed but are, however, not entirely rejected. These supplies are supposed to be chiefly connected with the equipping of French troops in North Africa.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 30 NOVEMBER, 1943

PG/30933

16 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 18.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean,
U 81 Straits of Otranto-Cape Passero area,
U 407 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as 4° W, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0756/16 November CH 7447 1 merchant ship of 500 G.R.T., westerly course, speed 7 knots.

2) 0852/16 November CH 8443 2 destroyers, course 80°, speed 10 knots.

3) 0855/16 November CH 8455 2 destroyers, course 250°.

4) 0935/16 November CH 8347 65 merchant ships, 2 destroyers, 3 escorts, course 260°, speed 7 knots.

5) 1045/16 November CJ 6755 1 transport of 5,000-6,000 G.R.T., course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:

0807/16 November approximately CH 6150 American unit located in traffic with Oran.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1515/16 November 1 freighter in ballast, 1 "Agathe" class boat put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 0800/15 November 2 transports put in to Malaga which put out at 1800 with 1,625 political refugees on board. Escort of 3 destroyers which cruised off Malaga the whole day.

3) 1930/16 November in Gibraltar harbor: 1 "Warspite" class battleship in dock, 1 "Cairo" and 1 "Boise" class cruiser in the harbor.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1330/16 November CJ 9981 8 landing craft, course 30°, speed 7 knots.

2) 1529/16 November CO 3348 1 merchant ship of 1,500 G.R.T.

3) 1530/16 November off Cos 2 merchant ships, 5 auxiliary ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 2106/16 November CP 1570 1 British unit located.

2) 2111/16 November CJ 6520 1 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report 5 ships with American war supplies are said to have put out from Suez on 17 November for Bari.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 565 (Henning) reported a success (see V.a).

The boats were informed of enemy movements as follows:

0843/16 November as in III.A.b.1 of 15 November.
1852/16 November as in III.B.d.

V. a) Successes:

U 565 (Henning) reported hearing 1 hit 3 minutes 48 seconds after firing a stern shot on a submarine in CO 3381 at 1729 on 15 November.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

The time of sailing of U 223 (Wächter) and U 616 (Koitschka) scheduled for 16 November has been put back until the new radar interception sets (Wanze G 2) arrive, due in Toulon on the evening of 16 November.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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17 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 42.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean,
U 81 Straits of Otranto-Cape Passero area,
U 407 CO 55.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0749/17 November CH 7682 60 merchant ships, 5 escort vessels, course 270°.

2) 0900/17 November CH 9481 1 merchant ship of 10,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers, course 90°.

3) 0915/17 November CH 9461 1 merchant ship of 3,000 G.R.T., 1 corvette, course 240°.

4) 2010/17 November CJ 9272 20 merchant ships, 2 guardboats, course 180° to 200°.

5) 2320/17 November CJ 9219 60 ships, northerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1108/17 November CJ 6650 British unit located

According to a radio intercept report:
2) 0750/17 November CH 7657 1 convoy, course 255°, speed 7.5 knots.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0630/17 November 1 American cruiser of the "Boise" class, 2 American destroyers, 2 Italian destroyers ("Alpino" class) put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1425/17 November 1 "Boise" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1010/17 November CP 1412 1 small warship.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

U 617 (Lt.(s.g.) Brandi) is reported missing for the last time with effect from 12 September 1943. The boat put out from Toulon on 28 August, was beached and scuttled off Melilla after an air attack on 12 September. The crew has been interned.
(Naval War Staff 2nd Division/C-in-C U-boats (Operations) G 11 527 A5 dated 17 November.)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

18 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 42.

B. Western Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean,
U 81 Straits of Otranto-Cape Passero area.
U 407 CO 55.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0752/18 November CH 7913 1 destroyer, course 70°, speed 12 knots.

2) 1230/18 November CJ 7316 1 merchant ship up to 3,000 G.R.T., 6 landing craft, course 120°.

3) 1150/18 November CJ 6718 3 probable motor minesweepers in line ahead, southwesterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1130/18 November 1 "Delhi" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

2) 1930/17 November Gibraltar harbor report:
1 "Warspite" class battleship in dock.
Cruisers: 1 "Cairo" class,
1 "Boise" class,
1 auxiliary cruiser.
10 destroyers (visible).

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

1206/18 November CJ 6370 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

Nothing special to report.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and U 371 (Mehl) was informed of the shipping in Ajaccio.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

1) The times of sailing of U 223 (Wächter) and U 616 (Koitschka) have been postponed until 20 November. The radar interception sets which have to be installed did not arrive until the evening of 17 November and must be overhauled and tested.

2) According to information from Naval War Staff 3rd Division the following is the picture of battleship movements in the Western Mediterranean. It is revealed from reports received since 14 November:

a) The battleship "Nelson" passed Gibraltar at 0800 on 15 November on her way to Britain and was sighted by an aircraft at 1230/ 16 November 180 miles west of Lisbon. (Very probably identical to the unit identified as the "Richelieu" by air reconnaissance on 14 November 70 miles west of Oran - see War Diary entries of 14 and 15 November.)

b) It has still not been confirmed whether the battleship "Renown" (probably wrongly identified as the "Exeter" - see War Diary of 15 November) entered the Mediterranean on 16 November.

c) If the "Renown" has arrived, there is no change in the number of enemy battleships in the Western Mediterranean (1 "Nelson" class, 1 "Renown" class, 1 "Richelieu" class).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 42.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean,
U 81 Straits of Otranto-Cape Passero area,
U 407 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0415/19 November CJ 6785 3 probable escort vessels, 15 merchant ships, course 10°.

c) By radio intercept service:

On the evening of 18 November a fairly large American convoy was in the Algiers-Oran sea area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0900/19 November Ceuta: 28 freighters, 1 tanker, 4 destroyers, 2 escort vessels, bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 0845/19 November Gibraltar: 14 freighters, 1 tanker, 2 cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 destroyer, 3 escort vessels.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0729/19 November CP 4888 1 probable cruiser, 2 destroyers, northerly course.

2) 0805/19 November CP 4832 3 destroyers, southerly course.

3) 1055/19 November abreast of Brindisi harbor 7 large transports. 4 escorting vessels, northerly course.

4) 1923/19 November CJ 6162 2 fairly small ships, course 300°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

1622/19 November CO 2690 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Krieg) reported a success (see V.a).

U 371 (Mehl) received orders to operate off Ajaccio and on the convoy route west of Sardinia. It is intended to recall U 371 to Toulon on the evening of 21 November to install the new radar interception set (Wanze G 2).

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:

U 81 (Krieg) on 18 November in CK 7175 sank 1 transport of 7,500 G.R.T.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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20 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 42.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean, sea area around Rhodes,
U 81 Straits of Otranto-Cape Passero area,
U 407 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 223 put out from Toulon at 1715/20 November on his 4th operation.
U 616 put out from Toulon at 1715/20 November on his 6th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 223, 380, 410, 450, 593, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Aegean, Ionian Sea.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0748/20 November CJ 5962 1 guardboat, easterly course, high speed.

2) 0005/21 November CJ 9247 40 large merchant ships and guardboats, course 30°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 2100/19 November Tangier: 1 battleship, 1 probable aircraft carrier, 1 medium-sized freighter, 4 destroyers making for the Mediterranean.

2) 1000/20 November 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) According to an agent's report the "Warspite" was lying in dock in Gibraltar with engine damage.

c) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0622/20 November CO 6333 1 probable cruiser, 2 destroyers, course 110°, moderate speed.

2) 0920/20 November CJ 6689 1 apparent freighter.

3) 1228/20 November Gulf of Cos (Aegean) 4 destroyers, 1 escort vessel.

c) By radio intercept service:

0921/20 November CO 1690 British unit located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
c) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) was ordered to send a short situation report at night if possible, if not to report his position by short signal. No signal was received.

U 81 (Krieg) reported a two-fan miss on 1 3,000 G.R.T. freighter at 1823 on 20 November in CJ 9889. Both torpedoes detonated prematurely after 25 and 27 seconds. U 81 requested permission to return as he had only 1 stern torpedo left. He received orders to make for Pola.

U 223 and U 616 received permission to attack all submarines identified as enemy.

U 565 (Henning) has reported a success (see V.a) and believes he must return because of considerable damage. U 565 received orders from Admiral Aegean to start the return passage to Salamis on the night of 20/21 November.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:

U 565 at 0142 on 20 November in CO 3629 after firing a bow shot on a submarine ("Zaunkönig")

heard a loud detonation and sinking noises 13 minutes later. Torpedo was definitely picked up on the hydrophones after 12 minutes 45 seconds while the diesel hydrophone bearing disappeared. The submarine is considered definitely sunk.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

The Führer and Supreme Commander has awarded Lt.(s.g.) von Schlippenbach (Commander of U 453) the Knight's Cross on 19 November. The following Commanders have received the German Cross in Gold: Lt.(s.g.) Mehl (U 371), Lt.(s.g.) Roether (U 380), Lts.(j.g.) Krieg (U 81), Koitschka (U 616) and Deckert (U 73).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 42,
U 223 CH 63 (outward bound),
U 616 CJ 44 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean (homeward bound),
U 81 CK 74 (homeward bound),
U 407 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 380, 410, 450, 593, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Cape Tenes, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0820/21 November CH 8457 2 patrol vessels. CH 8286 1 merchant ship of 200 G.R.T., 1 submarine, westerly course, slow speed.

2) 0845/21 November CH 8355 convoy approximately 350,000 G.R.T., 60 merchant ships, 3 tankers, 2 corvettes, 3 destroyers, 1 cruiser, course 80°, speed 6 knots.

3) 1000/21 November CJ 4373 2 destroyers, 1 M.T.B., 1 minesweeper.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0730/21 November 1 "Birmingham" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

2) a) 1000/21 November Cape Spartel: 1 "Philadelphia" class cruiser, 5 destroyers, making for the Mediterranean.
b) 1200/21 November put in to Gibraltar.

3) 1450/21 November Tangier: last of 54 ships passed on to the Mediterranean.

4) 1530/21 November 2 freighters, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

5) 1715/21 November 2 freighters, 1 corvette put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. Convoys in 4) and 5) joined the large eastbound convoy in 3).

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) reported at 0439/22 November from CO 5554 heavy traffic for 2 days.

U 81 (Krieg) intended to cross the 42nd parallel at 1000 on 22 November.

The boats were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1305/21 November as in III.A.b.2 of 20 November.
1643/21 November as in III.A.b.2.
1835/21 November as in III.A.b.3.
0212, 0218) as in III.A.d.2 and 3.
0332/21 November)

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

According to a report from Cairo 3 more officers and 30 members of the crew of U 458 are in British hands. (See War Diary of 6 November 1943.)

VI. General situation:

Naval War Staff 1st Division (U-boat Operations) (I.U. 32689 Most Secret) issued orders on 20 November to examine the possibility of operating another U-boat between Sicily and Naples. As the Luftwaffe can successfully attack convoys along the African coast, but the area between Sicily and Naples is unfavorable for them, the operation of another U-boat seems justified.

Captain U-boats' views are as follows:

1) The operational area between Sicily and Naples latterly was not very fruitful. Recently increased traffic has been observed. At present one boat (U 616) is operating there, to be followed by a second (U 593) on 26 November and perhaps more depending on the situation.

2) For successful operations, apart from other factors, it is important that the Commander be familiar with the sea areas.

3) Operations under the African coast, in my opinion, are of great value in view of the great supply activity at present. The Luftwaffe attacks large convoys only occasionally, not, however, constant traffic which in our experience has been particularly rewarding for U-boats. Cooperation with the Luftwaffe is an advantage there.

4) The operation now ordered for one U-boat on the North African coast (U 223) and one in the Tyrrhenian Sea, with a commander familiar with that region, will bring information after a fairly long break for the next boats.

In Most Secret/S.O.s only 220 dated 21 November, Naval War Staff 1st Division was informed of these considerations.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CJ 41 (homeward bound),
U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 CJ 75 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean (homeward bound),
U 81 CK 44 (homeward bound),
U 407 CO 55.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 380, 410, 450, 593, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0718/22 November CH 9617 convoy, course 70° (see 21 November, III.A.b.2: 60 merchant ships, 3 tankers totaling approximately 350,000 G.R.T.).

2) a) 1510/22 November CH 7684 convoy of 46 ships including 6 destroyers, 3 corvettes, course 90°, speed 9 knots. (See 21 November, III.A.d.3: 54 ships).

b) 1720/22 November CH 7694 convoy of 48 merchant steamers, course 70°, speed 9 knots.

3) a) 0830/22 November CH 8475 40 merchant steamers, course 200°.

b) 0840/22 November CH 7695 30 merchant steamers, of these were identified 8,000-10,000 G.R.T. steamers, 4 escort vessels, course 270°.

c) 1508/22 November CH 7673 38 ships, course 270°, speed 10 knots.

d) 1735/22 November CH 7593 30 merchant steamers, 7 destroyers, course 270°, speed 9 knots.

4) 0750/22 November CH 7575 1 freighter of 5,000 G.R.T., westerly course.

5) 1240/22 November CJ 4997 2 coasting freighters, northerly course, speed slight.

6) 1340/22 November CH 8362 4 merchant steamers, 20,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers, westerly course, moderate speed.

7) 1400/22 November CH 9461 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, southwesterly course.

8) 1745/22 November CH 7588 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, course 90°, speed 18 knots.

9) 1400/22 November in Algiers: 2 battleships, 6 cruisers, 12 destroyers, approximately 60 landing craft were berthed.

c) By radio intercept service:

1830/22 November CH 7593 British unit reported aircraft shadowing convoy (see III.A.b.3).

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0730/21 November (see War Diary of 21 November, III.A.d.1). 1 "Birmingham" class cruiser has not sailed, but put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 81 (Krieg) intends to be at Rendezvous H off Pola at 0800 on 23 November.

U 371 (Mehl) intends to cross the 42nd parallel to the north at 0200 on 23 November and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0800. U 371 received permission to attack submarines.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

0847/22 November as in III.A.d.4 of 21 November.
1301/22 November as in III.A.d.2.
1441/22 November as in III.A.b.1.
2300/22 November as in III.A.c.
0429/23 November as in III.A.b.2.a, 6 and 7.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing special to report.

The present heavy enemy traffic in the Western Mediterranean is revealed by the reports in III.A.b.1-3 as 2 large eastbound convoys and one westbound convoy.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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23 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 371 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 565 Aegean (homeward bound),
U 81 CJ 31 (homeward bound),
U 407 CO 55.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 371 put in to Toulon at 0900/23 November. 15th operation interrupted.
U 81 put in to Pola at 0930/23 November from his 16th operation.
U 565 put in to Salamis at 0800/23 November from his 15th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 380, 410, 450, 593, 642.
2) Pola: U 453, 596.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0910/23 November CH 8357 approximately 40 merchant steamers, course 80°, speed 6 knots. (See 22 November, III.A.b.2.b)
1315/23 November CH 8392 50 ships, of these 5 large liners, 2 tankers, 2 corvettes were identified.
1625/23 November CH 9447 convoy stopped.

1715/23 November CH 9448 convoy continued.
26 merchant steamers,
8 landing craft,
6 destroyers in all-round screen, course 90°, speed 9 knots.

All messages referred to the same large eastbound convoy.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of the large eastbound convoy as in III.A.b.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

One of the German naval officers who returned from captivity in Britain (Lt.(s.g.) Mende) has reported the following on the loss of U 409 (Massmann):

The boat was surprised and attacked by an aircraft at night about 40 miles north of Algiers. He was forced to submerge. 2 hours later a destroyer began a depth charge pursuit in the course of which 130 depth charges were dropped. U 409 had to surface probably because of damage, the extent of which could not be determined exactly. The boat was sunk by gunfire from the destroyer, possibly also by scuttling carried out by the boat's Engineer Officer. 38 men are believed to have been picked up by the destroyer, 11 are missing including the First Watchkeeping Officer. Shortly before it was lost, a steamer of 6,000 or 8,000 G.R.T. was sunk, the name of which was given as "Davis".

The officer reporting received this information from the Engineer Officer and Warrant Quartermaster of the U-boat. According to what another repatriated officer said (Major on the General Staff d'Elsa) U 409 was destroyed on 11 July. No documents fell into the enemy's hands.

VI. General situation:

On 23 November G.I.S. Head Station submitted a request to Captain U-boats through Commander Wendrich, to assist in preventing an exchange of saboteurs near S.Tropez by allocating a U-boat. According to a reliable source the act will take place on the night of 26/27 or 27/28 or at the very latest 28/29 November. The group of agents will be landed southeast of S.Tropez from an enemy submarine. As the action seems promising in view of the definite information, U 593, ready to sail on 25 November, will occupy a waiting position in the area concerned for a few days. U 593 will not yet be ready on 25 November for a longer operation.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 453 put out from Pola at 1615/24 November on his 14th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0705/24 November CJ 7844 4 coastguard vessels, course 270°, high speed.

2) 0705/24 November CJ 7753 1 merchant steamer, 3,000 G.R.T. (lighted), course 270°, moderate speed.

3) 0800-1230/24 November CJ 7367 4 merchant ships up to 8,000 G.R.T., northeasterly course.

4) 2145/24 November CJ 4335 2 ships, course and speed not known.

5) 2247/24 November CJ 1673 2 small lighted ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0745/24 November 1 "Birmingham" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1130/24 November 1 French auxiliary cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The date of sailing of U 596 (Nonn) arranged for 24 November has been postponed until the arrival of a Wanze G 2 from Toulon as the set which came for the boat was not working.

The boats were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1644/24 November as in III.A.b.1.
1831/24 November as in III.A.b.3.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

At 1300 on 24 November an attack was made by approximately 100 aircraft on Toulon docks, causing the following damage, casualties and losses:

U-boat base Mourillon is completely out of action, U-boat base Missiessy partly usable.
U-boat personnel casualties: 1 dead, 3 severely wounded, 8 slightly wounded, 1 missing.

Damage to U-boats:

U 380 3 holes in the pressure hull.
U 73 upper deck damaged by a crashing floating crane.
U 450 extensive damage, both batteries and bow tubes gashed.
U 371 diving tank 5 and hydroplanes damaged.
U 593 damage cannot be confirmed until after the trimming experiment and trials.

Damage in the docks:

Severely damaged: electric generating station, the whole of the E-boat works, paint factory and store, foundry, U-boat fitting shop and quay works. Temporary total breakdown of dock current supply. 110 and 10-ton crane destroyed, 150-ton crane severely damaged.

Some of the U-boat personnel will have to be accommodated in Costabelle (20 km. east of Toulon) because of the partial destruction of the quarters in the Missiessy base.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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25 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin.
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55,
U 453 CJ 37 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put out at 1830/25 November on his 15th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Habibas Islands, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1219/25 November CH 7441 1 British auxilary sailing vessel of 1,000 G.R.T., course 70°.

2) a) 1309/25 November CH 7658 convoy, 16 troopships up to 20,000 G.R.T. each, 5 destroyers, course 50°, speed 12 knots.
b) 1735/25 November CH 8445 convoy of 18 transports, 4 destroyers, course 70°, speed 12 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1800/24 November Cape Spartel sighted convoy making for the Mediterranean. So far 18 large ships, apparently troopships and 8 destroyers made out (see III.A.b.2).

2) 1020/25 November Punta Carnero: 1 French cruiser, apparently "Jeanne d'Arc" class.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

Because of damage to teleprinter communication with the outside world caused by the air raid on Toulon on 24 November, only reports of enemy movements were received, sent by radio.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 593 (Kelbling) put out to attack submarines in inshore waters.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of the enemy sighting in III.A.b.2.b.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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26 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea,
U 593 CJ 14.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55,
U 453 CK 47.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

The convoy of troopships was sighted by our aircraft several times.

1) a) 0750/26 November CH 9472 convoy of 15 ships, 4 destroyers, 4 corvettes, easterly course.

b) 0850/26 November CH 9446 convoy of at least 20-25 ships, the majority troop-ships, course 80°, speed 9 knots.

c) 1220/26 November CH 9438 convoy of 16 ships, 5 destroyers identified, course 80°, speed 12 knots.

d) 1545/26 November CH 9566 convoy of 15 ships, the majority troopships, 6 destroyers, course 90°, speed 15 knots.

Other sightings:

2) 1010/26 November CJ 9455 convoy, 1 destroyer, 5 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., course 30°, slow speed.

3) 1055/26 November CJ 4386 apparently 2 M.T.B.s, course 300°, high speed.

4) 2230/26 November CJ 4375 3 ships, course and speed not known.

5) 1010/26 November CJ 3972 2 merchant ships up to 1,000 G.R.T., course 90°, speed 7 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1815/25 November 1 laden freighter, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) was ordered to send a short situation report if possible, if not to report his position. No signal was received.

The boats were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1430/26 November as in III.A.b.2.
1545/26 November as in III.A.b.1.a.
1936/26 November as in III.A.b.1.c.
1545/26 November as in III.A.b.1.d.

U 565 (Henning), who put in to Salamis on 23 November from the operational area in the Aegean, is again under the Command of Captain U-boats for operational purposes at the orders of Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations).

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

In spite of the damage caused in the dockyard by the air raid on Toulon on 24 November, repairs to U-boats can still be carried out in Toulon. The damaging of a few boats has in consequence delayed their being made ready.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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27 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea,
U 593 CJ 14.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55,
U 453 CK 47.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Algiers, around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0746/27 November CJ 7842 1 cargo-carrying passenger ship of 8,000-10,000 G.R.T., course 90°, slow speed.

2) 0913/27 November CH 9642 2 destroyers stopped.

3) On 22 November air reconnaissance discovered 2 battleships in Algiers, probably the "Richelieu" and the "Renown".

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0830/27 November 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1530/27 November Tres Forcas: 1 "Repulse" class battleship, 2 destroyers, making for the Atlantic.

3) On 22 November the battleship "Richelieu" lay in Algiers according to an agent's report.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1000/27 November CO 4421 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, 4 merchant ships up to 10,000 G.R.T., 16 merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., course 128°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1050/27 November CO 4128 British unit reported aircraft shadowing convoy, course 128°, speed 8 knots (see III.B.b).

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 407 (Brüller) and U 223 (Wächter) were ordered to report their positions. U 407 reported from CO 5442 that the boat has so far carried out unsuccessful attacks on 1 light cruiser, 1 eastbound convoy and 1 battleship, without managing to fire a shot.

U 593 (Kelbling) was informed that the action planned (see War Diary of 23 November) will take place on the night of 27/28 November.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1946/27 November as in III.A.b.2.
1943/27 November as in III.B.b.
2345/27 November as in III.A.d.1.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The Führer has awarded Lt.(j.g.) Fenski (Commander of U 407) the Knight's Cross.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea,
U 593 CJ 14.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 54,
U 453 CK 47.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0800-1010/28 November CJ 1685 2 coasting freighters, hove to.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to radio intelligence an eastbound convoy was in the Bizerta sea area on the evening of 28 November.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0815/28 November Tres Forcas: 1 aircraft carrier, 1 gunboat, making for the Mediterranean.

2) 1400/28 November Tres Forcas: 1 convoy making for the Atlantic: 9 transports with 2 funnels each, 20 freighters, 8 destroyers, 3 cruisers, 5 battleships.

Note by Captain U-boats: The information of the battleships is not reliable.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 407: 1117/28 November CO 5489 1 light cruiser.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0940/28 November off Termoli harbor 5 merchant ships, approximately 3,000 G.R.T. each.

c) By radio intercept service:

One eastbound convoy was intercepted on the morning of 28 November in the sea area around Malta. (Probably as in III.B.b of 27 November.)

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 453 (von Schlippenbach) reported the completion of minelaying off Brindisi and received orders to make for Pola. U 453 intends to be at approach point H off Pola at 0700 on 1 December.

U 223 (Wächter) reported his position at 2006 from CH 9541.

U 593 (Kelbling) asked whether the operation had ended as he saw nothing on the night in question - 27/28 November - (see War Diary of 27 November). As the operation is over according to information from Commander Wendrich, U 593 has been recalled to Toulon and intends to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0800 on 29 November.

U 407 (Brüller) reported a success (see V.a).

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1535/28 November as in III.A.d.1.
0110/29 November as in III.B.b.

V. a) Successes:

U 407 at 1117 on 28 November in CO 5489 (10 miles north of Ras Amer) obtained one hit from a fan of four on a light cruiser. The cruiser continued with slow revolutions. The boat's signal was transmitted at 2350. According to a radio intercept report a U-boat was attacked with depth charges at 1320 in CO 5811. This very probably was U 407.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

According to an agent's report a fairly large allied landing will take place shortly in Italy.

(Signed) Kreisch.

29 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 sea area Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea,
U 593 CH 33 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55,
U 453 CJ 63 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put in to Toulon at 0900/29 November after completing his special operation (attacking a submarine).

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 31, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean, sea area northwest of Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0935/29 November CJ 4852 1 merchant ship, stopped.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1100/29 November Punta Carnero large convoy of 66 ships bound for the Atlantic.

2) 1800/29 November 9 French freighters in ballast, 2 escort vessels put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 2000/29 November 2 freighters in ballast, 1 escort vessel put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0745/29 November CO 4483 5 transports, 7 large freighters, 1 escort, course 101°, speed 12 knots.

2) 0824/29 November CO 4117 1 transport, 1 escort, course 110°, speed 14 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) a) 0746/29 November CO 4483 unit reported aircraft shadowing formation (see III.B.b.1).

b) 1450/29 November CO 4598 unit again reported aircraft shadowing formation, course 89°, speed 12 knots.

c) 1610/29 November CO 4678 unit reported 15 aircraft attacking.

2) a) 0824/29 November CO 4117 escort reported 1 aircraft shadower.

b) 1525/29 November CO 4516 unit reported 2 aircraft shadowing the convoy, course 126°, speed 15 knots.

According to a radio intercept report there are in the Malta-Benghazi area 4

convoys including those intercepted in 1) and 2). The positions of the other two were not given.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 616 was ordered to report his position or, if possible, send a short situation report. The boat did not report.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1954/29 November as in III.B.b.1 and 2.
2344/29 November as in III.B.c.1.c.
0058/30 November as in III.A.d.2.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

A. As a result of the air raid of 24 November on Toulon the dates of completion of a few boats will be subject to delay, in some cases considerable. The following picture is obtained:

U 73 slight delay through indirect damage (crane fell on upper deck).
U 642 delay of about one week caused by loss of workshop. Boat itself suffered no damage.
U 380 delay of about a fortnight due to damaged pressure hull.
U 450 and U 371 delay of probably one month owing to considerable damage.
U 371 diving tank 5 damaged, multi-unit hydrophones' oscillator destroyed.
U 450 battery and torpedo tubes damaged. At present we have no information as to whether either boat will require the tubes to be changed.

B. Group South in teleprint messages Most Secret 8209 dated 26 November and 8262 dated 27 November reported as follows (excerpt):

1) In the opinion of Group South the subdivision of anti-submarine sweep areas in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean for the Luftwaffe has no longer any purpose as it has often not been possible to attack submarines sighted in view of the uncertainty as to whether they were our U-boats or enemy submarines.

2) Group South considers it necessary to grant our aircraft permission to attack submarines outside the closed area also, when continuous information as to the movements of our boats is necessary.

3) Captain U-boats is requested to examine how the radio signals received from the boats may be most speedily passed on to Group South and the Admiral-in-Command concerned.

Captain U-boats gave his views in Teleprint Message Most Secret 3498 dated 29 November to Group South, for information Admiral Aegean and Admiral Adriatic:

1) Anti-submarine hunt areas lie only in our area and in areas where our traffic runs, in which only enemy U-boats are attacked. Former hunt areas corresponded to this principle and their division has worked well. It was recommended for the Adriatic to reduce the former closed area D 6 (the whole of the sea area north of 42° N) by a line joining 3175, 3485, 6399 with the aim of having our U-boats proceed only west of this line so that the coastal areas in the eastern Adriatic are always free for anti-submarine sweeps.

2) The operational areas of our U-boats are in the area of enemy traffic chiefly from the Straits of Otranto to Malta and on the coasts of Cyrenaica and Palestine. Orders prevailing up to now forbidding attacks on submarines in the operational area of our boats have been justified. Moreover successful attacks on enemy submarines in the open sea area are unbelievably small as our forces are not sufficient for effective anti-submarine sweeps under our coast. Extending anti-submarine sweeps to the open sea area therefore only causes additional wastage of time and work in notifying all participating stations of the movements of our boats and conceals an intolerable danger of exposure. Captain U-boats reports in cases where a sea area is not used by our U-boats for a fairly long period as, e.g. the whole Eastern Mediterranean in recent months. The present introduction of closed area D 50 (the area east of 25° outside the closed areas in the Aegean to the coast of Palestine) takes this sufficiently into account.

Summary of 1) and 2):

Captain U-boats sees no need to alter the present handling of anti-submarine activity. Changes cause unrest and uncertainty.

3) Continual transmission of positions of the boats is unnecessary and dangerous in the opinion of Captain U-boats.

4) Captain U-boats recommends the following for the transmission of important messages to Group South and Admiral Aegean: That Officer-in-Charge U-boat Base Salamis, who has access to all U-boat wireless messages through Naval Communications Officer Athens, be instructed to pass on immediately by teleprinter to Group South and Admiral Aegean any radio messages recognized to be of importance for Group South. Captain U-boats then would occasionally remind the U-boat Base Salamis of transmission, on the command wave for safety.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 November, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin area,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55,
U 453 CJ 62.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 596 put out at 1500/30 November from Pola on his 8th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0940/30 November CJ 4852 2 merchant ships of 500 G.R.T. each, 1 guardboat, course 90°.

2) 1105/30 November CJ 7337 2 merchant ships of 500 G.R.T. each, 1 guardboat, course 60°.

3) 2104/30 November CJ 9248 convoy probably 30-40 ships, course 150°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to radio intelligence a westbound convoy was in the sea area east of Algiers at midday on 30 November.

2) According to bearings and radio evaluation an eastbound convoy passed through the Straits of Gibraltar at 2200 on 30 November. Convoy was discovered in 35°-38° N, 14°- 17° W, a U.S.A.-Mediterranean convoy, and is presumed to be particularly important.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0800 to 0900/29 November (delayed report) Ceuta: 40 ships, 3 destroyers, 4 escort vessels, 1 corvette making for the Mediterranean.

2) 1620/30 November Tres Forcas: 24 transports, 8 destroyers, 2 gunboats, making for the Atlantic.

3) 1800/30 November Punta Carnero: 1 French cruiser of the "Montcalm" class put out for the Atlantic.

4) 1200/30 November Tres Forcas: 3 freighters, 2 escort vessels, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a). By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1110/30 November CJ 6616 1 small coasting vessel.

2) 1400/30 November CK 7218 7 merchant ships, 1 cruiser, 1 large escort vessel, speed slight, northerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 616 (Koitschka) reported his position from CJ 9431. The boat has so far observed no traffic in the operational area.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

2118/30 November as in III.B.b.2.
2231/30 November as in III.A.d.1.
0127/1 December as in III.A.b.3.
0129/1 December as in III.A.d.4.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

In answer to a query of Captain U-boats put to C-in-C U-boats concerning further plans for filling the Mediterranean with U-boats, bearing in mind the fact that this is particularly urgent since some of our boats are out of action for a fairly long period owing to damage from aircraft, C-in-C U-boats replied (7706 Most Secret dated 30 November) that a further allocation of single U-boats has been arranged if U 230 (Siegmann)'s experiences are favorable. U 230 is bound for the Mediterranean from Brest and, as far as is known, put out on 24 November.

(Signed) Kreisch.

Synopsis for November

I. The enemy wear and tear in men and material arising from fighting in southern Italy, the need for replacements caused by this as well as apparently greater reinforcements were the causes of very brisk, strong supply traffic from the Atlantic through the Straits of Gibraltar. Besides innumerable medium-sized and small convoys, 7 large convoys and 2 composed entirely of transports were intercepted. Until then, the arrival of 6 large convoys per month in the Mediterranean was considered normal.

The convoy of 23 large transports totaling 375,000 G.R.T. which passed Gibraltar on 4 November probably carried 60,000 men and was the first large convoy of troops from the U.S.A. since 1 September. In an attack by our aircraft on the evening of 6 November, 14 ships of this convoy totaling 150,000 G.R.T. and 2 destroyers were hit. A large convoy of supplies from England, which reached the Mediterranean on 10 November, was attacked on 11 November off Arzeu by our aircraft. 20 units totaling 110,000 G.R.T. were hit and 3 of these totaling 23,000 G.R.T. as well as 2 destroyers were sunk.

The second of the 2 large convoys of troopships (with 18 transports totaling 270,000 G.R.T.) was intercepted at midday on 25 November northwest of Oran and attacked successfully by our aircraft on 26 November. Probably the same convoy with 12 transports and freighters was intercepted and attacked on 29 November northwest of Benghazi. From this, it would seem that the enemy also sends convoys through the Sicilian Channel.

In the rhythm of replenishment and supply the enemy withdrew empty cargo space from the Mediterranean. The withdrawal of landing craft was also continued. So on 22 November it was discovered that 139 large landing craft had been withdrawn up to then.

The visual reconnaissance of Algiers on 22 November obtained an impressive picture of enemy tonnage in the Western and Central Mediterranean. There were in the harbor 35 ships totaling 200,000 G.R.T. and 60 landing craft, in the roads 60 merchantmen (one-third of them troopships) totaling approximately 400,000 G.R.T. On the same day approximately 400,000 G.R.T. shipping lay in Naples harbor and roads. Brindisi and Bari were also used increasingly by the enemy as supply ports. The reconnaissance of Bari on 12 November revealed 40 to 50 small to medium-sized ships. On the same day 26 ships lay in Brindisi. In Sardinia and Corsica the enemy mainly used Cagliari, Ajaccio and Maddalena.

The maximum amount of enemy cargo space until then was determined to be approximately 5,000,000 G.R.T. on 6 November.

Information of conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean is slight and scrappy. The German Air Force is moderate in strength and, because of strong enemy defenses, not in a position to fly continuous reconnaissance there.

Enemy traffic concentrated in the Western Mediterranean on the North African coast in November also. In the Central Mediterranean only slight traffic was intercepted on the route Palermo-Naples and Malta-Gulf of Taranto and Straits of Otranto. It follows that the boats stationed in the Western Mediterranean must operate on the traffic route on the African coast, in the Central Mediterranean between Otranto and Malta, in the Eastern Mediterranean on the coast of Cyrenaica.

Information regarding heavy enemy units did not give a clear picture of their whereabouts.

On 15 November, 1 "Nelson" class battleship put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic and was intercepted 180 miles west of Lisbon at midday on 16 November. On 22 November our aircraft reconnaissance reported 2 battleships in Algiers, viz. the "Richelieu" and the "Renown". One of our boats sighted a battleship off the coast of Cyrenaica. Date, course and other details are not known as the U-boat, which put out on 11 November, was still in the operational area at the end of the month. Since 8 November a "Warspite" class battleship has lain in dock in Gibraltar. She was damaged on 16 September in Salerno Bay by an aerial torpedo. It may be assumed that the following were in the Mediterranean at the end of the month, apart from the battleship in Gibraltar: 1 "Nelson" class probably in Malta, also probably the "Renown" and the "Richelieu" in Algiers.

II. The number of our U-boats was 13 at the beginning of the month, including U 450 which broke through from the Atlantic on 31 October. Another boat, U 642, passed through the Straits on 6 November. Neither boat operated as they were first called in to Toulon so that we would receive their experiences on breaking through the Straits in order to judge them with regard to operations of other boats from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. Both boats carried out the operation without any special difficulties and it was revealed that it was an advantage to proceed submerged. Breaking through is a great strain on crews with periods of submersion lasting up to 40 hours. A necessary preliminary for the break-through submerged is a full battery. The difficulty of the task is still, as it was before, approaching the western entrance to the Straits unobserved.

Another boat, U 230, at the end of the month will be on his way from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

III. The small number of boats did not permit the strong enemy traffic to be countered effectively. Unfortunately only 2 boats could be allocated for the Western Mediterranean. Of these, U 593 put in to port on 7 November from the sea area around Oran while the second boat, U 223, did not put in until 20 November.

U 81 operated from 10 to 23 November on the enemy shipping route from Malta to the Straits of Otranto while U 407 was set on the concentration point of enemy supply traffic off the coast of Cyrenaica, which always brought successes.

U 565 operated in the Aegean to support the recapture of the enemy occupied island of Leros. After the close of the operation (Leros capitulated on 18 November) U 565 was again placed at the disposal of Captain U-boats.

U 453 completed 2 minelaying operations.

Apart from the inadequate number of boats 2 events checked operations:

1) The knowledge that the radar location set "Wanze" recently installed in the boats was not free from radiation and therefore could no longer be used resulted in the withdrawal of U 380 from the Tyrrhenian Sea, as well as U 81, who put out from Pola on 6 November, on the same day for the installation of a new, probably radiation-free set, the "Wanze 2". This was a serious measure, because it meant that 2 boats, one at operational readiness and one already in the operational area, would again be out of action for a time. But even other boats' sailings were delayed by the installation or non-arrival of the new sets, viz. U 616 and U 223 by 4 days, U 596 by 6 days.

2) U-boat warfare command in the Mediterranean received a considerable blow in an air attack on Toulon by approximately 100 enemy bombers on 24 November.

   Damage in the dock and U-boat base as well as to a few boats led to considerable delays in some cases in the making ready of the boats.

   In detail:

   a) U 73 Delay of 7 days.
      The boat suffered damage when a crane fell on the deck.

   b) U 371 Delay of approximately 6 weeks.
      Diving compartment 5 damaged, multi-unit hydrophones taken down and installed. Torpedo tubes damaged.

c) U 380 Delay of approximately 2 weeks. Pressure hull damaged by bombing.

d) U 410 Delay of approximately 1 month. The boat is changing the barrels of the forward tubes as a result of damage caused by a subchaser when putting in to port on 3 October. The delay is caused by the loss of workshops.

e) U 450 Delay of approximately 7 weeks. Battery damaged. Both batteries taken down and installed and 40 or 50 battery cells being renewed.

f) U 642 Delay of approximately 3 weeks caused by loss of workshops.

IV. November brought few successes compared with October, chiefly for the reasons given in III.

The need for new boats to be brought up remains to a high degree.

The number of boats occupying the operational area in November was as follows:

Day	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In port	Total of boats	
1	2	-	1	1	9	12	U 45 in addition
2	1	-	1	2	9	13	
3	2	-	1	2	8	13	
4	2	-	1	2	8	13	
5	1	1	-	2	9	13	
6	1	1	-	2	9	13	U 642 in addition
7	-	2	-	5	7	14	
8	-	2	-	3	9	14	
9	-	2	-	2	10	14	
10	-	2	-	2	10	14	
11	-	2	1	2	9	14	
12	-	1	2	2	9	14	
13	-	1	2	2	9	14	
14	-	2	1	-	11	14	
15	-	3	-	-	11	14	
16	-	3	1	-	10	14	
17	1	3	-	-	10	14	
18	1	3	-	-	10	14	
19	1	3	-	-	10	14	
20	1	3	-	-	10	14	
21	1	1	2	2	8	14	
22	1	1	1	3	8	14	
23	2	1	-	3	8	14	
24	2	1	-	-	11	14	
25	2	1	1	-	10	14	
26	3	2	-	-	9	14	
27	3	2	-	-	9	14	
28	3	2	-	-	9	14	
29	2	1	-	1	10	14	
30	2	1	-	1	10	14	

Daily average in the periods:

From	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In port
1-10	0·9	1·0	0·4	2·3	8·8
11-20	0·4	2·4	0·7	0·6	9·9
21-30	2·1	1·3	0·4	1·0	9·2

Daily average for the month:

	1·1	1·6	0·5	1·3	9·3
i.e.	7·98%	11·61%	3·63%	9·43%	67·48%.

V. The following successes were obtained in the Mediterranean in November:

Boat	Number of merchant ships sunk	G.R.T.	Warships sunk	Days at sea	Remarks
U 81	1	7500	-	14	
U 223	-	-	-	11	
U 371	-	-	-	9	
U 380	-	-	-	11	
U 407	-	-	-	20	1 cruiser torpedoed
U 450	-	-	-	8	
U 453	-	-	-	19	
U 565	-	-	1 submarine	22	
U 593	1	7000	-	12	
U 596	-	-	-	1	
U 616	-	-	-	11	
U 642	-	-	-	8	
12 U-boats	2	14,500	1 submarine	146	1 cruiser torpedoed

1) 12 boats at sea for 146 days.

2) $\frac{\text{Tonnage sunk}}{\text{Number of boats}} = \frac{14,500}{12} = 1,208·4$ G.R.T. per boat

3) $\frac{\text{Number of days at sea}}{\text{Number of boats}} = \frac{146}{12} = 12·2$ days at sea per boat

4) Every boat at sea in November 1943 sank in an average of 12·2 days at sea 1,208·4 G.R.T. per boat, i.e. 99 G.R.T. per boat per day.

VI. No losses were incurred.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 DECEMBER, 1943

PG/30933

1 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin area,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 54,
U 453 CJ 31 (homeward bound),
U 596 CJ 62 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 593 put out from Toulon at 1700/1 December on his 16th operation.
U 453 put in to Pola at 0930/1 December on his 14th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 593, 642.
2) Pola: U 81.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0815/1 December CH 7498 1 merchant steamer of 5,000 G.R.T.

2) 0824/1 December CH 7474 1 patrol vessel.

3) 0847/1 December CH 7452 1 merchant steamer of 3,000 G.R.T., course 90°.

4) 1712/1 December CH 8394 7 ships (probably corvettes), westerly course, speed 10 knots.

5) 1735/1 December CH 9465 30 merchant ships, 5 destroyers, course 90°, speed 8 knots (probably convoy of III.A.d.1 of 30 November, 1943).

6) 2015/1 December CJ 5923 35 merchant ships, course 170°, speed 8 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) The U.S.A.-Mediterranean convoy which passed Gibraltar at 2200 on 30 November was in the Alboran-Oran sea area on the evening of 1 December according to a radio evaluation.

2) A Mediterranean-Britain convoy was in the Oran-Cape Tenes sea area on 1 December.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

a) 0720/1 December the French battleship "Lorraine", 1 "Cairo" class cruiser and 3 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

b) 1915/1 December the "Lorraine" and 3 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2138/1 December CJ 9368 1 ship, course and speed not known.

2) 1346/1 December CJ 9695 1 probable destroyer, course 210°, speed 15 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:
d) By G.I.S. stations:
e) By naval forces:
} Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

It is intended to have U 593 (Kelbling) proceed on the west coast of Sardinia southward to the operational area on the North African coast between Bougie and Bone. An operation afterwards in the Tyrrhenian Sea is planned if reconnaissance reports and U 616's present operation show favorable results.

U 73 (Deckert) is intended for operations in the Alboran-Oran sea area.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

1221/1 December as in III.A.c.2 of 30 November.
0124/2 December as in III.A.d.b.
0120/2 December as in III.A.b.6.
0332/2 December as in III.A.b.4 and 5.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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2 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea,
U 593 CJ 42 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 45,
U 596 CK 47.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Alboran, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0701/2 December CH 9654 38 freighters, 6 destroyers, course 90°, speed 8 knots.

2) 1750/2 December CH 7489 convoy of 70 freighters, 8 destroyers, course 90°, speed 7 knots.

3) 1755/2 December CH 7495 convoy of 30 freighters, 5 destroyers, course 270°, speed 7 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

The U.S.A.-Mediterranean convoy which passed Gibraltar at 2200 on 30 November, was in the Oran-Cape Tenes sea area at about 1400/2 December according to an estimation and bearing. (See III.A.c.1.)

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) a) 0800/2 December Tarifa: Convoy of approximately 70 ships, making for the Mediterranean (see III.A.b.2).

b) 0930/2 December Europa Point: Convoy of 53 freighters, 8 tankers, 6 American destroyers, 2 corvettes, 1 tug, making for the Mediterranean.

2) 0900/2 December 2 destroyers, 4 corvettes, 2 minesweepers, 1 tug put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 0950/2 December 3 corvettes put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

4) 1500/2 December Tres Forcas: 1 convoy of 22 ships making for the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 593 (Kelbling) received as his operational area the area between the meridians in CH 9545 and CJ 7856. (Cape Corbelin-western exit of Galite Channel.)

U 596 see VI.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1211/2 December as in III.A.d.1.a.
1441/2 December as in III.A.b.1.
2134/2 December as in III.A.d.1.b.
0432/2 December as in III.A.b.2.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Group South reported in Teleprint Message 1023 S.O.s only dated 2 December, 1943:

1) On 3 December a combined operation was carried out to clean up the islands between Solta and Mljet (Dalmatia) occupied by the enemy (bands) necessary to free the coastal route supplying Dalmatia from attack. Enemy forces receive reinforcements and supplies continually from ports in southeastern Italy, apparently between Vieste and Bari, also by steamer.

2) As it is essential to prevent this traffic to support operations on the islands, but no surface vessels are available, Captain U-boats is requested to try out a short operation by U-boats for this purpose. It is stressed that the operation is of military importance because of the effect on the supply position on the east Adriatic coast and also with relation to a reduction of enemy shipping promising success.

Situation: Altogether 5 boats are in the Central Mediterranean (east of the Strait of Messina and Sicilian Channel) as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean. In harbor undergoing repairs are: U 565 in Salamis, U 81 and U 453 in Pola, (U 453 put in on 1 December from a minelaying operation). U 407 is at sea in the operational area on the coast of Cyrenaica (he put out on 11 November) and U 596, who put out from Pola on 30 November, is proceeding to the operational area between the Straits of Otranto and Cape Passero (Sicily). Captain U-boats intends to operate U 596, the only available U-boat, in answer to Group South's request and to allot him as his operational area CJ 63 and 66 as well as CK 41, western half. Group South is informed of the appropriate orders sent to U 596 and is requested to send more detailed information for the boat e.g. regarding our naval forces, permission to attack, and any sighting reports.

U 596 (Nonn) received as his attack area CJ 63 and 66 as well as CK 41, western half, was notified of the nature of his mission and was granted freedom to attack all targets in CJ 66 and targets identified as enemy in CJ 63 and CK 41, with the additional note that instructions will follow. For confirmation U 596 was ordered to report his position by short signal. The officer-in-charge U-boat base Salamis received orders to transmit radio traffic with U 407 and U 596 to Group South forthwith.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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3 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin area,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea,
U 593 CJ 45.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 45,
U 596 CJ 66.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 73 put out from Toulon at 0015/4 December on his 15th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 73, 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) a) 0755/3 December CH 7693 convoy of 70 merchant steamers, course 90°, speed 10 knots.

b) 0913/3 December CH 8472 the same convoy (see War Diary of 2 December, III.A.d.1).

2) 0751/3 December CH 8482 1 destroyer, westerly course.

3) 2010/3 December CJ 6755 23 merchant ships, 1 destroyer, stopped.

4) 2120/3 December CJ 9243 10 landing craft, course 60°.

c) By radio intercept service:

The convoy, which was in the Oran-Cape Tenes sea area on 1 December, reached Gibraltar on 3 December according to estimations. (War Diary of 1 December, III.A.c.2.)

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0830/3 December Algeciras: Convoy of 30 ships making for the Atlantic.

2) 0930/3 December 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

3) 1010/3 December 10 landing craft (tank) put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

4) 1115/3 December 6 freighters in ballast, 7 landing craft (tank), 1 tug, 4 corvettes, put in from the Mediterranean.

5) 1300/3 December Cape de Gata: 1 armed transport, approximately 12,000 G.R.T., making for the Mediterranean, unescorted.

6) 1830/3 December 1 "Dido" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from an unknown direction.

7) 1030/3 December Ceuta: 8 freighters, 12 landing ships (tank) with landing craft (tank) as deck cargo, making for the Atlantic; 5 freighters making for Gibraltar.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0810/3 December CO 1137 1 probable destroyer.

2) 0835/3 December Straits of Otranto: 1 destroyer, moderate speed, northerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 616 (Koitschka), who yesterday reported that he had not observed any traffic in the operational area so far, was reminded of the Naples-Messina traffic which was recently intercepted by our aircraft with a few sightings. U 616 reported during the evening that he has not discovered any traffic, only patrols and requested to be allotted an operational area in the Western Mediterranean. U 616 received orders to remain in the operational area first. In this way allowance will be made

for Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operation)'s order that value is placed on U-boat operations in the Tyrrhenian Sea (attention is drawn to War Diary of 21 November, entry VI).

U 407 (Brüller) was ordered to report his position; he did not reply.

U 596 reported his position from CK 4851 at 1321/3 December as ordered on 2 December. The details, requested to be sent by Group South informing U 596 of conditions in his present operational area, have so far not arrived.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and enemy movements as follows:

2027/3 December as in III.A.b.1.b.
0248/4 December as in III.A.b.3 and 4.
0402/4 December as in III.A.d.5.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Corbelin area,
U 616 Tyrrhenian Sea,
U 593 Cape Corbelin-Bone,
U 73 CH 39 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 54,
U 596 CJ 66.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Delayed enemy sightings of 3 December:

1) 2020/3 December CJ 6789 1 destroyer, course 70°, high speed.

2) 2025/3 December CJ 9137 1 destroyer, course 220°, high speed.

3) 2110/3 December CJ 9219 1 merchant ship, course and speed not known.

4) 2130/3 December CJ 9259 2 landing craft, course and speed not known.

5) 2135/3 December CJ 9297 2 ships, course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to calculation a Britain-Mediterranean convoy was in the sea area 40° to 42° N, 17° to 19° W on the evening of 4 December. It can be expected to reach Gibraltar in 4 or 5 days (8/9 December).

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1745/4 December 1 "Dido" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1800/4 December 2 destroyers, 1 "Agathe" class boat put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 407: 1800/4 December CO 5469 1 westbound convoy, speed 6-12 knots.

b) By air reconnaissance:)
c) By radio intercept service:) Nothing to report.
d) By G.I.S. stations:)
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 616 has been withdrawn from his present operational area in the Tyrrhenian Sea and sent to the Western Mediterranean. This caused a redistribution of attack areas which were ordered as follows:

U 73 (Deckert) west of the meridian in CH 8465.
U 223 east of there to the meridian in CH 8595.
U 593 adjoining to the meridian in CH 9645.
U 616 adjoining to the meridian in CJ 7856.

As Group South has so far issued no details for the operation of U 596 (Nonn) in the Adriatic and, on the other hand, the German Air Force has not discovered any traffic in U 596's present operational area while patrolling continuously, Group South was again requested to send more information for U 596.

U 223 (Wächter) and U 407 (Brüller) were ordered to report their positions. U 223 did not report, U 407 reported as in III.B.a.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

0119/5 December as in III.A.d.1.
0226/5 December as in III.A.d.2.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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5 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Caxine area,
U 616 CJ 85,
U 593 Cape Caxine-Cape Jijelli,
U 73 CH 91.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55,
U 596 CJ 66.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 8[illegible], 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

No reconnaissance in the Western and Central Mediterranean because of weather conditions.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean; probing reconnaissance of Nile Delta.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:) Nothing to report.
c) By radio intercept service:)

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1630/5 December 1 gunboat, 1 destroyer, 1 heavily armed freighter, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1450/5 December CJ 9935 20 medium-sized freighters, 5 escort vessels, course 230°, speed 8 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 223 (Wächter) was ordered to report his position. The boat reported a curve shot at 2300 on 4 December in CH 8513 fired at a destroyer and a detonation heard 13 minutes later. Captain U-boats does not assume a success because of the long running time. U 223 also reported 3 approaches by aircraft without a location when radar location sets were working. This leads to the following considerations:

a) There is a possibility that the new radar location set Wanze G 2 is not free from radiation.

b) The enemy is working with frequencies which can neither be intercepted by the Wanze G 2 nor by the detection set "Naxos" (free of radiation).

c) The enemy is employing a hitherto unknown method of locating U-boats.

U 407 (Brüller) was informed that we intend to recall him on the evening of 8 December. U 407 put out on 11 November and will have been 4 weeks at sea on 8 December.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

0201/6 December as in III.B.b.
0508/6 December as in III.A.d.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

In reply to Captain U-boats' query to Group South, Group South has instructed Admiral Adriatic to ensure that Captain U-boats is informed continually of conditions in U 596's operational area (Group South Operations Most Secret 8647 dated 5 December).

Captain U-boats has received no information from Admiral Adriatic.

If no information is received from Admiral Adriatic during 6 December either, U 596 will receive orders to continue his passage to the operational area between the Straits of Otranto and Cape Passero already provided, where, according to the verbal report of the Commander of U 81 just returned from this area on 23 November, brisk enemy traffic is running with slight air and sea patrols. As the present number of boats is insufficient for successful U-boat warfare, we cannot consider having a boat in an area unlikely to bring successes according to our knowledge of the situation, even less so when no definite details of conditions in the operational area can be sent to the boat.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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6 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Caxine area,
U 616 CJ 75,
U 593 Cape Caxine-Cape Jijelli,
U 73 CH 82.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 54,
U 596 CJ 63.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea and Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1112/6 December CJ 4397 1 apparent destroyer, course 330°, high speed.
CJ 4373 1 apparent freighter, course 270°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1300/6 December Gibraltar harbor report: A "Warspite" class battleship in dock, 2 "Cairo" class cruisers, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 9 destroyers, 44 small vessels, 38 enemy freighters, 6 enemy tankers, 1 liner.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

As no information on conditions in U 596's operational area was received on 6 December either, it does not seem likely to bring success if the boat remains any longer in this sea area. U 596 (Nonn) received orders to make for the attack area between the Straits of Otranto and Cape Passero.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

In an air raid on Salamis on 6 December 1 barracks and 1 officers' quarters building were damaged. No damage in the dock or to U 565.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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7 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Caxine area,
U 616 CJ 77,
U 593 Cape Caxine-Cape Jijelli,
U 73 sea area west of Cape Ivi.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 55,
U 596 CK 44.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 616: 0300/8 December CJ 7712 probable convoy, see V.a.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1143/7 December CJ 7343 3 coasting vessels, northerly course, speed slight.

2) 1210/7 December CJ 4692 1 freighter of approximately 500 G.R.T., southerly course, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0430/7 December Ceuta: 10 large freighters, 1 tanker of approximately 8,000 G.R.T., 1 destroyer, 2 "Agathe" boats.

2) 0830/7 December Tangier: 3 destroyers, 3 probably gunboats, 2 "Agathe" boats, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1425/7 December CK 7193 3 freighters, 2 escort vessels, northerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 616 (Koitschka) reported a success (see V.a).

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy reports as follows:

2016/7 December as in III.A.d.1.
0232/8 December as in III.B.b.

V. a) Successes:

U 616 at 0300/7 December in CJ 7712 sank 2 steamers and left one on fire. Total tonnage 24,000 G.R.T.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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8 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 Cape Ivi-Cape Caxine area,
U 616 CJ 77,
U 593 Cape Caxine-Cape Jijelli area,
U 73 area west of Cape Ivi.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 54,
U 596 CK 71.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

2205/8 December CJ 6745 1 merchant ship of 1,000 G.R.T., course 90°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1110/7 December Tres Forcas: 3 large tankers, 4 escort units.

2) 0900/8 December 1 "Thetis" class submarine put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) According to an agent's report the French battleship "Lorraine" put out from Mers el Kebir on 2 December and put in again on the same day.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1358/8 December CJ 6279 approximately 20 small ships, probably landing craft, northwesterly course, moderate speed.

2) 0515/8 December CJ 6222 1 small naval craft, apparently a motor torpedo-boat, course 190°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 230 (Lt.(s.g.) Siegmann) reported his position from CH 8111 at 2249 after breaking through from the Atlantic. U 230 received orders to make for the attack area between the meridians in CH 9546 and CH 9666, if he was fully ready for operations. If the boat was not ready to operate, he was to report by short signal "No" and make for Toulon via CH 6785 and CH 6645. In the former case the new eastern limit of U 593's operational area would be the meridian in CH 9546 and the new western limit

of U 616's operational area the meridian in CH 9666.

U 407 received orders to return to Pola.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of the enemy movement in III.A.d.1.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The German Naval Command Italy requested the allocation of at least one U-boat to attack an enemy supply convoy of tankers for southern Italy, which according to its information and survey of the situation is running undisturbed on the Bizerta - Ustica - Naples route. It points out the few good opportunities for attacks and successes which are offered there (German Naval Command S.O.s only 712 dated 8 December).

Comments of Captain U-boats:

Neither air reconnaissance nor our U-boat operations in the last few weeks have shown that the Tyrrhenian Sea is a particularly suitable operational area for U-boats.

Therefore no U-boat operations are intended there at first as the prospects of successes are considered better under the African coast. The proof of this is shown by, among others, U 616 who was withdrawn to the area east of Cape Bougaroni, and sank 3 steamers three days after leaving the old operational area after unsuccessful operations in the Tyrrhenian Sea where he observed no traffic.

German Naval Command Italy has been informed of Captain U-boats' intentions and was requested to supply details of the information mentioned (Captain U-boats S.O.s only 234 dated 9 December).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 85,
U 616 CJ 77,
U 593 CH 95,
U 73 CH 84,
U 230 CH 82 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 51 (homeward bound),
U 596 CJ 99.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1705/9 December CJ 4517 3 troopships, course 260°, speed 10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0155/8 December Tangier: 57 ships including 40 freighters, 3 tankers, 14 escort vessels.

2) a) 0350/8 December Tangier: 40 freighters, 1 probable small cruiser, 9 destroyers or corvettes, making for the Mediterranean.

b) 1800/9 December Tres Forcas: Smoke clouds and 14 barrage balloons apparently belonging to the large convoy 18 miles to the north.

3) 1000/9 December 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 230 (Siegmann) was informed of the attack areas of the boats on the North African coast:

U 73 west of the meridian in CH 8465, adjoining him to the east U 223 to the meridian in CH 8365, adjoining him U 596 to the meridian in CH 9546, U 616 east of the meridian in CH 9666. The space between U 593 and U 616 is for U 230.

U 230 reported at 0510 on 10 December with short signal "No" that he is not ready to operate and is therefore making for Toulon.

U 616 (Koitschka) reported a success (see V.a). He is returning because of the breakdown of both Naxos aerials.

The attack area on the coast of Cyrenaica between the meridians in CO 4646 and CO 5565, south of the parallel in CO 5422 is arranged and ordered for U 565 (Henning), putting out from Salamis on 11 December.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

0851/9 December as in III.B.b.2 of 8 December.
1538/9 December as in III.A.d.3.
0212/10 December as in III.A.b.
0745/10 December as in III.A.d.2.b.
0848/10 December as in III.A.d.2.a.

V. a) Successes:

U 616 (Koitschka) at 1955 on 9 December in CJ 7428 (80 miles northeast of Philippeville) sank one destroyer.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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10 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0300 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 85,
U 616 CJ 71 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 94,
U 73 CH 84,
U 230 CH 59 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CO 12 (homeward bound),
U 596 CJ 99.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

1) 1730/10 December CH 8455 eastbound convoy, speed 9-12 knots.

2) 0055/10 December CH 6393 1 submarine, course 10°.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0950/10 December CJ 7309 5 coastguard vessels, easterly course, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1025/10 December 1 "Dido" class cruiser, 1 destroyer put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

2) 1245/10 December 1 "Manxman" class minelayer put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

3) 1330/10 December the Italian cruiser "Duca d'Aosta" put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean, 1515/10 December put out for the Atlantic.

4) 1745/10 December 23 landing craft (tank), new type, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0010/10 December CJ 6259 1 merchant ship up to 10,000 G.R.T., course 270°, speed 10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report a convoy is supposed to have put out from Port Said for the Mediterranean on 10 December, cargo probably food. Destination unknown.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

As U 230 (Siegmann) and U 616 (Koitschka) are proceeding to Toulon, the attack areas are rearranged as follows:

U 223 (Wächter) between the meridians in CH 8465 and CH 9455, U 593 (Kelbling) adjoining him eastward to the meridian in CJ 7826.

U 230 (Siegmann) was ordered to report the estimated time of crossing 42° N and received port entering instructions for Toulon.

U 616 (Koitschka) reported a submarine as in III.A.a.2 and was forbidden to attack submarines as we must take U 230's presence into account. U 616 intends to cross 42° N at 0000 on 12 December and to be at the rendezvous at 0800.

U 73 (Deckert) reported as in III.A.a.1.

U 407 (Brüller) intends to cross 42° N at 1800 on 11 December and to be at approach point H off Pola at 0900 on 12 December.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy sighting as in III.B.b.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Admiral Adriatic requested Captain U-boats to carry out the minelaying operation planned by him on the enemy-occupied east coast of Italy with U-boats owing to the dropping-out of E-boats for the operation.

Minelaying is planned off Cape Otranto, off Brindisi, Bari and Cape Gargano (Admiral Adriatic Most Secret 1206 A 1 dated 9 December).

Comments by Captain U-boats:

1) The effect of the U-boat mine works only up to 30 meters deep.

2) Brindisi and Bari are mined sufficiently, as far as is possible by U-boats.

3) Other points mentioned are not worthwhile, in Captain U-boats' opinion, because of the high priority operation and disadvantage of splitting up the few U-boats.

4) No boat will be ready to operate within a measurable space of time.

Admiral Adriatic has been informed accordingly.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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11 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 83,
U 616 CH 63 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 95,
U 73 CH 84,
U 230 CH 67 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CK 48 (homeward bound),
U 596 CJ 99.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 223: 1300/11 December CH 8513 small eastbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:)
c) By radio intercept service:) Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) a) 0600/11 December Tangier: Convoy of approximately 60 vessels, the majority freighters, 3 tankers approximately 10,000 G.R.T. each, escorted by 8 destroyers or corvettes.

b) 0645-0740/11 December Ceuta reported the same convoy making for the Mediterranean.

2) 1515/11 December 1 "Dido" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 1615/11 December 1 minelayer "Abdiel" put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 596 (Nonn) reported a success.

U 223 (Wächter) reported a success and requested permission to return owing to considerable leakages.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1535/11 December as in III.A.b.1.
0044)
0420)/12 December as in III.A.d.2 and 3.

V. a) Successes:

U 596 (Nonn) at 1337 on 9 December in CK 7445 (20 miles southeast of Cape Colonne) sank 1 steamer of 7,000 G.R.T. from a southwest convoy of 17 steamers.

U 223 (Wächter) at 1300 on 12 December in CH 8518 (5 miles northeast of Cape Khamis) sank 1 destroyer.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

1) German Naval Command announced the following in amplification of S.O.s only 712 dated 8 December:

Irregular, lightly escorted convoy traffic from Tunis - west coast of Sicily - Salerno - Bay of Naples and independently routed ships along the coast have been identified by means of scrappy air reconnaissance and radio intelligence. Photographic reconnaissance has revealed a very great change in the shipping in Naples. Strong destroyer and M.T.B. escorts only appear directly off the coast.

German Naval Command Italy considers the appearance of U-boats in the sea area mentioned likely to be successful - even if this occurs only when they are proceeding to and from the African coast at their approach and departure - and necessary to relieve our coastal defenses.

After the withdrawal of E-boats from the Adriatic there are no offensive forces to disrupt convoy traffic and restrain escorting forces.

Captain U-boats has informed German Naval Command Italy that no boat is available at present owing to increased losses.

Situation:

After U 223 breaks off, there will still be 2 boats on the North African coast, U 73 and U 593, which put out on 4 and 1 December respectively.

The next boat (U 380) will probably be ready for operations on 20 December, another (U 642) on 29 December.

2) Captain U-boats left at 1800 for Weimar for a Flag Officers' conference on military training.

Deputy: S.O. 29th U-boat Flotilla.

(Signed) Kreisch.

12 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 83,
U 616 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 95,
U 73 CH 84,
U 230 CH 63 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 407 CJ 31 (homeward bound),
U 596 CK 77.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 616 put in to Toulon at 0830/12 December after his 6th operation.
U 407 put in to Pola at 1000/12 December after his 7th operation.
U 565 put out from Salamis at 1417/12 December on his 16th operation (on the coast of Cyrenaica).

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0801/12 December CH 8481 2 patrol vessels.

2) 0820/12 December CJ 9491 2 merchant ships up to 3,000 G.R.T., 2 landing craft, course 270°, slow speed.

3) 0923/12 December CH 8439 2 destroyers, course 250°, moderate speed.

4) 0926/12 December CH 8518 3 patrol vessels, course 250°, speed slight.

5) 1213/12 December CJ 4288 convoy, not identified exactly owing to clouds, 4 ships counted, northeasterly course.

6) 2040/12 December CJ 6741 convoy of 40 merchant ships, 6 destroyers.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0900/12 December the battleship "Renown" and 3 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1745/11 December Tres Forcas: 1 probable battleship, 3 gunboats, making for the Atlantic. Possibly the same as 1).

3) 1120/12 December Gibraltar: Convoy of 12 freighters, 3 corvettes, 2 destroyers, 1 "Nestor" class auxiliary cruiser.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0830/12 December CO 1743 3 destroyers, 2 guardboats, course 300°.

2) 2215/12 December CJ 6298 3 coasting freighters, course 130°, speed slight.

3) 2235/12 December CJ 6275 1 merchant ship of 5,000 G.R.T., course 300°, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 223 (Wächter) received orders to return to Toulon.

After U 223 broke off, the following received new attack areas:

U 73 west of the meridian in CH 8375,
U 593 east of it.

According to an agent's report an action took place between 2 British destroyers and a German U-boat on 12 December abreast of Motril (south coast of Spain: 36° 45' N, 3° 30' W). (In Foreign G.I.S. Intelligence Naval West/Intelligence Organization 48019/43 C.) If the report was correct, it could only refer to U 73 (Deckert). In order to be certain, U 73 was ordered to report his position by short signal. At the same time 2nd Flieger-division was requested to carry out a reconnaissance south of Motril if the situation permitted. In addition, Naval War Staff 1st Division was requested to approach the Spanish, if necessary, for the purpose of reconnaissance in this area.

At 0035/13 December 1 enemy reconnaissance aircraft reported: "Am over surfaced, stopped U-boat." The longitude was given as 6° 20' E, the latitude QH 30. Naval High Command Radio Intelligence Division interpreted the latitude as 40° 30' or 41° 30', i.e. CH 6368 or CH 3965. In this case it might refer to U 230 bound for Toulon. According to Radio Intelligence at 0050/13 December Oran issued orders for 3 more aircraft to operate. According to a later report from Naval High Command the latitude was believed to be 37° 30' N giving a position in CH 9398. In this case it would most probably be U 593.

At 0250, according to a radio intercept report from Main Naval D/F Station Karersee, an aircraft received the following orders from Oran: "Search the following area: QH 10 N 5° 55' E, QH 50 N 5° 55' E, QH 50 N 6° 20' E, QH 10 N 6° 20' E. If QH = 37 as Main Naval D/F Station assumed, the area given was within CH 9357, CH 9651, CH 9662, CH 9368.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were notified of enemy movements as follows:

1514 as in III.B.b.1.
1625 as in III.A.d.3.
1918 as in III.A.b.1.3 and 4.

V. a) Successes:)
)
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

On 11 December another photographic reconnaissance of Naples, Salerno, and a few smaller ports in this coastal area was flown.

In Naples itself a considerably smaller amount of shipping was identified (262,000 G.R.T.) compared with 22 November (approximately 400,000 G.R.T.). The number of landing craft was strikingly small. Altogether only 9 landing craft (tank) were sighted.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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13 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 59 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 95.
U 73 CH 84?
U 230 CH 63 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CK 77,
U 565 CO 26 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1125/13 December CJ 7326 3 patrol vessels, course 140°.

2) 2020/13 December CJ 6746 2 destroyers hove to.

3) 2030/13 December CJ 6782 1 coastguard vessel, course 360°, speed slight.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

To 12 December, III.A.d.1: The battleship which put in to Gibraltar was not the "Renown" but one of the "King George V" class.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0108/14 December CJ 3784 2 cruisers, course 170°. (Details of grid square reported queried.)

2) 0153/14 December CJ 6612 2 landing craft, course 0°.

3) 0145/14 December CJ 6298 1 landing craft, stopped.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 593 (Kelbling) was ordered to report his position. No signal was received.

U 230 (Siegmann) was reminded to report his time of arrival at Toulon. U 230 intends to cross the 42° N parallel at 0800 on 15 December and to be at the Toulon rendezvous at 0800 on 16 December.

U 73 (Deckert) reported a three-fan miss on a destroyer at 1605 on 7 December in CH 7696. Destroyer turned away after fan fell. After a curve shot was fired at 1746 on 7 December in CH 7692 at a frigate in a westbound tanker convoy of 3 tankers and 4 frigates, U 73 heard a detonation 14 minutes 18 seconds later. Captain U-boats does not assume a success owing to the long running time. At 1037 on 13 December in CH 8446, U 73's quadruple anti-aircraft gun was carried away by a destroyer. Boat did not report any further damage whatsoever so that it is assumed that U 73 is clear for operations. According to these reports, the action reported yesterday between 2 British destroyers and a German U-boat cannot have involved U 73. As there cannot be another German U-boat on the south coast of Spain, it was most probably a false report. At 0250 on 13 December, an enemy aircraft received orders to search the following area: Between latitude 37° 10' N and 37° 50' N, within longitude 5° 55' E and 6° 20' E. The degrees of latitude are interpreted. It is believed that the orders are connected with the report of 0035/13 December from an enemy aircraft over a surfaced stopped U-boat (see War Diary of 12 December).

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Group South announced that an operation is planned after 16 December on the enemy-occupied islands of Korcula, Mljet, Hvar, Brac, Solda, Lagosta and Vis on the Dalmatian coast.

Increased enemy supply traffic will have to be reckoned with after the start of the operation. Its success depends, however, largely on the disruption of sea supplies to the enemy-occupied islands.

Group South requested Captain U-boats to find out whether 1 or 2 U-boats will be available for the duration of the operation in the sea area south of the islands as far as the Italian coast.

If it is not possible for them to operate during the whole course of the operation, it is desired that they operate mainly between the start of the operation and the end of December. Admiral Adriatic received instructions to send details of the purpose and method of the operation direct to Captain U-boats. (Group South S.O.s only no reference dated 13 December.)

Remark: 2 boats are in the Eastern Mediterranean. Of these U 565 put out from Salamis on 12 December bound for the operational area on the coast of Cyrenaica. U 596, which put out from Pola on 30 November, is between the Straits of Otranto and Cape Passero and according to our information has still 10 torpedoes on board.

Captain U-boats is awaiting Admiral Adriatic's instructions regarding details.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 68 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 95,
U 73 CH 84,
U 230 CH 63 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CK 77,
U 565 CO 55.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance as far as Oran, around Corsica and Sardinia.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0809/14 December CH 7693 2 patrol vessels.

2) 0815/14 December CH 8451 2 merchant ships of 7,000 to 8,000 G.R.T. each, 2 escort vessels, course 240°, moderate speed.

3) 0841/14 December CJ 4284 3 small barges.

4) 0945/14 December CJ 5774 1 small coasting freighter, northerly course, moderate speed.

5) 2155/14 December CJ 6742 1 destroyer, probably harbor defense.

6) 2008/14 December CJ 6757 1 escort vessel stopped.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1400/14 December Gibraltar harbor report: 1 "King George V" class, 1 "Warspite" class battleship in dock, 1 "Cairo" class cruiser, 1 "Fiji" class cruiser, 1 Italian cruiser, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 10 destroyers.

2) 1745/14 December 1 freighter, 1 "Agathe" class boat put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1400/14 December CJ 6613 1 patrol vessel, course 170°, speed 10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 565 (Henning), which put out on 12 December, was reminded by Admiral Aegean of the passage report when 35° N is passed. No signal was received.

U 596 (Nonn) reported a success (see V.a). At a depth of 100 meters 1.5 tons of water forced their way into the boat in one hour through the outboard breeches.

The decision as to whether the boat is still clear to operate must be left to the Commander.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1642/14 December as in III.A.b.1 and 2.
0114/15 December as in III.A.d.2.

V. a) Successes:

U 596 (Nonn) on 13 December fired a fan of four at a freighter of 7,000 G.R.T. and a destroyer and heard 3 detonations 5 minutes 51 seconds later. Because the message is not clear we must await the Commander's report to estimate the success.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 66 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 95,
U 73 CH 84,
U 230 CH 36 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 99,
U 565 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 453, 407.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2309/15 December CJ 9167 2 merchant ships of 1,000 to 10,000 G.R.T., 1 destroyer, course 40°, speed slight.

2) 2315/15 December CJ 9148 1 destroyer, course 30°, moderate speed.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1340/15 December Tangier: 5 escort vessels, 2 submarine chasers, 2 freighters approximately 2,000 G.R.T. each, 1 special vessel approximately 1,000 G.R.T., 9 smaller steam trawlers, camouflaged and armed, 1 small tug, making for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2020/15 December CJ 6128 2 destroyers, course 270°.

2) 2100/15 December CJ 6532 3 landing craft, course 280°.

3) 2110/15 December CJ 6612 1 landing craft.

4) 2230/15 December CJ 6381 1 ship. Not clearly identified. Course 80°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 223 (Wächter) intends to cross the 42nd parallel to the north at 0000/17 December and to be at the rendezvous at 0800.

U 565 (Henning) reported his position from CO 5233 at 1908/15 December.

U 593 (Kelbling) was ordered to report his position for the second time since 13 December. Boat did not reply. Because of the radio intercept reports received of an enemy aircraft over a surfaced, stopped U-boat in 9398 on the night of 12/13 December and the orders for 3 more enemy aircraft to operate, the greatest concern is felt for U 593.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of the enemy movement as in III.B.b.4.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Naval War Staff 1st Division (I.U. - U-boat Operations) ordered the recall of U 596 from his operational area in time to support the operations against the enemy-occupied islands between Solda and Mljet so that he can operate in the Adriatic for at least 3 days to support the operations.

U 81 is to be fitted out with Zaunkönigen, on the orders of Naval War Staff 1st Division (I.U. - U-boat Operations). He is assigned to an operation in the Adriatic. (Naval High Command/Naval War Staff 1st Division (I.U.) 3693 S.O.s only dated 15 December.)

As the operation is due to start on 16 December, U 596 has received orders to occupy the operational area CJ 63 and CJ 66 and the western half of CK 41 and received permission to attack all targets, but only those identified as enemy in the northern half of CJ 63 and CK 41. Naval War Staff 1st Division, Group South and Admiral Adriatic have been informed of U 596's mission and Admiral Adriatic has been requested to provide further details for the execution of the operation for U 596's information.

Naval War Staff 1st Division has also been informed that U 81 cannot be fitted out with Zaunkönigen at present as there is still no testing place in Pola.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

16 - 31 DECEMBER, 1943

PG/30933

16 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 63 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 96,
U 73 CH 84,
U 230 CH 33.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CK 74,
U 565 CO 55.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 230 put in to Toulon at 0845 on 16 December.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica and Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:) Nothing to report.
c) By radio intercept service:)

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0030/16 December Gibraltar: 1 freighter in ballast, no details identified, making for the Mediterranean.

2) 0830/16 December 1 freighter in ballast of approximately 7,000 G.R.T. put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 0015/16 December Gibraltar: 1 laden transport, 1 landing craft (personnel), escorted by 3 destroyers.

4) 0930/16 December 3 corvettes put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1311/16 December CK 4711 5 merchant ships, 20,000 G.R.T., south-westerly course, speed 10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of enemy movements as follows:

1703/16 December as in III.A.d.3.
1831/16 December as in III.B.b.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Admiral Adriatic proposes to have our U-boats operate, concentrating west of the islands (Solda to Mljet) between 42° 30' and 43° 20' N in support of our operations against enemy surface forces and guerilla vessels. The first target is "Korcula" (Admiral Adriatic Most Secret 1536 dated 15 December).

U 596 (Nonn) has been informed of the delay and received orders to concentrate in operational area CJ 66.

Captain U-boats requested Admiral Adriatic for a limit in U 596's operational area outside which he is to be free to attack all targets.

(Signed) Kreisch.

17 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 223 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 593 CH 96,
U 73 CH 84.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CK 74,
U 565 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 223 put in to Toulon at 1030/17 December after his 4th operation against the enemy.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642, 230.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

2221/17 December CJ 9161 6 ships, course and speed not known.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing special to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 593 (Kelbling) was ordered to report his position. The boat did not reply. Since no signal has been received from U 593 since the third request on 13 December, the greatest concern is felt for the boat.

U 596 (Nonn), on instructions from Admiral Adriatic, received freedom to attack all targets west of the line connecting CJ 3842 and CK 4144. According to Admiral Adriatic's communication, the proposal is for U 596 to concentrate in his operational area between latitudes 42° 30' N and 43° 20' N. (See War Diary of 16 December.)

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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18 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 593 CH 96,
U 73 CH 84.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 66,
U 565 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642, 230.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance around Corsica, Sardinia, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:) Nothing to report.
c) By radio intercept service:)

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 2330/17 December Ceuta: Convoy of 87 ships, making for the Atlantic.

2) 0140/18 December Gibraltar: 40 freighters, 15 escort vessels, making for the Atlantic.

3) 18 December 1 "King George V" class battleship put out from Gibraltar for an unknown destination.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:) Nothing to report.
c) By radio intercept service:)

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report of 12 December 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier with 36 aircraft, 2 cruisers, 8 torpedoboats, 4 submarines, 10 gunboats, 4 torpedoboat-chasers, 3 tankers, 8 transports, are proceeding from Alexandria to Haifa and on to Beirut.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 596 (Nonn) was informed that the operation against Korcula will start on the morning of 20 December and that our E-boats would be taking part.

An enemy aircraft reported that at 0750/18 December it was over a submerging U-boat, course 130°, speed 6 knots, in CO 5531. Another aircraft at 0825/18 December received orders to shadow it as long as it had sufficient fuel. Most probably it was U 565 (Henning).

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report and were informed of the enemy movement as in III.A.d.3.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

U 593 (Kelbling) must be presumed lost.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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19 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 84.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 66,
U 565 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Sea reconnaissance around Corsica, Balearic Islands, between 3° and 8° E, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2024/19 December CJ 6775 30 - 40 ships.

2) 2035/19 December CJ 6786 5 ships, southerly course.

3) 1040/19 December CJ 6742 53 ships.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1000/18 December 1 freighter of 8,000 G.R.T., 1 tanker of 10,000 G.R.T., put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 1150/19 December 11 British freighters, 1 French freighter, 1 French troopship, 2 corvettes, put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

3) 1730/19 December 4 freighters, 2 escort vessels, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 0302/19 December CO 4820 British unit located.

2) 1733/19 December CJ 2381 2 British aircraft crash-landed in the sea.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 565 (Henning) was informed that an enemy aircraft received orders to shadow a U-boat sighted in CO 5531 at 0750 on 18 December as long as its fuel lasted out. The boat was ordered to report his position. No position report was received.

U 73 (Deckert) was ordered to send a situation report if possible, otherwise to report his position. Last signal from the boat was on 13 December. No situation or position report received from U 73.

The western boats were informed of the enemy movement as in III.A.d.3.

All boats at sea received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

1) We have been informed by radio (1621/19/19) that operation "Herbstgewitter 2" is postponed temporarily.

As U 596 (Nonn) was assigned to this operation by order of Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations), the boat has received no orders from Captain U-boats for the present. Instructions are awaited from Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations).

2) Captain U-boats returned at about 1300 from his trip to Weimar for F.O.s' conference.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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20 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 84.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 66,
U 565 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 380 (Brandi) put out from Toulon at 1630/20 December on his 10th operation (of the boat, Commander's 9th operation).

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 380, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° E, 40° N.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea, Aegean.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

1) On the evening of 20 December according to D/F bearing, a westbound convoy was in the Oran - Alboran area.

2) 1100/20 December a U-boat was sighted by an American steamer (WYQL) 12 miles north and 28 miles west of Marittimo.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1)	1330/19 December	1 freighter of 5,800 G.R.T. put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
2)	1345/19 December	1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.
3)	0900/20 December	1 freighter of 4,100 G.R.T. put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
4)	0930/20 December	1 "Cairo" class cruiser, 1 Dutch destroyer, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
5)	0940/20 December	3 French freighters, 1 French corvette, 1 French minesweeper ("Elan" class) put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.
6)	0950/20 December	6 minesweepers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
7)		6 minesweepers put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.
8)	1300/20 December	1 French "Elan" class minesweeper put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
9)	0850/20 December	2 small tankers, 1 escort vessel, passed Tres Forcas on an easterly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The reports on the enemy as in III.A.c.1 and III.A.d.3, 4, 6 and 9 were passed on to the western boats.

U 73 (Deckert) and U 565 (Henning) were ordered for the second time to report their positions. No signal was received from U 73, U 565 reported from CO 5465.

According to a verbal report from the Commander of U 407 (Brüller), who until the middle of this month was in U 565 (Henning)'s present operational area, traffic runs in a line 12 miles from the coast (pencil note in margin: Cyrenaica), also westbound traffic from CO 5597 to the northwest as far as CO 5545, from here on a westerly course. As air patrols increase we can expect the traffic in this area to increase also. The current in the operational area drives strongly to the east. This information has been passed on to U 565.

U 380 (Brandi), outward bound, has permission to attack submarines north of 38°. The western boats have been informed that the boat has sailed and has permission to attack U-boats north of 38°. Doubts as to whether a submarine is enemy or friendly are thereby excluded when there is an opportunity to fire.

Positions of the Swedish ship "Formosa" at 2100/20 December and the hospital ship "Shamrock" at 2000/21 December were passed on to the boats.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

No instructions have so far been received from Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) on the further use of U 596 and start of operation "Herbstgewitter 2". It is intended to ask the boat for a situation or position report. The boat's operation must be examined for its usefulness.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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21 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 84,
U 380 CH 6320 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 66,
U 565 CO 54.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea, east coast of Sardinia, around Corsica and west coast of Sardinia. Protective reconnaissance between 3° E and 8° E, southern limit 40° N.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1325/21 December 1 of our aircraft sighted a submarine, course 200°, in CH 6327.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) According to radio location a British unit was in CH 6420 at 1728.

2) On the evening of 21 December a westbound convoy was in the sea area of Bizerta.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0615-0730/21 December 51 probable freighters, 6 escort vessels, sighted from Ceuta, making for the Mediterranean.

2) 0900/21 December abreast of Tarifa, 3 tankers, 18 freighters, 3 destroyers, 1 corvette proceeding from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean.

3) 1045/21 December 13 large freighters, 1 ocean-going tug, 4 escort vessels sighted from Ceuta, making for the Mediterranean.

4) 1045/21 December 1 transport of 8,000 G.R.T., 9 large freighters put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

Note: The vessels given in 3) and 4) probably formed the convoy given in 2).

5) 1250/21 December 6 laden freighters, 2 escort vessels, 1 ocean-going tug sighted from Ceuta. Proceeding from Gibraltar to the Mediterranean.

Note: Another station gives the composition of the convoy as follows:

1 tanker of 8,000 G.R.T., 2 Liberty ships, 5 large freighters, 2 escort vessels, possibly more.

6) 1230/21 December 4 freighters put in to Gibraltar from an unknown direction.

7) 1500/21 December Tangier-Caraminal: 7 apparent destroyers on a westerly course.

8) 1400/21 December 3 freighters put in to Gibraltar from an unknown direction.

9) 1635/21 December 2 transports of 12,000-15,000 G.R.T., 2 destroyers sighted from Spartel, making for the Mediterranean.

10) 1800/21 December 6 freighters, 2 destroyers, 1 corvette put out from Gibraltar apparently for the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:
b) By air reconnaissance:
} Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1648/21 December convoy formation "Molli" (according to a German Air Force report of 0810 composed of 20 large and 13 medium-sized merchant ships, 5 escorts) reported an attack by 4 aircraft, position probably CN 3964. (Formation is steering northwest.)

2) Enemy radar service reported: "Formation of 10 ships in CJ 9245 at 2036."

3) More reports of formations of ships in the same sea area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The enemy movements as in III.A.b.1, c.1, d.1 and 3 were passed on to the western boats.

U 380 (Brandi) received as his operational area the area west of the meridian in CH 8245. After the messages reporting the convoys passing through the Straits of Gibraltar to the east had been received, the boat received orders to operate on the convoys.

U 73 (Deckert) received as his operational area the area east of U 380. The boat was to report his position by short signal when he set off. This request, like the previous two, was also not answered. It must be assumed that the boat is operating on the eastbound convoys and has therefore not reported.

U 596 (Nonn) was ordered to report the situation and/or his position. The boat signaled "No traffic, air patrol, CJ 66, lively location activity, Naxos and Wanze broken down, codes only to Sylvester. My position CJ 6369."

Information has been received that D-day for "Herbstgewitter 2" is 22 December. U 596 has been informed of this and reminded that our E-boats will start operations connected with "Herbstgewitter 2" as darkness falls on 21 December in the Brindisi - Bari area.

An extract from the Armed Forces Report and the positions of the Red Cross ships were passed on to the boats.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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22 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 8440,
U 380 CH 9150 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 6360,
U 565 CO 5460.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 642 (Brünning) put out from Toulon at 1710/22 December on his 4th operation (of the boat and the Commander).

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea, African coast, protective reconnaissance between 3° E and 8° E, southern limit 40° N, between Cape Tenes and Algiers.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1234/22 December CH 8285 1 corvette, course 250°.

2) 1404/22 December CH 3291 1 drifting forward or after part of a ship.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1315/22 December British unit which at 1248 had the position grid square 4227 transmitted to it reported: "Area searched, wreckage of a ship found. No trace of survivors."

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1700/21 December 1 ore-carrying freighter put out from Almeria, joined passing ore-carrying freighter with destroyer escort.

2) 0630/22 December 1 transport of 15,000 G.R.T., 3 freighters, 1 destroyer, 2 corvettes put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

3) 0730/22 December 70 ships passing through Straits of Gibraltar to the east (according to air reconnaissance La Linea).

4) 0815/22 December 10 British freighters, 1 British tanker, 3 corvettes, 1 French warship put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

5) 0950/22 December 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

6) 1030/22 December 1 freighter,
1840/22 December 1 freighter, 2 corvettes put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

7) 1815/22 December 10 minesweepers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

1) 1730/22 December 1 of our submarine-chasers had a suspicious location in CJ 1455 presumably from a submerged enemy submarine.

2) 1550/22 December CH 3385 enemy submarine.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received:

1) the reports as in III.A.b.1, III.A.d.3, 4, 5 and 7;

2) positions of Red Cross and hospital ships;

3) an excerpt from the Armed Forces Report; and

4) information that U 642 put out from Toulon at 1710 and on the outward passage has permission to attack submarines north of the parallel in CJ 1885 and south of this parallel east of the meridian in CJ 4765.

U 642 (Brünning) has been informed of the reports in III.A.c.1 and III.A.e.1.

According to a radio intercept report, at 0300 an enemy escort reported to Algiers sighting a submerged U-boat steering a northerly course bearing 270°, 2 miles from his position which was interpreted by the radio intercept stations as 36° 55' N, 1° 20' E (= CH 8267). A bearing was taken on the escort in the direction of Cape Tenes. It is possible that the signal was made by the corvette sighted by the German Air Force at 1234/22 December in CH 8285.

U 380 (Brandi), U 73 (Deckert) also, may be in the area where the U-boat was sighted. U 380 and U 73 were informed of the sighting. U 73 (Deckert) has still not reported. As more east-bound convoys are running from Gibraltar, there is a chance that the boat has not made the signals ordered in the last few days for that reason.

Our E-boats will put out at dark for a night sortie in connection with operation "Herbstgewitter 2" in the area Lastove to the western tip of Hvar Island, western tip of Scedro Island, western part of Korcula. The boats will open fire on Lastove at dawn and put in to Cattaro at 0800 at the latest. The E-boats had to abandon the operation because of weather conditions.

U 596 (Nonn) was informed of the E-boat operation and that it was abandoned.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

U 301 (Körner) is reported missing for the last time with effect from 21 January. The boat was probably sunk by the British submarine "Sahib". One midshipman (j.g.) has been taken prisoner. The remainder of the crew including the Commander were killed.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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23 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 8440,
U 380 CH 8340,
U 642 CJ 4220 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 6380,
U 565 CO 5460.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance west of 5° E as far as the African coast. Protective reconnaissance between Spain and Corsica, north of 41°.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, southwest of the Peloponnese, southeast of Rhodes, south and southwest of Cyprus, inshore waters from Otranto to Cape Spartivento.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0845/23 December CJ 8469 2 tankers of 7,000 G.R.T., 1 escorting vessel, course 270°.

2) 1023/23 December CH 9456 5 merchant ships of 10,000-12,000 G.R.T. each, 1 escort vessel, course 70°.

3) 1031/23 December CH 9544 90-100 ships totaling 600,000 to 700,000 G.R.T., predominantly Liberty ships, 4 freighters over 10,000 G.R.T. and approximately 4 tankers, escorted by 4 destroyers, course 90°.

4) 0820/23 December CH 3385 1 raft with 5 survivors. Do 24 guided towards it to rescue them.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 23 December in the evening according to a radio intercept report from the Main Naval D/F Station Montpellier a Mediterranean convoy was in the sea area close to Cape Bon and is supposed to be bound for Augusta and Taronto.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0800/23 December 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1815/23 December 4 probable transports of approximately 12,000 G.R.T. each, 1 freighter, 4 minesweepers, 2 "Agathe" class boats put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

1) Enemy submarine sighted off Sestrilevante.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The boats received:

1) reports as in III.A.b.1, 2 and 3; III.A.d.2,

2) positions of hospital, Red Cross and neutral ships,

3) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 642 (Brünning) received as his operational area the area east of the meridian in 8245, south of the parallel in 5595. At the same time the boat was informed that according to our latest information the main traffic routes run:

1) through CJ 8925, CJ 9495, CJ 9516, CJ 6786,

2) through CJ 8925, CJ 8397, CJ 6745, and

3) from Naples to Messina.

U 73 (Deckert) has not reported. Although the boat was not ordered to report his position, it was expected that a signal would be received after the two large convoys had passed the area where the boat was presumed to be. Concern is felt for U 73.

U 565 (Henning) reported that the boat is limited in its ability to submerge owing to heavy depth-charge attacks. The forward periscope casing is damaged, Wanze broken down and the boat makes loud noises. He is making for Salamis for an urgent basic overhaul of the diesels. Intends to cross 35° N at 0600 on 25 December.

U 596 (Nonn) was informed that the anti-aircraft carrier "Niobe" taking part in operation "Herbstgewitter 2" ran aground near Salve Island and broke up on 22 December apparently from 2 U-boat torpedo hits.

Last night the E-boats taking part in operation "Herbstgewitter 2" were supposed to carry out the operation planned for the previous night. Because of weather conditions the E-boats did not sail.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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24 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 73 CH 8440,
U 380 CH 8350,
U 642 CJ 7210 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 6380,
U 565 CO 5550 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance west of 5° E, north of 38° N. Protective reconnaissance 3° and 8° E, north of 40°, Tyrrhenian Sea. Otherwise no details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of southeast coast of Italy, coast of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1933/24 December CJ 6797 1 probable warship hove to.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1815/23 December 1 laden freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1845/23 December 1 laden freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

3) 1900/23 December 1 laden freighter, 1 "Agathe" class boat put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

4) 0800/24 December 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

5) 0930/24 December 2 laden freighters put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

6) 0915/24 December convoy of about 20 ships coming from the Mediterranean sighted from Gibraltar.

7) 1100/24 December convoy of 16 British freighters, 1 Polish freighter, 1 Greek freighter, 2 corvettes put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

8) 1115/24 December 2 transports probably carrying troops, 3 destroyers sighted from Ceuta making for the Mediterranean.

9) 1200/24 December 2 freighters put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

10) 1345/24 December 9 freighters, 3 corvettes, 2 "Agathe" class boats, and 1 tug put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

11) 1350/24 December 10 transports of 15,000 G.R.T. each and larger, 1 freighter of

9,000 G.R.T., 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers (sighted from Ceuta), sighted from Spartel making for the Mediterranean. Later 2 transports, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers turned away from the convoy and continued on a course set for the Mediterranean. The remainder of the convoy turned off to the Atlantic.

12) 1715/24 December 2 transports, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic (see III.A.d.11.)

c) By naval forces:

1130/24 December CJ 1472 enemy submarine sighted.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following reports were passed on to the boats:

1) as in III.A.e, III.A.d.8,

2) positions of hospital ships,

3) Christmas greetings from C-in-C U-boats and Captain U-boats,

4) Naval High Command Daily Orders,

5) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 642 (Brünning), in contradiction to previous orders (operational area in the Tyrrhenian Sea) received orders to operate on the large convoy of 70 ships which, according to an air reconnaissance report from La Linea, is believed to have passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on 22 December. This convoy has so far not been picked up again by any shore station or by air reconnaissance.

U 596 (Nonn). The E-boats taking part in operation "Herbstgewitter 2" were due to carry out the sortie planned at night. Because of weather conditions the boats did not sail. Captain U-boats intends to issue orders on 25 December for U 596 to return (see under VI).

U 565 (Henning) intends to cross 35° N at 0600. Admiral Aegean took over command at 0200 and gave permission for the boat to cross.

Admiral Aegean informed the boat that an aircraft from Alexandria reported an A.S.V. (air to surface vessel) location at 2210 and that at 2400 the aircraft received orders to attack. At 0254 the boat was ordered to report his position. U 565 reported from CO 5223.

V. a) Successes:

Nothing to report.

b) Losses:

U 73 (Deckert) is believed to be lost.

VI. General situation:

Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations), Group South and Admiral Adriatic have been informed by teleprinter (Captain U-boats Mediterranean Most Secret 3725) that I intend to order U 596 to return on 25 December. The reasons are as follows:

1) The boat has reached the limit of its operational duration.

2) The boat is only ready to operate with restrictions because of breakdowns and faults. (Faults: leaky stern tubes and exhaust cut-out. Breakdown: "Wanze" and "Naxos".)

3) The boat has no prospects of success in this operational area.

The following is noted with regard to U 596's operation:

The boat was assigned to operation "Herbstgewitter 2" for the greater part of his operational period. During that time he could not achieve any successes. On the other hand, in the 10 out of 25 days at sea so far, when he operated on enemy traffic routes on the southeast coast of Italy, the boat sank a 7,000 G.R.T. steamer, torpedoed another 7,000 tonner and 1 destroyer (probably sunk).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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25 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 8350,
U 642 CJ 7710

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 6370,
U 565 CO 2860 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 642.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance west of 5° E north of 38° N. Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, southwest of Peloponnese, Ionian Sea, inshore waters from Otranto to Cape Spartivento.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

Evening of 25 December, probably in the sea area Philippeville - Bone, one convoy according to operator's evaluation.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0045/25 December 10 ships, 2 destroyers proceeding from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean. No details could be distinguished because of fog.

2) 0830/25 December 11 freighters, 4 gunboats north of Tres Forcas, making for the Mediterranean.

3) 0845/25 December 1 cruiser with 3 funnels put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:)
c) By radio intercept service:) Nothing to report.
d) By G.I.S. stations:)

e) By naval forces:

1) 1505/25 December CO 3737 enemy submarine.

2) 1630/25 December north of Levita enemy submarine withdrawing to the southeast.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following reports were passed on to the boats:

1) as in III.A.d.1 and 2,

2) positions of hospital ships,

3) extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 596 (Nonn) was informed that the E-boats were putting out at dark to hunt enemy vessels. The boat received orders to return to Pola, as planned (see War Diary of 24 December, VI).

U 565 (Henning) reported that he will be at Point 140 A at 0700 on 27 December.

V. a) Successes:)
b) Losses:) Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

26 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 8430,
U 642 CJ 7590.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 6370,
U 565 CO 2620.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea. Protective and sea reconnaissance of sea area from south coast of France to CH 8360 and back on the same route. Protective reconnaissance of sea area south coast of France to 40° N.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

1) The convoy given in III.A.c.1 of 25 December was in the Bizerta area on the evening of 26 December according to an operator's evaluation.

2) Westbound convoy was in the Tenes - Oran sea area on the evening of 26 December.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0815/26 December 1 freighter of 6,000 G.R.T., put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

2) 0930/26 December 1 Belgian transport and 1 British transport carrying troops, 1 light cruiser, 3 destroyers, 2 corvettes, 2 escort vessels put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

3) 0955/26 December 1 cruiser probably American, with 3 funnels sighted in the Straits making for the Atlantic.

4) 1005/26 December 1 British transport, 1 French transport approximately 14,000 G.R.T., 3 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

5) 1115/26 December 1 "Fiji" class cruiser, 1 "Aurora" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

c) By naval forces:

0700/26 December enemy submarine shelled 3 barges off Sestrilevante.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were passed on to the boats:

1) alteration in the plan of conversion tables,

2) German Air Force recognition signals,

3) positions of hospital ships,

4) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 596 (Nonn) has so far not reported when he will reach the rendezvous. The boat has been reminded he has to report.

U 565 (Henning) was informed by Admiral Aegean that the boat must sail from the harbor boom with a ground mine escort and that this escort will be ground mine defense escort boat 2. In addition the U-boat is warned to expect to meet a convoy bound for Suda.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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27 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CM 8430,
U 642 CJ 7580.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 6220 (homeward bound),
U 565 CK 8980 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 565 (Henning) put in to Salamis at 1045/27 December from his 16th operation (of the boat).

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea. Protective reconnaissance west of 5° E north of 39° N and between 3° and 8° E north of 40° N.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Sea reconnaissance of Eastern Mediterranean east of 32°, Ionian Sea.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

1) Evening of 27 December eastbound American convoy in the Malta sea area.

2) Evening of 27 December westbound convoy in the Gibraltar sea area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1000/27 December	3 laden French freighters, 1 French corvette coming from the Atlantic abreast of Europa Point. Convoy turned away again at 1200. Set course for the Atlantic.
2) 1300/27 December	2 freighters of 4,000 to 5,000 G.R.T. each, 1 escort vessel, 1 corvette making for the Atlantic, reported by Cape Spartel.
3) 1325/27 December	convoy passed Tangier - Caraminal line on a westerly course. Freighters estimated at approximately 2,000 G.R.T.
4) 1000/27 December	5 British freighters put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0400-0800/27 December	5 vessels, details not identified, in CP 5879, 5788 and 8219.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were passed on to the boats:

1) an extract from the announcement from Naval High Command on the loss of the battleship "Scharnhorst",

2) positions of Red Cross and hospital ships,

3) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 380 (Brandi) was ordered to report his position. The signal was not answered.

U 596 (Nonn) was reminded to report the time of his arrival at the rendezvous. The boat signaled that he will be at Point H at 0800 on Tuesday (28 December). U-boat base Pola has been informed.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

The last operation of U 596 again showed that the use of U-boats to support landing operations is not worthwhile. A U-boat cannot give support to our forces when they are carrying out landing operations because the pre-requisite of "operating", vision and mobility are denied to the boat by enemy air patrols.

The use of U-boats in operation "Herbstgewitter 2" is not considered by Captain U-boats to be advisable because:

a) the area is unsuitable for U-boats,

b) our sea and air forces are operating in the same sea area,

c) valuable enemy targets are lacking.

It is therefore intended to allocate the area on the southeast coast of Italy to U 81 as his operational area. Naval High Command/Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) has been informed of this by teleprinter (Captain U-boats Most Secret 3749/43).

(Signed) Kreisch.

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28 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 8430,
U 642 CJ 7730.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 596 CJ 2395 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 596 (Nonn) put in to Pola at 0930/28 December from his 8th operation (of the boat).

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° E north of 40° N. Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0855/28 December 2 M.T.B.s in the northern part of the Strait of Bonifacio, northeasterly course.

2) 1015/28 December CJ 9884 10 merchant ships up to 10,000 G.R.T., 2 escort vessels, course 21°.

3) 1015/28 December CJ 9884 14 merchant ships, course 270°.

4) 1017/28 December CN 3257 2 units, course 150°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Evening of 28 December a westbound convoy was in the Malta sea area according to an operator's evaluation.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0345/28 December 20 medium-sized and large vessels, 8 destroyers or gunboats sighted from Tangier making for the Atlantic.

2) 0810/28 December 3 freighters of 5,000 - 6,000 G.R.T., 1 freighter of 2,000 G.R.T., 2 submarine chasers passed the Tangier - Caraminal line, making for the Mediterranean.

3) 0845/28 December 41 freighters, 8 tankers, 2 corvettes, 3 destroyers, abreast of Punta Carnero, making for the Atlantic.

4) 0900/28 December 1 probable auxiliary cruiser, 5 large cruisers, 3 small cruisers passed abreast of Ceuta, making for Gibraltar.

5) 1030/28 December 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

6) 1045/28 December 16 British freighters, 1 Norwegian freighter, 1 French freighter, 2 freighters of unknown nationality, 1 French destroyer, 1 corvette, 1 tug put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

7) 1100/28 December 1 French transport, 1 French freighter, 1 Italian freighter, 1 French corvette put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

8) 1810/28 December 1 large French destroyer "Mogador" proceeding from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

0948/28 December CJ 1448 one of our steamers torpedoed by a submarine.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were passed on to the boats:

1) reports as in III.A.d.2,

2) Serial Order No.34,

3) positions of hospital ships,

4) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 380 (Brandi) and U 642 (Brünning) were ordered to report their positions. U 380 reported at 2307 from CH 7542. No signal was received from U 642 (Brünning). An indistinct short signal received at 1905 cannot be the position report requested of U 642 because the request was not transmitted until 2234.

U 642 (Brünning) received orders to occupy the operational area (in the Tyrrhenian Sea) ordered on 23 December in signal serial number 509. The sighting as in III.A.b.2 was passed on to "Brünning".

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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29 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7542,
U 642 CJ 7560.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea. Protective reconnaissance of sea area south coast of France to Balearic Islands.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic, Ionian Sea.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0750/29 December CJ 8379 2 merchant ships of 10,000 G.R.T., 1 destroyer, course 60°.

2) 0940/29 December CJ 5748 1 merchant ship up to 3,000 G.R.T., course 90°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 29 December Britain - Mediterranean convoy was in the CF 65 sea area. Convoy will have passed through Straits of Gibraltar by 3 January.

2) 1455/29 December Algiers patrol vessel reported a submerged U-boat in CH 9138.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0100/29 December 2 large silhouettes, transports of 12,000 G.R.T., possibly 2 destroyers sighted

from Ceuta making for the Mediterranean.

2) 1730/29 December 1 freighter of 10,000 G.R.T. passed Alicante at a distance of 1½ miles on a northeasterly course.

3) 0815/29 December 2 transports put in to Malaga to embark Frenchmen.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1615/29 December CK 4877 7 merchant ships, several small naval craft, northerly course.

2) 1940/29 December CJ 6613 1 ship, no details ascertained.

3) 2206/29 December CJ 3789 2 ships, course 170°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were passed on to the boats:

1) reports as in III.A.b.1, 2, III.A.c.2, III.A.d.1.

2) a) German Air Force recognition signals from 1 to 6 January,

b) putting into effect recognition signal cartridge 3,

c) cancellation of codeword "Espe",

d) identification numbers to identification groups of conversion table, identification word "Mündung" for January and February,

3) positions of hospital ships,

4) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 642 (Brünning) was ordered to report his position. The boat reported from CJ 8395.

U 380 (Brandi) was informed that he may expect some of our U-boats proceeding from the west to the east.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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30 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7540,
U 642 CJ 8395.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 81 (Krieg) put out from Pola at 1730/30 December on his 17th operation (of the boat).

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance of sea area from south coast of France to Balearic Islands.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Central Mediterranean between 16° 30' E and 19° E north of 33° N.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1100/30 December CJ 4661 2 tankers, 1 guardboat, northerly course.

2) 1938/30 December CJ 6785 2 merchant ships of approximately 2,000 G.R.T. hove to.

3) 1950/30 December CJ 9129 30 ships, course and speed not ascertained.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) A westbound convoy, in the Malta sea area on 28 December, was in the Bizerta - Philippeville sea area on 30 December.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1345/30 December 1 "Aurora" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1100/30 December 2 French transports, carrying troops, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette, 1 minesweeper passed Punta Carnero making for the Atlantic.

3) 0945/30 December 1 freighter of 4,982 G.R.T. in ballast, 1 escort vessel, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to the radio intercept service at 0932, convoy formations "Novelty", "Rubble", "Nipple", "Evolution", in the Benghazi area received warning of aircraft.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were passed on to the boats:

1) the report in III.A.d.3,

2) "Zaunkönig" successes to date,

3) a correction to Standing War Order from C-in-C U-boats No.121,

4) position of a hospital ship,

5) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 642 (Brünning) was sent the reconnaissance reports as in III.A.b.2 and 3.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Naval High Command/Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) concurs with the intention to operate U 81 in the sea area of the southeast coast of Italy (see War Diary of 27 December, VI). (Naval War Staff 1st Division (Operations) I.U. 4047 S.O.s only dated 30 December.)

(Signed) Kreisch.

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31 December, 1943

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7540,
U 642 CJ 8390.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 81 CJ 3720 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° E north of 40°, otherwise no information.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
b) By air reconnaissance:) Nothing to report.

c) By radio intercept service:

On the afternoon of 31 December a U.S.A. - Mediterranean convoy was in the Gibraltar sea area according to an operator's evaluation.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1800/29 December	2 large freighters passed Cape de Gata making for the Mediterranean.
2) 30 December	1 British steamer of 5,438 G.R.T. put in to Valencia, took on 50,000-60,000 barrels of apples. Probably due to sail on 1 or 2 January. An explosion occurred in the steamer on 31 December.
3) 0845/31 December	1 freighter in ballast put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
4) 0815/31 December	1 landing ship (tank) sighted from Cape Spartel making for the Mediterranean.

5) 0900 1 freighter.
1100 1 tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

6) 0900 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0845/31 December CO 4124 convoy of 16 merchant ships, 3 escort vessels, course 310°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were passed on to the boats:

1) New Year greetings from Naval High Command, C-in-C U-boats and Captain U-boats, and

2) an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 380 (Brandi) was informed that according to radio intercept reports:

a) on 30 December a westbound convoy was in the Bizerta - Philippeville sea area, and

b) on 31 December a U.S.A. - Mediterranean convoy was in the Gibraltar sea area.

Naval War Staff announced that for reasons of prestige it wishes British steamers near the Spanish Mediterranean coast to be sunk as soon as possible.

Apart from continual traffic in ore from the neighborhood of Cartagena there is additional traffic in food by British ships from Valencia and Cartagena. Ships are mainly escorted by a destroyer or corvette. The boat is informed of this. The report in III.A.d.3 was passed on to the boat.

U 81 (Krieg) was ordered to report whether he observed enemy aircraft laying mines between 2200 and 2230 on 30 December in CJ 2634 to 3442.

According to a teleprinter message from the Officer-in-Charge U-boat base Pola there is a suspicion that a group of enemy aircraft carried out minelaying in the area given. No signal was received from the boat.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

In Naval War Staff 1st Division (U-boat Operations) I.U. 4080/43 S.O.s only dated 31 December, Naval War Staff pointed out the increase in enemy traffic to Turkish ports and ordered U 453 to operate in this area.

Captain U-boats had intended to have not only U 453 (Lührs) but also U 407 (Korndörfer), both commanders of which have changed, operate in the eastern part of the Eastern Mediterranean. Apart from the possibility of disrupting traffic, it has been found worthwhile to let boats with new commanders operate in the eastern part of the Eastern Mediterranean where, owing to slight enemy activity, the commander and his crew will have a chance to become accustomed to each other and to their boat.

(Signed) Kreisch.

Synopsis for December 1943

I. The strength of enemy mercantile traffic was also determined in December mainly by supplies required for the Italian front. From this it is obvious that the enemy is still further exploiting the success achieved during the year, namely the opening up of the Mediterranean.

Some of the convoys passing through the Straits of Gibraltar in to the Mediterranean from Britain, probably also from the U.S.A., choose the shorter route to East Asia through the Mediterranean. Returning convoys use the same route. This has been confirmed by radio intercept messages and aircraft reconnaissances.

No activity on the part of heavy allied units was observed. A total of 5 battleships, 1 auxiliary aircraft carrier and 15 cruisers was estimated at the end of the month.

In addition there are the Italian units of which probably only the smallest proportion are fully ready to operate. These forces were neither reported nor observed to move. If none have been withdrawn from the Mediterranean, it is estimated that there are 5 battleships and roughly 6 cruisers in the Mediterranean area.

No preparations for large-scale landing operations in the form of movements of landing craft were observed. The withdrawal of landing craft from the Mediterranean continues. An influx was particularly noted at the middle of the month. The total number has been reduced by about one-third of infantry and tank landing craft and one-fifth of landing ships (tank) as compared with the number in the Mediterranean area at the time of the invasion of Italy. The possibility of carrying out a very important landing cannot therefore be excluded but it is not believed probable as there are no indications of it.

On the other hand we must always take into account the possibility of small outflanking landings such as the enemy attempted in the Garigliano estuary.

It was ascertained from air reconnaissance reports that some of the smaller landing craft are being used for supplies chiefly on the route from north Sicilian ports to Naples and Taranto - Brindisi - Bari. It may be assumed that effective German Air Force attacks on the ports mentioned have forced the enemy to choose transhipments to avoid heavy concentrations of merchant shipping in ports near German airfields.

II. U-boat operations were concentrated in the Western Mediterranean because of information of the past months and more recently, in proportion

to the boats available as well as their allocation to the Western and Eastern Mediterranean. This area is touched by the main stream of enemy traffic.

The routes used by the enemy in this area are determined in principle by two factors:

1) The narrowness of the area offers greater possibilities of carrying out avoiding actions to the north or south.

2) The nearer he is to the conquered coast, the more effective and simple is the protection of supply traffic afforded by fighter cover against air attacks and anti-U-boat sweeps by naval and air forces.

Enemy traffic therefore runs within a line of approximately 40 to 50 miles breadth parallel to the enemy-occupied coast.

In the western part of the Western Mediterranean, in the "funnel", where he has no coast under his control available, traffic is spread over the whole width of the area. It must be noted however that the main part runs south of Alboran.

The part of the traffic coming from the west bound for the west coast of Italy, steers for the ports in north Sicily. Here some of the supplies, as stated already, are transferred to smaller landing craft and then transported to Naples.

On this part of the route also, full use is to be made of the protection which enemy escorting forces can offer traffic. On two main traffic routes which take these principles into account traffic is being overpowered.

The route which seems to the enemy most secure leads from Palermo through the Lipari Islands in an arc eastward hauling out to Naples.

The less protected and less used route runs from Palermo past Ustica Island then direct to Naples.

U-boat operations were concentrated on these routes in constant use in the Western Mediterranean.

Traffic from the Western Mediterranean bound for the Eastern Mediterranean passes through the Sicilian Channel then runs in the protection provided by Malta to the coast of Cyrenaica and on along the African coast, again at a distance of approximately 40 miles from the coast.

Traffic from the east bound for Italy uses the same route to Cyrenaica. Then it branches off between Benghazi and Derna and steers for the southeast coast of Italy in an arc hauling out to the west. Here it again runs parallel to

the coast and is then divided between the ports there.

It must be noted here also that sailing instructions depend on the protection which naval and air forces can give.

The small number of boats available in the Eastern Mediterranean operated on the main focal points of traffic, in the area of the coast of Cyrenaica and off the southeast coast of Italy. It was not possible fully to exploit the possibilities of successes as during the month only 2 boats were available for the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition there is the fact that one of these boats was assigned, for the greater part of his operational period, to the operation to clean up the Adriatic islands.

III. It is obvious from the points given in II that there is no problem of finding the enemy in the Mediterranean area. The routes he uses are less subject to alteration because of the narrowness of the area and therefore always known. Operations on these routes always lead in a longer or shorter period to successes. On the other hand U-boat operations in support of our landings, such as those carried out in the Aegean to occupy Leros and Samos Islands and in the Adriatic to clean up (enemy-occupied) islands, do not achieve any satisfactory successes. This is once again shown by U 596's mission in the Adriatic in the operation against Korcula when the boat could not achieve a single success, in spite of spending the greater part of his operational period in this area, while on a 10-day sortie on the southeast coast of Italy, i.e. on one of the enemy traffic routes in the Eastern Mediterranean, he sank 2 steamers of 7,000 G.R.T. each and one destroyer. The experiences gained by Captain U-boats on U-boat warfare are as follows:

1) Considering the efficiency of the enemy's anti-submarine defenses, and in particular of his air forces, it cannot be expected that U-boats will be able to operate against a specific target, which is only in position for a short period, with any great prospects of success. Under conditions as they now are in the Mediterranean theater, the U-boat is, as it were, stationary, for the enemy's air patrols deprive it both of vision and mobility, which are prerequisites for its proper operation. The "stationary" U-boat would therefore have to wait until, perchance, it may be approached by its target - a circumstance which is unlikely to arise, for even a few thousand meters' difference in the distance of the target may prevent the U-boat from attacking. Even attacks on some convoys of 70 or more units have for this reason been unsuccessful.

2) U-boat operations must therefore be carried out where there is continuous traffic, preferably

in an area where enemy movements can be watched by our air reconnaissance or notified by our reporting service. Even under these conditions the U-boat may miss some of the convoys, but the large number of targets available and the period of time at its disposal are bound to result in some successes. The experiences of two years of U-boat warfare in the Mediterranean show that every deviation from this principle has led to failure. Even in the "defense against landings" U-boats did not gain any special successes, since, as has already been stated, in an area where the enemy concentrates his air patrol U-boats cannot "operate" in the proper sense of the word.

3) Conditions are particularly unfavorable for U-boats when they are to operate:

a) in an area where geographical difficulties, lack of space, small depths and tricky navigation are additional problems to the enemy's air patrol,

b) in the presence of our own air and naval forces which, from the point of view of the U-boat represent an additional threat, and

c) in the absence of targets for attack, that is to say, with only light enemy naval forces, small units and landing craft.

These three conditions have always applied in our operations in the Aegean and Adriatic Seas, and consequently Captain U-boats does not consider it worthwhile to continue them. These conditions do not suit the peculiar nature of U-boat warfare and must of necessity lead to failure.

4) To sum up: The great improvements in the enemy's method of anti-submarine warfare, as well as the changes in the war situation and the present state of U-boat design - which latter need not be enlarged upon here - compel us to reduce drastically the number and nature of the assignments allocated to them.

Nevertheless, operated with proper reference to existing conditions the U-boat continues to be a powerful weapon.

IV. The sinkings obtained in December (see VIII) cannot be regarded as satisfactory measured by the enemy traffic running in the Mediterranean. However, in the first third of the month there were only 6 U-boats, in the second third 4 and in the last third only 3 in the operational area. For the numbers of U-boats on operations in December see VII.

It is noted with regard to individual operations:

a) U 596 (Nonn) was assigned for the greater part of his operational period to support an operation cleaning up the Dalmatian islands. The boat was unable to achieve any successes there.

b) U 230 (Siegmann) passed through the Straits of Gibraltar from the west to the east. No special difficulties arose. According to a verbal report from the Commander the most essential prerequisite for the success of the operation is an unobserved approach. If this is successful then the task can be considered completed.

According to our latest experience it seems best for the operation to be carried out submerged.

c) U 453 (Schlippenbach) in previous months in three operations has laid TMB mines in Bari and Brindisi roads. Both roads have been extensively and usefully mined. In all three cases the operation meant the full use of the boat which was withdrawn from other employment for altogether approximately 2 months for these missions.

In spite of the fairly moderate traffic to and from the two ports established by air reconnaissance, so far no success or favorable effect of the minelaying has been observed. This raises the question whether, with the efficiency of modern minesweeping gear, such a minelaying operation directly off a harbor is worth the risk and loss of a U-boat operation with torpedoes. Minelaying operations in the Mediterranean by U-boats have so far not been able to prove convincing.

V. As far as can be seen, conditions in the Mediterranean will not change basically in the coming month. The volume of enemy traffic will increase rather than decrease; for it may be expected that the enemy will use the route through the Mediterranean even more than the route round the Cape.

(Pencil note in margin: Mediterranean, a closed sea area. To attack convoys a unified control is absolutely essential. Only myself - Captain U-boats. There is nothing here of that.)

There are at present no signs of a large-scale landing operation. However the possibility is not excluded as the number of landing craft in the Mediterranean area permits the enemy such an operation.

The possibility that the enemy is undertaking small outflanking operations on the south Italian front arises again as it has done before. The operation of our U-boats against such undertakings - as already reported earlier - will be made more difficult or even impossible by our minefields off the Italian coast. The enemy who obviously knows of these minefields and has therefore no difficulties, uses them as flanking minefields against U-boats.

Operations must concentrate on the main traffic routes; only here can the enemy be effectively attacked by our boats.

VI. It has not been discovered that the enemy has any new weapons to combat U-boats. One boat reports that he was approached by aircraft three times without having a location beforehand when his radar location sets were clear. The following considerations are suggested:

a) There is the possibility that the new radar location set "Wanze 2" is not free from radiation. (Pencil note: No!)

b) The enemy is working on frequencies which cannot be picked up by either "Wanze G 2" or radar set "Naxos".

c) The enemy is employing a so far unknown method of locating U-boats.

VII. The number of U-boats occupying the operational areas in December was as follows:

Date	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In port	Total No. of boats
1	2	1	1	1	9	14
2	2	1	2	-	9	14
3	3	2	-	-	9	14
4	3	2	-	-	9	14
5	4	2	1	-	8	14
6	4	2	-	-	8	14
7	4	2	-	-	8	14
8	4	2	-	-	8	14
9	4	1	-	2	8	15
10	3	1	-	3	8	15
11	3	1	-	3	8	15
12	3	1	-	3	8	15
13	2	1	1	2	9	15
14	2	2	-	2	9	15
15	2	2	-	2	9	15
16	2	2	-	1	10	15
17	2	2	-	1	10	15
18	2	2	-	-	11	15
19	1	2	-	-	11	14
20	1	2	-	-	11	14
21	1	2	1	-	10	14
22	1	2	1	-	10	14
23	2	2	1	-	9	14
24	2	1	1	1	9	14
25	2	1	1	1	9	14
26	2	1	-	1	9	13
27	2	-	-	2	9	13
28	2	-	-	1	10	13
29	2	-	-	-	11	13
30	2	-	1	-	10	13
31	2	-	1	-	10	13

Daily average in the periods:

From	Western Med.	Eastern Med.	Outward bound	Homeward bound	In port
1-10	3·2	1·6	0·4	0·6	8·4
11-20	2	1·7	0·1	1·4	9·6
21-31	1·8	0·8	0·6	0·5	9·6

Daily average for the month:

	2·3	1·3	0·4	0·8	9·2
i.e.	16·4%	9·3%	2·9%	5·7%	65·7%

VIII. The following successes were obtained in the Mediterranean in December:

Boat	Number of merchant ships sunk	G.R.T.	Warships sunk	Days at sea	Remarks
U 73	-	-	-	22	
U 81	-	-	-	2	
U 223	-	-	2 destroyers	17	
U 230	-	-	-	9	
U 380	-	-	-	12	
U 407	-	-	-	12	
U 453	-	-	-	1	
U 565	-	-	-	16	
U 593	-	-	-	19	
U 596	2	14,000	1 destroyer	28	
U 616	3	24,000	1 destroyer	12	
U 642	-	-	-	10	
12 U-boats	5	38,000	4 destroyers	160	

12 U-boats in 160 days at sea sank 5 ships totaling 38,000 G.R.T. and 4 destroyers.

12 boats spent 160 days at sea.

1 boat spent 13·33 days at sea on an average.

12 boats sank 38,000 G.R.T.

1 boat sank 3166·7 G.R.T. on an average.

Each boat in an average of 13·33 days at sea sank 3166·7 G.R.T. i.e. 238 G.R.T. per day.

Efficiency of boats operating:

In December 238 G.R.T. per boat were sunk in 160 days at sea by 12 boats operating (pencil note: or each boat sank 85 G.R.T. per day).

IX. 2 U-boats were lost in December:

U 593 (Kelbling) probably by enemy aircraft.
U 73 (Deckert): no information as to its loss.

(Signed) Kreisch.

WAR DIARY

OF

CAPTAIN U-BOATS, ITALY

1 - 15 JANUARY, 19[illegible]

[illegible]

1 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7540,
U 642 CJ 8390.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 81 CK 4450.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° north of 40°, reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea. No further details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of southeast coast of Italy and westwards. No other details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2030/1 January CJ 6745 1 destroyer, course 100°.

2) 2050/1 January CJ 6758 1 destroyer, course 210°.

c) By radio intercept service:

According to an operator's evaluation, the convoy suspected on 30 December to be in the Philippeville sea area was in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar on 1 January. The convoy has probably passed through the Straits of Gibraltar.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1100/31 December	1 tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.
2) 0900/31 December	1 tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.
3) 1530/31 December	1 American freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.
4) 0730/1 January	7 freighters, 2 destroyers, 3 corvettes put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.
5) 0900/1 January	1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.
6) 0900/1 January	1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.
7) 0930/1 January	1 "Aurora" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.
8) 1245/1 January	1 freighter of 8,000 G.R.T., 3 general purpose freighters, 4 freighters of 6,000 G.R.T each, 2 freighters of 5,000 G.R.T. each, 7 destroyers, sighted from Tangier, bound for the Atlantic.
9) 1530/1 January	1 "Cairo" class cruiser, 1 Polish freighter, 1 Polish destroyer put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:
b) By air reconnaissance:
c) By radio intercept service:
} Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

31 December. 2 ships put out from Port Said for Iskanderun.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) A report as in para. III.A.d.6.

2) Statements from British airmen about location and attack procedure. (Airmen were shot down in outer Biscay area.)

3) Daily orders from C-in-C Navy and C-in-C U-boats concerning the loss of Lieut.(s.g.) Johannes Mohr.

4) Positions of hospital ships.

5) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 642 (Brünning) was informed of sightings in para.III.A.b.1 and 2.

U 81 (Krieg) reported that he saw no mines dropped from enemy aircraft (see War Diary for 31 December). The boat reported in the same radio message that the Commander had a high temperature (probably influenza) and that until he had recovered the boat would remain in CJ 37 and 38. The boat was ordered to put in to Pola if the attack was not a very mild one and cured in a very short time. Instructions for treating the illness were transmitted at the same time.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

---

2 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7540,
U 642 CJ 3590.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 81 CJ 3760 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance of northern part of Western Mediterranean. Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea. No further details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic Sea. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2000/2 January CJ 6741 1 ship, details not made out.

2) 2040/2 January CJ 6765 5 ships stopped, details not made out.

3) 2045/2 January CJ 6789 12 landing craft, 2 escort vessels, southerly course.

4) 2050/2 January CJ 9128 9 landing craft, northerly course.

5) 2120/2 January CJ 6774 1 destroyer, course 20°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1730/1 January 17 freighters, 2 British tankers, 2 corvettes, 2 escort vessels put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

2) 1840/1 January 4 motor launches put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

3) 1930/1 January 5 freighters, 1 tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

4) 0830/2 January 1 freighter, 1 motor launch, 1 escort vessel put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

5) 1000/2 January a large convoy passed Gibraltar towards the Mediterranean, was composed as follows according to calculations: 60 freighters, 8 tankers, 2 special service vessels, 2 landing craft (tank), 10 escort vessels.

6) 0850/2 January 7 destroyers sighted standing off and on from Cape Spartel.

7) 1030/2 January 6 destroyers coming from the Mediterranean joined the destroyers previously reported.

8) 1230/2 January 6 destroyers (which came from the Mediterranean) proceeded out of sight on bearing 280°.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0830/2 January CJ 6643 1 coasting freighter of 500 G.R.T., course 120°.

c) By radio intercept service:
d) By G.I.S. stations:
e) By naval forces:
) Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

An extract from the Armed Forces Report was transmitted to the boats.

U 380 (Brandi) received a report on the convoy named in para.III.A.d.5.

U 642 (Brünning) received the sightings as in para.III.A.b.1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The boat was informed in another radio message where the enemy's main traffic routes in the Tyrrhenian Sea ran (evaluation from air reconnaissance reports):

1) From Palermo via island of Ustica, then directly to Naples.

2) From Palermo via Lipari Islands via CJ 9516, then directly to Naples.

3) From CJ 9516 east of Stromboli to Strait of Messina.

U 81 (Krieg) put in to Pola because of the Commander's illness. The boat was at Point H at 0700.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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3 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7560,
U 642 CJ 8330.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 81 CJ 2390 (homeward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

U 616 (Koitschka) put out from Toulon at 1630 on his 7th operation.
U 81 (Krieg) broke off his 17th operation, put in to Pola at 0900.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450, 616.
2) Pola: U 407, 455, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° north of 40°. No further details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Eastern Mediterranean, coast of Africa, Adriatic Sea. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

2140/2 January British aircraft reported enemy U-boat in unindicated position.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1630/2 January 1 tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

2) 0815/3 January 25 freighters, 6 gunboats, 1 light cruiser off Punta Carnero bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 1050/3 January 23 ships, 3 corvettes, 3 submarine chasers, 1 minesweeper, line Tangier - Caraminal.

4) 1300/3 January convoy sighted from Ceuta bound for the Mediterranean.

5) 1330/3 January 8 freighters.

6) 1500/3 January 6 British freighters, 2 Greek freighters, 5 minesweepers, 4 gunboats put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

7) 0930/3 January 1 tanker, 3 freighters put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

8) 0900/3 January 1 Italian freighter, 4 British freighters, 1 tug, 5 corvettes put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

9) 1030/3 January 1 light cruiser put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

10) 1030/3 January 1 freighter, 3 corvettes put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

11) 1100/3 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0745/3 January CO 5836 13 medium-sized merchant ships, 3 patrol vessels, course 270°, speed 8 knots.

2) 1951/3 January CJ 6375 2 destroyers, course 310°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1001/3 January Alexandria broadcast an air raid warning for convoy formations - 1) "Valour", 2) "Evolution" and 3) "Neighbor". These formations must have been in the immediate Alexandria area, for Alexandria got an air raid warning simultaneously.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) The position of a hospital ship.

2) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

The boats in the Western Mediterranean were informed:

1) that a convoy (small convoy - about 25 merchant ships - see III.A.d.2 and 3) had entered the Mediterranean;

2) that U 616 put out from Toulon at 1630 and that on its outward passage the boat had permission to attack submarines east of the line from CH 3385-6925, north of the parallel in CJ 7125;

3) how the Naxos aerial was to be handled.

U 616 (Koitschka) was informed that an enemy submarine was sighted in CJ 1432 at 2224.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

No further reports had been received so far about the first large January convoy, consisting of about 70 merchant vessels including 8 tankers, which passed eastwards through the Straits of Gibraltar on 2 January.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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4 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7560,
U 642 CJ 8380,
U 616 CH 6360 (outward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 407, 453, 596, 81.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Gulf of Gata, Tyrrhenian Sea, east coast of Sardinia, Strait of Bonifacio. Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° E, north of 40°.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Strait of Otranto. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

4 January. In the evening an eastbound convoy was in the sea area east of Algiers. This was probably the large convoy.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1100/4 January 1 destroyer put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 1520/4 January 4 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

3) The British steamer "Haresden" put out from Valencia for Cartagena, continuing to Gibraltar on 5 January.
The British steamer "Wearpool" put out from Valencia on 3 January for Cartagena. Will probably proceed onward on 7 January.
The British steamer "Dunkeld" put in to Valencia on 3 January. Will probably put out on 5 or 6 January.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0840/4 January CK 7212 8 large, 6 medium-sized freighters, 3 patrol vessels, northerly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

2018/4 January CO 6750 British unit was located.

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) Recognition signal routine from 6-10 January.

2) Positions of hospital ships.

3) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 380 (Brandi) was informed of the traffic as in para.III.A.d.3.

U 616 (Koitschka) and U 380 (Brandi) were given operational areas. U 380 would occupy the area west of the meridian in 8345, U 616 the area east of it.

U 380 (Brandi) had not reported to date. We assumed that the boat had not found the large convoy.

U 616 (Koitschka) might have gained contact if the boat were capable of a swift outward passage. According to a radio intercept service report, the large convoy was east of Algiers during the night. (In CH 9637 according to dead reckoning.)

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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5 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7580,
U 616 CH 9390 (outward bound),
U 642 CJ 8330.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° north of 40° N. Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea. No further details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic Sea, inshore waters off the southeast coast of Italy, inshore waters from Mersa Matruh to Ras Amer. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0912/5 January CJ 9444 1 destroyer, course 30°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 5 January. According to radio intercept service (bearings and operator's evaluation), in the forenoon an eastbound convoy was in the Cape Tenes - Algiers sea area. Convoy was bound for Augusta. This was probably the convoy which passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on 3 January. (See War Diary for 3 January under III.A.d.)

2) 5 January. According to radio intercept service (operator's evaluation), an eastbound convoy was in the Bizerta sea area. Probably the first large convoy. (See War Diary for 2 January under III.A.d.)

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0900/3 January according to an agent's report, a convoy of about 80 ships on a northeasterly course was sighted off Almeria. (First large convoy.) According to this the first large convoy had passed the bottleneck very far to the north.

2) 1400/5 January 1 "Aurora" class cruiser, 1 "Sydney" class cruiser

put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 1820/5 January 3 battleships, 5 destroyers sighted from Cape Spartel bound for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0708/5 January 1 probable freighter in CO 6786, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

2247/5 January aircraft based on Alexandria reported air to surface vessel location in CO 5479.

d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Brandi) and U 642 (Brünning) were requested by short signal to report their positions. U 642 reported his position from CJ 9469. No report was received from U 380.

The report as in III.A.b.1. was passed on to U 642.

The reports as in III.A.d.2. and 3. were transmitted to the western boats.

The boats received an extract from the Armed Forces Report.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

6 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7560,
U 616 CJ 9530,
U 642 CJ 9460.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° north of 40° N. Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea. No further details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic Sea, inshore waters of southeast coast of Italy. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

1) 0240/23 December CH 8355 type and number not given.

2) 1500/27 December CH 7541 1 freighter of 6,000 G.R.T. Note: Report is from U 380.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1040/6 January 8117 4 landing craft, southerly course.

2) 1955/6 January 30 merchant ships off Naples, stopped.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1808/6 January unit with convoy "Rubble" - steering westsouthwest - reported 12 enemy aircraft, did not give its own position (probably Oran area).

2) 6 January in the evening a westbound convoy was in the sea area east of Gibraltar.

3) 6 January in the evening a Britain-Mediterranean convoy was in CG 4980 according to bearing and operator's evaluation.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0300/6 January 4 ship silhouettes, 1 large, sighted from Ceuta, bound for the Mediterranean. No further details because of fog in the Straits.

2) 0845 1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

3) 0845 convoy of 56 ships, including 45 merchant ships, 1 transport, 1 tanker bound for the Atlantic.

4) 1130 1 French torpedo-carrying cruiser of the "Chacal" class put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

5) 1240 1 French torpedo-carrying cruiser of the "Chacal" class put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

6) 1300 2 aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 10 miles north of Tres Forcas, easterly course.

7) 1600 4 more destroyers sighted from Tres Forcas on an easterly course.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0900/6 January 3 freighters of 2,000-3,000 G.R.T. each, put to sea from Bari.

2) 1303/6 January 1 merchant ship of approximately 4,000 G.R.T. in CK 7422, course 220°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1308/6 January convoy formation "Hennock" in Malta area proceeding under an air raid warning.

d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) A radio reminder from C-in-C U-boats concerning the firing of T5 torpedoes according to hydrophone bearings, while in the outward and inward passage areas of our own boats.

2) The commissioning of the Swedish ship "Saggat" as a Red Cross ship, bound from Philadelphia to Marseilles.

3) Positions of hospital and Red Cross ships.

4) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 380 (Brandi) and U 616 (Koitschka) were sent the following reports:
The War Diary for 5 January under III.A.c.1. and III.A.d.3.
The War Diary for 6 January under III.A.d.1, 6 and 7.

U 380 (Brandi) was requested for a position report for the second time. The boat reported that: On 23 December at 0240 it fired 2 unexplained "Zaunkönig" misses in CH 8355, and then was attacked with depth charges. Tube 2 out of order. On 27 December at 1500 one F.A.T., which missed, and one dud were fired at a 6,000 G.R.T. ship. The boat had not received serial numbers 585. 586. The missing serial numbers did not concern the boat.

U 343 (Rahn) reported his position from CH 7278.

U 952 (Curio) reported his position from CH 7322 and that both Naxos aerials were out of order.

As far as could be seen to date, both boats had made the breakthrough without difficulty.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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7 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7280,
U 616 CH 9530,
U 642 CJ 9460,
U 343 CH 7270)
U 952 CH 7322) reinforcements.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° E north of 40° N. Reconnaissance of Algerian coast. No further details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Central Mediterranean, Ionian Sea. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:)
) Nothing to report.
b) By air reconnaissance:)

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 2253/7 January enemy aircraft "Z.F.S.H." reported enemy U-boat in X.V. 42° N. Y.O. 00° E (W?). (X.V. is thought to be 35°.)

2) 2256/7 January Gibraltar-based aircraft "W.B.U.P." reported an enemy submarine surfaced in 36° 40' N, 2° W, course 45°, speed 8 knots.

3) 2311/7 January same aircraft sent S.O.S. from 36° 40' N, 2° W (CH 7299). (Since it was assumed that the S.O.S. signal was not sent in code, the parallel given as 35° in the signals would actually be 36°.)

4) 2336/7 January the S.O.S. signal was canceled.

5) 2300/7 January North African Command Post Tafaroi sent the following to aircraft "Z.F.S.M." and "J.F.S.S.": "Carry out search for U-boats within a radius of 20 miles around 35° 40' N (parallel probably 36°) U.N. 05° W or U.N. 55° E."

6) 2314/7 January aircraft "Z.F.S.H." reported an enemy submarine surfaced at 35° (?) 40' N U.N. 55° E or W.N. 05° W.

7) 2323/7 January aircraft "Z.F.S.H." reported a U-boat in 36° 42' N, 2° W (CH 7299).

8) Aircraft "Z.F.S.H." reported: "Have attacked with depth charges. Hit probable, have lost contact." Last position 36° 40' N, 2° 7' W (CH 7298).

9) 0336/8 January and 0348/8 January aircraft "W.B.U.R." reported to Gibraltar: "Am over enemy U-boat in 37° 19' N, 29° W (CH 8115), northerly course, speed 12 knots."
German Naval High Command Radio Intelligence added that the position indicated in this report was very inaccurate.

10) 0530/8 January unit O.Q.H. reported a U-boat surfaced, bearing 230°, 4 miles from his own position

35°(?) 28' N U.N., 53° W
or 07° E.

11) 0540/8 January same unit sent tactical signal.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 7 January 1 "Cairo" class cruiser put out from Gibraltar in the morning for an unknown destination.

2) 1205/7 January 1 transport of 16,000 G.R.T., with landing craft on deck, sighted from Cape Spartel bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 1320/7 January 1 supply freighter, with M.T.B.s on deck, sighted on the line between Tangier and Caraminal bound for the Mediterranean.

4) 1630/7 January 1 Polish destroyer, 2 American motor launches put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

5) 1530/7 January 3 British freighters, 2 Greek freighters, 1 tanker, 2 corvettes, 1 escort vessel put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

6) 1530/7 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

7) 1545/7 January 4 freighters of 4,000 G.R.T. each, 1 special service freighter of 6,000 G.R.T. put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

8) 1830/7 January convoy of 38 freighters, 9 tankers, 2 destroyers, 4 corvettes sighted in the Straits proceeding from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

9) 1830/7 January 2 freighters, 1 Norwegian tanker put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

10) 1830/7 January 8 freighters put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

11) 1900/7 January 1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) The position of a hospital ship.

2) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

Reports as in paras.III.A.c.3 and III.A.c.4. were transmitted to the western boats.

The radio intercept reports given under III.A.c, from which it was apparent that our U-boats were being attacked, came from the sea areas where U 380 (Brandi), U 343 (Rahn) and U 952 (Curio) were; it was not clear from the reports whether one or several boats were being chased. It was intended to request U 952 for a position report during the coming night and U 380 and U 343 the following night.

The radio intercept report that there were 5 enemy units at sea in the Oran - Algiers area was transmitted to the western boats.

U 952 (Curio) was ordered to proceed to Toulon as both Naxos aerials had broken down.

U 343 (Rahn) was to occupy the area between the meridians in CH 8275 and CH 9455 if the boat was in full operational readiness. If not, he was to commence the return passage to Toulon and to report his position by short signal when departing.

If U 343 remains in the operational area, U 380 will operate west of the meridian in 8275, U 616 (Koitschka) east of the meridian in CH 9455.

U 380 (Brandi) had his attention drawn to the fact that his main task was to operate on convoy traffic, and that operations on the Valencia - Gibraltar fruit traffic were a subsidiary assignment.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

According to an agent's report, 3 battleships and 3 cruisers put in to Gibraltar to refuel at 2200 on 5 January (see War Diary for 5 January under III.A.d.3). The formation put to sea after refuelling, and took over the escort of an east-bound convoy consisting of 14 transports with troops on board and 20 freighters with war material and provisions. The convoy had not been reported previously. We suspect that:

a) the battle group is bound for East Asia, or

b) that the composition of the battle group was not as given above, but as the formation sighted from Tres Forcas (see War Diary for 6 January, III.A. d.6 - 2 aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers.) If the latter is the case, we can count on the enemy having planned operations in areas outside fighter range, and on his intending to utilize the carriers as a jumping-off base for fighters. If both formations - a) 3 battleships, 3 cruisers, b) 2 aircraft carriers, 3 cruisers, 11 destroyers - are actually in the Mediterranean, we may then assume that the formation will remain there, and will be used for large-scale operations, possibly against the Italian mainland.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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8 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7520,
U 343 CH 7290,
U 952 CH 8110 (homeward bound),
U 616 CH 9520,
U 642 CJ 9190.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° E north of 40° N. Reconnaissance of the coast of North Africa, Sicilian Channel, Tyrrhenian Sea. No further details.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the coast of Cyrenaica, Central Mediterranean, Ionian Sea, Adriatic Sea. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0050/8 January CJ 7742 1 battleship, 2 aircraft carriers, 5 screening forces (possibly destroyers), easterly course.

2) 2110/8 January CJ 9512 18 merchant ships, 2 destroyers, course 340°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 2135/8 January aircraft "A.O.R.Y." reported to Algiers: "Am over enemy U-boat in 35° 52' N Y.A. 50° W (10° E)."

2) 2158/8 January aircraft "A.P.S.M." reported air to surface vessel location of unnamed object in L.B. 10° N L.A. 10° E.

3) 2217/8 January aircraft "N.Y.L.N." reported to Gibraltar: "Am over enemy U-boat in 35°(?) 52' N Y.Q. 14° E."

4) 2308/8 January aircraft "W.F.D.J." reported to Gibraltar: "U-boat surfaced in 36° 54' N, 14° 5' W (CH 7372), course 90°, speed 10 knots."

5) 0752/8 January aircraft "A.P.S.N." reported: "U-boat in W.G. 00° N L.A. 7° E, course 180°, speed 2 knots."

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0020/8 January 6 large laden freighters, one of them a transport, possibly 2 escort vessels, sighted from Ceuta bound for the Atlantic.

2) 0915/8 January 4 freighters of 4,000 G.R.T. each, 1 destroyer, 2 "Agathe" boats sighted from Cape Spartel bound for the Atlantic.

3) 1300/8 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0830/8 January CO 5964 14 large, 3 medium-sized freighters, 2 destroyers, 1 large submarine cruiser, course 270°.

2) 1000/8 January CO 4677 10 large freighters, 27 medium-sized freighters, 3 patrol vessels, course 130°, speed 10 knots.

3) 1545/8 January CO 5822 20 merchant ships, 5 patrol vessels, course 280°.

4) 1618/8 January CO 4951 6 large merchant ships, 9 medium-sized merchant ships, 6 patrol vessels, course 240°.

c) By radio intercept service:

2 convoys ("Extended" and "Mammoth") intercepted by radio intercept service in the area of the coast of Cyrenaica. (See III.B.b.1-4).

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) A radio message concerning additional recognition lights shown by aircraft.

2) German Air Force recognition signal routine from 10 - 15 January.

3) An alteration of key-word "Delphinus 5" to "Delphinus 18".

4) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

The sighting as in III.A.b.1 was sent to U 616 (Koitschka) and U 642 (Brünning) and the one in III.A.b.2. to U 642.

U 616 (Koitschka) reported: ""Zaunkönig" missed "Agathe" at 1456 in CH 9364. Explosion after 15 minutes 42 seconds. "Agathe" noiseless, rapid, loud noise on bearing 140°. Difference from "Agathe"." It is possible that the vessel attacked by "Koitschka" was towing a noise-box to deflect the "Zaunkonig".

U 952 (Curio) was requested to report his position by short signal on the Mediterranean service. The request was not answered.

It can be seen from radio intercept service reports that the enemy is continuing his U-boat hunt in the area in which he chased our boats yesterday, and has again intercepted one or more boats. It cannot be ascertained from the radio intercept reports at present which boat was sighted.

U 343 (Rahn) reported on the Ireland service, time of origin 2231: "Am being attacked by aircraft in CH 7348." The boat reported later, with serial number 2258/8/160: "Am being attacked by aircraft in CH 7343, am unable to submerge, request fighter cover."
The boat has been instructed that it is not possible to furnish effective fighter cover, and that the boat is to proceed according to Serial Order No. 37 if Spanish help is indispensable. The important part of Serial Order No. 37 is being sent to the boat in extract form. After this report has been received, it is clear that some of the radio intercept service reports received concern U 343. Since the majority of the positions given in the radio intercept service reports cannot be definitely deciphered, it is not clear whether only U 343 has been intercepted. U 380, who is also supposed to be in the area, has been asked to report his position in order to be clear on this point. To date this report has not yet been received.

The following measures have been taken to assist U 343:

1) 2nd Fliegerdivision was requested for aircraft, to be in the area in which U 343 was attacked after dawn. 2 aircraft were detailed. One aircraft took off at 0600 and is expected to return about 1300. The second is to take off after the first aircraft lands.

2) Help has been requested from the Spanish via C-in-C U-boats.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Nothing to report.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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9 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7580,
U 343 CH 5720 (homeward bound),
U 952 CH 5830 (homeward bound),
U 616 CH 9360,
U 642 CJ 9190.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 81, 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of the sea area off the east coast of Spain, Balearic Islands. Special reconnaissance of the area around Cartagena (help for own U-boat). Afternoon reconnaissance in the sea area around Alboran, Tyrrhenian Sea. Protective reconnaissance between 0° and 7° north of 39°.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance west and southwest of Cyprus, coast of Cyrenaica, Adriatic Sea. No further details.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1745/8 January CH 7336 1 destroyer probably V or W class, course 70°, speed slight.

2) 1755/8 January CH 7349 2 destroyers probably V or W class, course 70°, speed slight.

3) 2007/8 January CH 5757 1 destroyer, probably the one sighted at 1745.

Note: The aircraft assigned by 2nd Flieger-division to help U 343 reported these sightings. We may assume that the enemy has despatched an anti-submarine hunt group into the area in which our boats were reported by enemy aircraft and attacked on 7, 8 and 9 January. This assumption was confirmed by the radio intercept reports and locations (see III.A.c. 8 and 9).

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 0830/9 January aircraft "A.P.S.N." reported to Algiers: "Enemy U-boat in "VR" North "WE" East (position not indicated)."

2) Aircraft "A.P.S.N." reported to Algiers: "Addition to my report of 0752 (see War Diary for 9 January under III.A.c.5.) have attacked enemy with depth charges." Main Naval D/F Station Montpellier obtained a bearing of 208° on the aircraft when transmitting the report.

3) 1150/9 January aircraft "A.P.S.N." reported to Algiers: "Position of boat sighted at 0752 (see War Diary for 9 January under III.A.c.5.) is "WG" 00° N, "LA" 07° E, course 180°, speed 2 knots.

4) Gibraltar-based aircraft "N.F.Q.M." reported to Gibraltar at 1245: "Am

over enemy U-boat in 37° 46' N, 8° W (CH 5782)."

5) Same aircraft ("N.F.Q.M.") reported to Gibraltar at 1250: "Am over enemy U-boat in 37° 46' N, 19° W (CH 5773). Have sighted the periscope only."

6) 1840/9 January aircraft "O.P.Q.X." reported to Tafaroi: "Air to surface vessel location in 36° 48' N, 00°(?) 18' W CH 7385(?)."

7) 1850/9 January aircraft "X.N.O.Q." reported to Tafaroi: "Air to surface vessel location in 37° 35' N "MQ" 08' E. Have lost contact."

Note: It is not clear from the reports whether one or several boats were sighted. Probably more than one boat was intercepted.

8) 1750/9 January unit "T.J.P." reported to Gibraltar: "One aircraft bearing 240°, own position 180°, 10 miles from "Pal"." (Probably Cape Palos CH 8111.)

Note: The aircraft assigned as help sighted a destroyer at 1745 in CH 7336. The latter probably reported the aircraft at 1750.

9) 1805/9 January unit "O.Q.H." reported to Gibraltar: "A Ju 88 is shadowing, bearing 220°, from own position "VR" N "YQ" 12° W (or 48° E)."

Note: The aircraft assigned to help sighted two destroyers at 1755 in CH 7349. One destroyer probably reported the Ju 88.

10) More radio direction-finding fixes of enemy units were intercepted at
a) 0913 in CH 6550,
b) 1049 and 1107 in CH 6870 and 6880,
c) 1926 in CH 5721/5722,
d) 2008 in CH 5310/2970,
e) 2035 in CJ 7630.

11) 1746/9 January convoy formation "Screm" in Bone area received air raid warning.

12) 1040/9 January convoy formation "Vellum", proceeding westwards, was attacked by aircraft.

Convoy was in CH 9518 at 1040, course 264°.

13) Eastbound American convoy was in outer Gibraltar area during the night of 9/10 January.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0730 5 freighters, 1 tanker, 4 corvettes put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 0730 40 laden freighters, 4 convoy units coming from the Atlantic, passed Ceuta.

3) 0900 1 possible cruiser passed from the Mediterranean into the Atlantic.

4) 0730 2 freighters put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

5) 0845 1 auxiliary cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

6) 1730 1 British freighter escorted by one destroyer passed Cartagena on an easterly course. Formation kept well under the coast.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0815 CO 5947 24 merchant ships, course 130°.

2) 0835 CO 4689 27 merchant ships, 6 patrol vessels, course 250°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Heavy convoy traffic in the Eastern Mediterranean. Following convoy formations were intercepted: "Nettle", "Sandstorm", "Mammoth", "Extended", "Sampler" and "Wayon".

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) Reports as in III.A.c.1, 10a, 10b, 8, 9, 10c, 10d, III.A.d.2 and 6.

2) Directives concerning the showing of recognition lights by aircraft.

3) Positions of hospital ships.

4) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 380 (Brandi), U 343 (Rahn), U 952 (Curio) have not yet answered the request for their positions.

More sighting and attack reports were received from enemy aircraft in the area in which U 380, U 343 and U 952 were believed to be. Again, it cannot be ascertained definitely whether one or several boats are being intercepted.

The 2 aircraft provided by 2nd Fliegerdivision have sighted no U-boats or other clues in a reconnaissance of the area in which the boats are believed to be. The second aircraft sighted 3 destroyers (see III.A.b.1, 2, 3). On 10 January 2 more aircraft are scheduled for reconnaissance in the forenoon and one in the afternoon.

The Spanish have sent 2 large motor fishing vessels out from Aguilas to search the area. Neither vessel sighted anything; the report from the Spanish destroyer "Churruca", which put out from Cartagena, has not yet been received.

The boats were informed by radio that the Spanish destroyer had put to sea.

U 616 (Koitschka) sent a success report (see under V.a).

Pola U-boat base reported an air raid carried out by about 80 four-engined planes on Pola from 1100 to 1215. U 81 (Krieg) and the former Italian U-boat "Nautilus" sank after direct hits. U 407 (Brüller), U 596 (Nonn) and U 453 (Lührs) were not damaged. Slight damage to the base is specified, severe damage to the dockyard and considerable damage in the town. The following casualties have been confirmed to date:

a) Base: 1 Petty Officer and 3 men killed.
1 man missing, 4 men wounded.
b) U 81: 2 men killed.
c) U 407: 2 officers (Lieut.(j.g.)(E) Weser, Lieut. (j.g.) Baumgart) and 3 men killed.
1 Petty Officer and 1 man wounded.

No aircraft were shot down during the attack. Defenses were slight.

V. a) Successes:

U 616 (Koitschka) sank 2 submarines at 1124 on 9 January in CH 9525.

b) Losses:

U 81 (Krieg) was sunk in the harbor by a direct hit during an air raid on Pola.

VI. General situation:

In retrospect, the meeting of 3 of our U-boats off the southeast corner of Spain on 6/7 January and the U-boat hunt carried out there by the enemy, can be presented as follows:

U 380 (Brandi) was asked to report his position. No reply was received during the night 5/6 January. The boat was therefore called up again on 6 January. At 2324 on 6 January a radio message was received according to which the boat was in CH 7289 at 2137.

U 952 (Curio) reported his position by short signal on the coastal service from CH 7322 at 0521 on 7 January.

U 343 (Rahn) likewise reported his position from CH 7278 at 0613 on 7 January on the coastal service.

Both boats transmitted these position reports according to their operational orders, to indicate that they had passed the Straits of Gibraltar and had entered Captain U-boats' command area. A difficult situation hereby arose from an unfortunate coincidence. Within a few hours of each other, 3 boats transmitted messages from adjacent grid squares at the narrowest spot in the Mediterranean, less than 300 miles from Gibraltar and 100 miles from Oran. This circumstance made it much easier for the enemy to take bearings on the boats on a favorable basis. Operational control could not possibly make plans for this situation in advance, as they did not anticipate that both boats would pass the Straits at the same time and would transmit their passage reports from approximately the same position.

The lesson which must be drawn from this, is that in future boats must not transmit their passage reports until they are east of the bottleneck, from about the area between CH 69 to CH 59.

The risk must be taken that
a) operational control is informed of the successful breakthrough very late;
b) the boat is withdrawn from the area of operations if it has to commence its return passage because of damage suffered.

The last point does not count so much, because according to previous experience the majority of

boats which had accomplished the breakthrough could not operate at once - because of breakdowns or for other reasons - but had to commence the return passage.

The fact that both boats (U 343 and U 952) transmitted their passage reports on the coastal service leads to the conclusion that the boats tried first to transmit the short signal on the Mediterranean service, to which they should have switched after passing through. As a result, however, of unfavorable radio traffic conditions on this wave they were not heard by control and repeating station, and were thus forced to try to get through on another service. If the assumption that the boats transmitted the short signal several times is correct, this also must have made it easier for the enemy to take bearings.

The boats must therefore if possible avoid transmitting again a short signal which has not been acknowledge by control or repeating station, but, if possible, wait till the following night.

When the radio messages, from which it could be seen that the boats were relatively close to one another in an unfavorable area, were available, efforts were made to scatter them as quickly as possible.

U 952 (Curio) was ordered to return to Toulon as both his Naxos aerials had broken down.

U 380 (Brandi) was reminded that his main task was to operate on enemy convoy traffic, and that operations on the enemy fruit traffic proceeding under the Spanish coast, to which the boat had been directed as successes in this connection are desired at present for reasons of prestige, were to be regarded as subsidiary. It may be concluded that the boat was operating on the fruit traffic from its reported position, which was directly under the Spanish coast.

U 343 (Rahn) was ordered to occupy an operational area off the coast of Algeria if the boat is still fit for operations. Otherwise he too is to commence his return passage and then to report his position by short signal.

It cannot be seen definitely whether the plan to separate the boats has been, even if only in part, realized. The impression, from radio intercept service messages concerning U-boat sightings received, is that more than one boat must have been sighted.

(Signed) Kreisch.

10 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7580,
U 343 CH 5760 (homeward bound),
U 952 CH 5830 (homeward bound),
U 616 CH 9520,
U 642 CH 9130.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Protective reconnaissance between 4° and 6° E north of 40° N. Reconnaissance of Tyrrhenian Sea, Western Mediterranean as far as the North African coast, west of Majorca.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic Sea, Ionian Sea, southeast coast of Italy, sea area Benghazi-Malta, coast of Cyrenaica.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1047/10 January CH 8438 26 freighters, 4 patrol vessels, course 70°.

2) 1355/10 January CH 8434 60 merchant ships, 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, course 240°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1740/10 January aircraft "A.W.F.K." reported to Algiers: "Am over a submerging U-boat in "LB" 00° N "LA" 47° E, course 360°, speed 12 knots."

2) 1958/10 January aircraft "A.R.H.M." reported: "Have air to surface vessel location in 38° 33' N "MQ" 44° E."

3) 2014/10 January aircraft "A.R.H.M." reported: "Have air to surface vessel location position not indicated."

4) 1835/10 January unit with convoy "Decade" reported: "Convoy is being attacked by enemy aircraft in CH 8454, course 61°, speed 7 knots."

Note: "Decade" is the same convoy as in III.A.b.1. "Decade" passed eastwards through the Straits of Gibraltar on 9 January.

5) 10 January a convoy bound for England was in the immediate vicinity of Oran in the late afternoon. The convoy will pass westwards through the Straits of Gibraltar on 13 or 14 January. (This convoy is probably "Vellum".)

Note: Same convoy as in III.A.b.2.

6) 12 January a U.S.A.-Mediterranean convoy will pass eastwards through the Straits of Gibraltar.

7) 0635/11 January convoy "Monica 2" in the Algiers area received an air raid warning.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0045/10 January 1 ship towed in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 0045/10 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

3) 0545/10 January 30 vessels with escort screen (possibly more)

sighted from Tangier bound for the Mediterranean.

4) 0245/10 January 6 freighters, 1 corvette put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

5) 0700/10 January 2 freighters, 3 destroyers, 3 corvettes, put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

6) 0700/10 January 2 motor launches, 7 landing craft put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

7) 0700/10 January 54 freighters, 6 tankers, 3 destroyers, 3 corvettes, passed Gibraltar eastward bound.

8) 0800/10 January 16 ship silhouettes, 3 of them escort units, passed Ceuta eastward bound.

Note: The same convoy is probably being reported from different posts in 3), 7) and 8). 5) and 6) have presumably joined this convoy. The convoy would then be composed as follows:
56 freighters, 6 tankers, 6 destroyers, 6 corvettes, 2 motor launches, 7 landing craft. This convoy passed Gibraltar at 0800 on 10 January eastward bound.

9) 0900/10 January Italian Savoia (type not reported) put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

10) 0915/10 January 1 French tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

11) 1000/10 January 6 minesweepers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

12) 1030/10 January the battleship "Warspite" put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

13) 1545/10 January put in to Gibraltar again.

14) 1100/10 January 1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

15) 1215/10 January 1 freighter, 4 corvettes put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

16) 0930/10 January 1 Dutch, 1 British freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

17) 1110/10 January 2 minesweepers with gear sighted from Tangier making for the Atlantic.

18) 1605/10 January 2 minesweepers sighted from Tangier making for the Mediterranean.

19) 1150/10 January 6 large escort vessels sighted from Tangier making for the Atlantic.

20) 1300/10 January 1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

21) 1610/10 January 1 freighter of 5,000 G.R.T. sighted from Tangier making for the Atlantic.

22) 1600/10 January 1 tanker of about 8,000 G.R.T. sighted from Almeria on an easterly course.

23) 1910/10 January 2 destroyers sighted from Tangier making for the Mediterranean.

c) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0925/10 January CJ 9889 10 freighters of 65,000 G.R.T., 1 tanker of 10,000 G.R.T., 4 escort vessels, course 30°.

2) 1227/10 January CP 1411 1 M.T.B.

3) 1501/10 January 4 M.T.B.s off Syli harbor.

4) 1550/10 January CO 5839 6 freighters, 2 patrol vessels. southerly course.

5) 1640/10 January CN 6696 4 possible destroyers, course 290°.

6) 1645/10 January CN 3867 26 merchant vessels, single escort vessels, course 250°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1558/10 January air raid warning for convoy formation "Nursemaid" in the Benghazi area (possibly convoy under III.B.b.4).

d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) Reports as in III.A.d.8, 5 and 6, III.A.c.1, 4, III.A.b.1 and 2, III.A.c.2.

2) Correction to short signal book 1941.

3) Correction to C-in-C U-boats' Current War Order No. 121 (hospital ships notified).

4) Positions of hospital and supply ships.

5) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 380 (Brandi) reported his position at 0307 from CH 7813.

U 343 (Rahn) and U 952 (Curio) have not reported yet.

Apart from the reports given in III.A.c.1, 2 and 3 no others have been received. No conclusion can be reached from the reports available as to which boat is concerned as the positions cannot be decoded. 2nd Flieger-division again dispatched several aircraft into the area south and west of Cartagena and south and west of Ibiza. The aircraft discovered no clues about the boat.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Naval War Staff, 1st Div. informed us in a teleprint message (Naval War Staff, 1st Div. I.A. 805/44 Most Secret) that, since the enemy has dispatched heavy units to the Mediterranean,

there is a possibility that these are intended to exercise pressure on Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allies. In this case, we may count on an imminent attack against Crete or the islands in the Aegean, especially against Rhodes and other islands off the west coast of Turkey.

The Fuehrer demands that preparations for defense shall be re-examined and if possible supplemented. The Navy is instructed to concentrate the U-boats available in the Mediterranean for the defense of an attack against Crete and the Aegean islands.

Captain U-boats was requested to wire a plan of operations.

The following was reported to Naval War Staff, 1st Division:

1) U-boat position:

a) No boats are operating in the Eastern Mediterranean at present. Only U 616 of the boats in the Western Mediterranean is in full operational readiness. (At sea since 3 January, has 3 T5 torpedoes at most.)

b) 5 boats will be ready in Toulon between 17 and 21 January; one of the boats has a new captain, so that it is not advisable that he should proceed through the Sicilian Channel on his first operation, and he is to operate in the Tyrrhenian Sea.

c) Two boats, U 453 and U 407 will be ready in Pola in the middle of January, if no delays are caused by air attacks. Both boats have new captains, which limits their activities as it is their first operation.

2) Possibilities:

A strong concentration of U-boats in the Eastern Mediterranean will leave the Western Mediterranean bare for a considerable period, as the return route through the Sicilian Channel is not possible for boats with no ammunition. Passage through the Sicilian Channel is a difficult operation in any case (no easier than passage through the Straits of Gibraltar).

The dockyard situation is critical, as

a) Pola can only take in a limited number (4 boats under normal conditions) and is now further limited by air attacks.

b) Salamis can only take in one boat under present conditions. Air attacks, with which we must reckon, could put the base completely out of action.

3) Decision:

a) U 616 will be ordered to commence passage to the Eastern Mediterranean. Will operate first off the coast of Cyrenaica.

b) U 453 and U 407 will operate on the coast of Palestine, can be withdrawn to the Crete area later if occasion arises.

c) Further boats will not be dispatched until it is seen how the situation develops, for the reasons given under 1.b.

d) The basic principle will be that U-boats will remain in areas of enemy traffic which are known to offer prospects of success, until the enemy's intentions are definitely recognized. Moving the boats for screening purposes to a certain degree on suspicion means that they are endangered without serving any useful purpose.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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11 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7813,
U 343 CH 5830 (homeward bound),
U 952 CH 5690 (homeward bound),
U 616 CH 9520,
U 642 CJ 9430.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of sea area between 0° and 3° E as far as the African coast. Tyrrhenian Sea, protective reconnaissance between 3° and 8° E, north of 40° N.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance between Benghazi and Malta, Ionian Sea, coast of North Africa as far as east of Alexandria.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 2015/11 January CJ 6717 10 small and medium-sized landing craft, northeasterly course, speed slight.

2) 2030/11 January CJ 6783 1 destroyer, course 40°, moderate speed.

3) 2031/11 January CJ 6791 2 destroyers, course 250°, moderate speed.

4) 2106/11 January CJ 9273 5 landing craft, northerly course.

5) 2102/11 January CJ 9257 7 merchant ships, 5 escort vessels, northerly course.

6) 2135/11 January CJ 9426 16 merchant ships, 1 patrol vessel, course 30°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 0024/12 January convoy formation "Blankney" received air raid warning from Algiers.

2) 11 January at midday a westbound convoy was in the immediate vicinity of Bizerta.

3) A Britain-Mediterranean convoy (probably "Tarbat") will probably

put in to Gibraltar on 18 January.

4) Convoy formation "Vellum" will probably pass Gibraltar on 12 January.

5) The convoy which was between Oran and Cape Tenes on 10 January (probably "Decade") (see War Diary for 10 January under III.A.c.4) is bound for Naples and Taranto. Will probably arrive between 14 and 16 January.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0500/11 January 4 freighters of 5,000 G.R.T. each, 2 escort vessels passed Ceuta bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 0650/11 January 4 ships sighted from Tangier making for the Atlantic.

3) 0930/11 January 1 French minesweeper, 1 French survey vessel put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

4) 1000/11 January 1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

5) 1100/11 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

6) 1115/11 January 5 minesweepers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

7) 1140/11 January 1 freighter passed the Tangier-Caraminal line.

8) 1300/11 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

9) 1715/11 January convoy of 11 freighters, 2 gunboats, 3 corvettes, 1 tug, put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

10) 1830/11 January 1 freighter, 1 gunboat put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

11) 1930/11 January 3 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1519/11 January CP 7246 3 battleships, 2 cruisers, 1 possible aircraft carrier, 5 destroyers, 20 large freighters, course 150°.

c) By radio intercept service:)
d) By G.I.S. stations:) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) Reports as in III.A.b.5 and 6.

2) Radio reminder No. 76 (subject: leaving Naxos aerials up when submerging).

3) The use of a Swedish ship as a Red Cross ship carrying supplies for Greece between St. John and Greece.

4) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

U 642 (Brünning), who has so far operated without success in the Tyrrhenian Sea and is at the end of his intended period of operation, is given the area between the meridians in CJ 7825 and CJ 7714 as a new attack area. He can only be left there for a few more days.

U 616 (Koitschka) is operating west of "Brünning" as far as the meridian in CJ 9189.

It is intended to move U 616 (Koitschka) to the Eastern Mediterranean in accordance with the considerations given under para. VI of 10 January. As the phase of the moon is not at present favorable (full moon) and two intercepted eastbound convoys must pass through U 616's attack area on 12 and 13 January, the departure order for U 616 will not be given until the evening of 13 January.

No reports have been received from U 343 (Rahn) and U 952 (Curio). The destroyer sent by the

Spanish to help search for the boats has broken off the search without success.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Naval War Staff has agreed to the reported plans (see War Diary for 10 January under para. VI) in German Naval High Command, Naval War Staff, 1st Div. I.U. Most Secret S.O.s only No. 88/44.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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12 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 7810,
U 616 CH 9610,
U 642 CJ 8560,
U 343 CH 6740 (homeward bound),
U 952 CH 6580 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

No boats.

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0000 to 0800:

U 453 put out from Pola at 1645 on 12 January for his 15th operation.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 407, 453, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance north of 40° N, between 2° and 8° E, Tyrrhenian Sea, around Corsica.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic Sea, Aegean Sea, Ionian Sea, between Benghazi and Malta. Probing reconnaissance as far as Alexandria.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 616: 0050/13 January CH 9394 westbound convoy of 1 destroyer, 2 steamers up to 6,000 G.R.T. and 1 steamer of 10,000 G.R.T.

b) By air reconnaissance:)
) Nothing to
c) By radio intercept service:) report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 2215/11 January Tangier: 20 freighters, 1 tanker, 5 destroyers or gunboats, making for the Atlantic.

2) 2400/11 January 14 freighters, 2 tankers, 2 destroyers, 2 corvettes put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

3) 0100/12 January Ceuta: 29 large laden freighters (probably more) left the Mediterranean for the Atlantic. Some put in to Gibraltar. 4 escort vessels.

4) 0130/12 January Gibraltar: 8 freighters, 4 corvettes passing from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic.

5) 0200/12 January Tangier: 3 vessels, probably transports, 4 vessels of medium tonnage, 2 escort vessels making for the Atlantic.

6) 0445/12 January 2 freighters, 1 destroyer, 1 "Agathe" boat put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

7) 0830/12 January 1 French destroyer of the "Bourrasque" class put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

8) 0930/12 January) 1 freighter put in to
1030/12 January) Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

9) 1100/12 January 1 unit, apparently a battleship, sighted 11 miles northeast of Tres Forcas, bound for the Atlantic.

10) 1135/12 January 4 small units and 1 aircraft sighted in the same position, bound for the Atlantic. Apparently escort of the unit reported as a battleship.

11) 1240/12 January 3 freighters, 1 tanker, escorted by 1 French minelayer, 1 tug, 1 French survey ship put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

12) 0930/12 January 5 vessels 10 miles east of Alboran, possibly submarines, 1 destroyer on line patrol.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

According to a report of Luftflotte 2 of 11 January 1944, 3 apparent battleships are lying at Marsa Scirocco; according to information from Naval War Staff, 3rd Div. they may be Italian.

Otherwise nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 616 (Koitschka) reported successes on the convoy as in III.A.a and requested permission to return with 2 stern torpedoes and 1 bow torpedo left. U 616 was ordered to proceed to Toulon, as it does not seem advisable for him to remain in the operational area with the torpedoes reported. The boat's request to return also leads to the conclusion that breakdowns or damage would make further operation difficult. Captain U-boats therefore considers it more favorable to order the boat to commence the return passage, which is not too long, so that it may be put into operation again as soon as possible. The boat's departure to the coast of Cyrenaica - scheduled for 13 January - is therefore canceled, as this does not seem feasible in view of the considerations mentioned.

U 952 (Curio) at 1455 on 13 January reported by short signal that he intended to cross 42° N at 0800 on 14 January and would arrive at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0800 on 15 January.

No report has been received from U 343 (Rahn) to date.

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) Information on the lights to be used in Air Force recognition signals from 10 January.

2) Information on the German Air Force recognition signal routine after 14 January.

3) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

4) Information on the positions of various hospital ships.

5) Radio message concerning the repair of porcelain rod in the Naxos aerial.

V. a) Successes:

U 616 (Koitschka) reported, after 4 shots fired at the convoy mentioned in III.A.a.3, 3 explosions after 11 - 13 minutes, very loud sinking noises and then only one steamer noise. The verbal report from the commander is awaited in order to confirm the success.

b) Losses:

Nothing to report.

VI. General situation:

Convoy position (radio messages evaluated by operator):

1) Mediterranean-Britain convoy passed Gibraltar early on 12 January, was in the St. Vincent-Casablanca sea area about midnight.

2) Britain-Mediterranean convoy was in about CF 23 on the evening of 12 January.

3) Westbound convoy, which was in the Benghazi-Malta sea area on the evening of 9 January, has probably proceeded in partial convoys to Taranto, Augusta and Naples. A partial convoy was in the Bizerta sea area at midday on 11 January, at midday on 12 January in the outer sea area east of Algiers.

4) An eastbound U.S.A.-Mediterranean convoy, which passed Gibraltar on 10 January, was in the Algiers sea area on the morning of 12 January.

5) An eastbound Britain-Mediterranean convoy was in the Bone-Bizerta sea area on the evening of 12 January, destination Naples.

(Signed) Kreisch.

13 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 75,
U 616 CH 69 (homeward bound),
U 642 CJ 76,
U 952 CH 63 (homeward bound),
U 343 CH 65 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CJ 62 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 407, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance north of 39° N, between 1° and 8° E, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Adriatic Sea, Ionian Sea, sea area west of Benghazi, Crete-Alexandria sea area.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

U 380: 0034/11 January CH 7587 eastbound convoy.
0728/11 January CH 7548 westbound convoy.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 1100/13 January CJ 7916 20 large, 12 small landing craft, easterly course, slow speed. According to a rough evaluation the convoy consisted of 25 freighters totaling 128,000 G.R.T., some with barrage balloons, 1 freighter of 7,000 G.R.T. with an anti-torpedo net,

5 apparent patrol vessels, 3 apparent motor gunboats.

2) 1120/13 January CJ 7939 6 large ships, slow speed.

3) 1850/13 January CJ 6714 and 6717 convoy, estimated at 40 probable merchant ships or landing craft, 3 possible cruisers, 5 guardboats, northerly course.

4) 2100/13 January CJ 8337 7 probable merchant ships up to 5,000 G.R.T., 1 destroyer, course 60°.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0830/13 January 1 "Fiji" class cruiser put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

2) 0950/13 January Cape Spartel: 3 freighters of 3-5,000 G.R.T. each, 2 patrol boats, bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 1100/13 January 1 tanker put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

4) 1600/13 January Punta Carnero: 9 American corvettes bound for the Atlantic.
Tangier and Ceuta reported increased patrol activity by destroyers and corvettes in the Straits.

5) 1715/13 January 5 "Agathe" boats put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

6) 1715/13 January Punta Carnero: 3 French freighters bound for the Mediterranean.

7) 1930/13 January Gibraltar harbor report: 1 "Warspite" class battleship, 1 "Fiji" class cruiser, 2 French torpedo-carrying cruisers of the "Audacieux" class, 2 British auxiliary cruisers, 11 destroyers, 6 submarines, 41 small vessels.

8) 1400/13 January Algeciras: 5 American gunboats, bound for the Mediterranean.

9) 1645/13 January Ceuta: 3 French freighters, bound for the Mediterranean.

c) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1619/13 January CO 5831 27 large freighters, 4 escort vessels, course 230°, speed 7.5 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

1627/13 January CO 5589 British unit reported aircraft shadowing convoy, course 290°, speed 7.5 knots (see III.B.b).

d) By G.I.S. stations:)
) Nothing to report.
e) By naval forces:)

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Brandi) was ordered to move off eastward as far as the meridian in CH 9555 if operating in the bottleneck (i.e. the most westerly narrow part of the Western Mediterranean) does not seem to offer prospects of success. U 380 was informed that he is scheduled to be recalled on 17 January. U 380 has been 28 days at sea today.

U 453 (Lührs) received permission to attack all targets including submarines and was ordered not to cross the limit of the anti-submarine hunt area to the east or west.

U 380 reported convoys as in III.A.a and a hit heard 14.6 minutes after a curve shot was fired at a destroyer from the eastbound convoy and 1 explosion 15 minutes after a fan-of-three was fired at the large westbound convoy. Captain U-boats is at present assuming no successes as a result of the long running times. The verbal report from the commander is awaited to clear this up.

U 616 (Koitschka) intends to cross 42° N at 0000 on 15 January and to be at the rendezvous off Toulon at 0800.

No news of U 343 (Rahn).

U 952 (Curio) has been instructed to put in to Toulon.

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) Information concerning enemy movements as in III.A.d.8 and 9.

2) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

3) Information concerning the positions of hospital and Red Cross ships.

V. a) Successes:) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Convoy position:

1) The partial convoy proceeding to Naples from the Britain-Mediterranean convoy attacked on 10 January was in the sea area due south of Naples during the night of 13/14 January.

2) An eastbound U.S.A.-Mediterranean convoy, which was in the Algiers sea area on the morning of 12 January, was in the sea area due west of Bizerta on the night of 13/14 January.

3) A westbound convoy, in the Benghazi-Malta sea area on the evening of 9 January, was in the immediate vicinity of Algiers on the evening of 13 January.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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14 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 75,
U 642 CJ 76,
U 616 CH 63 (homeward bound),

U 952 CH 39 (homeward bound),
U 343 CH 66 (homeward bound).

B. Western Mediterranean:

U 453 CK 47 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

No boats.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 407, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance north of 40° N, Tyrrhenian Sea.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic Sea, Aegean Sea, around Crete.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1430/14 January CJ 8476 1 merchant vessel up to 5,000 G.R.T., course 9°, speed 10 knots.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 0400/14 January 4 freighters, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

2) 0825/14 January Cape Spartel: 8 destroyers bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 0845/14 January 5 landing craft (tank) put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

4) 0910/14 January Tres Forcas: 15 miles to the north, 4 freighters of medium tonnage, 1 destroyer, bound for the Mediterranean.

5) 0930/14 January 1 destroyer put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

6) 1300/14 January 1 tanker in ballast put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

7) 1730/14 January 1 Dutch submarine put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

8) 1830/14 January 2 destroyers put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

9) 1915/14 January 1 freighter in ballast put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

c) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

0640/14 January CO 4516 4 large, 1 medium-sized freighter, 5 possible destroyers with fighter cover, course 120°.

c) By radio intercept service:

1024/14 January air raid warning for 2 convoys in the Benghazi area.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, 2 British freighters and 1 Greek freighter of approximately 3,000 G.R.T. each, 1 British destroyer, 2 motorboats, put out from Beirut on the evening of 8 January in an unknown direction.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 952 (Curio) and U 616 (Koitschka) were informed that they may possibly meet as they are both returning and are due to reach the rendezvous at 0800 on 15 January.

U 642 (Brünning) was given the meridian in CH 9555 as the western limit of his operational area and was informed of his intended recall on 19 January. The boat was also asked for a position report. U 642 reported from CJ 8713 and also a success on 3 January 1944 (see V.a).

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) Information concerning enemy movements as in III.A.b, III.A.d.1, 3, 4 and 7.

2) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

3) Positions of hospital ships and of neutral shipping.

4) Radio reminder from C-in-C U-boats about a 38-hour depth charge hunt of a boat in the Atlantic, which had to proceed submerged for 42 hours.

5) Radio reminder about the ideal use made of the Naxos aerial by a boat in the Atlantic.

6) Information about enemy reports of a U-boat at 0810, at 2121 and at 2125 in an unindicated position.

V. a) Successes:

U 642 (Brünning) torpedoed a steamer of 7,000 G.R.T. at 1643 on 3 January in CJ 8395 (80 miles north of Palermo).

b) Losses:

U 755 (Göing) is reported missing for the last time with effect from 28 May 1943. 9 men were saved; 39 men, including the Commander, are missing (Naval War Staff, 2nd Div. C-in-C U-boats G 51 A5 of 13 January 1944).

VI. General situation:

Convoy position:

1) A Britain- Mediterranean convoy proceeding to Naples, attacked on 10 January east of Oran, arrived on the afternoon of 14 January. Ships proceeding to Maddalena will probably arrive on 15 January.

2) A westbound convoy, probably Mediterranean-U.S.A., in the Cape Tenes-Oran sea area on

the evening of 14 January, will probably pass Gibraltar on 16 January.

3) A Britain-Mediterranean convoy, in the sea area 36° - 38° N, 17° - 18° W on the morning of 15 January, will probably pass Gibraltar on 18 January.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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15 January, 1944

I. a) Daily U-boat positions at 0800 according to naval grid squares:

A. Western Mediterranean:

U 380 CH 76,
U 642 CJ 75,
U 616 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 952 CH 33 (homeward bound),
U 343 CH 63 (homeward bound).

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

U 453 CK 78 (outward bound).

b) U-boats homeward and outward bound from 0800 to 0800:

0900/15 January U 616 (from his 7th operation) and U 952 (from his 3rd operation) put in to Toulon.

c) In port (at 0800):

1) Toulon: U 223, 230, 371, 410, 450.
2) Pola: U 407, 596.
3) Salamis: U 565.

II. Air reconnaissance:

A. Western Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance north of 39° N, Tyrrhenian Sea, around Corsica.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

Reconnaissance of Adriatic Sea, Aegean Sea, sea area around Benghazi.

III. Reports on the enemy:

A. Western Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1227/15 January CJ 9455 3 large landing craft and 2 apparent escort vessels in line ahead, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

1) 1039/15 January CJ 4930 British unit located, inaccurately.

2) 15 January in the evening a westbound American convoy in the sea area due west of Gibraltar.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

1) 1845/14 January Cape Spartel: 1 large warship, probably a battleship or cruiser, as well as 2 destroyers, bound for the Mediterranean.

2) 1500/14 January Almeria: 1 freighter of 12,000 G.R.T. bound for the Mediterranean.

3) 0240/15 January Gibraltar: 1 "Cairo" class cruiser bound for the Atlantic.

4) 0300/15 January Gibraltar: 1 "Fiji" class cruiser bound for the Atlantic.

5) 0940/15 January Cape Spartel: 1 tanker of 12,000 G.R.T. bound for the Mediterranean, escorted by 2 corvettes.

6) 1100/15 January 4 corvettes put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

7) 1245/15 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

8) 1300/15 January 1 French tanker, 1 French minesweeper put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

9) 1300/15 January 1 freighter, 2 corvettes put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

10) 1415/15 January 1 freighter put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

11) 1440/15 January 1 freighter put in to Gibraltar from the Mediterranean.

12) 1500/15 January 11 ships, 1 corvette put out from Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

13) 1530/15 January 1 gunboat, 1 submarine put in to Gibraltar from the Atlantic.

14) 1645/15 January Tangier: 16 ships, 3 gunboats, bound for the Atlantic.

15) 1830/15 January 2 French torpedo-carrying cruisers of the "Audacieux" class put out from Gibraltar for the Mediterranean.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

B. Eastern Mediterranean:

a) By U-boats:

Nothing to report.

b) By air reconnaissance:

1) 0750/15 January CK 4737 1 patrol vessel.

2) 1000/15 January CN 3816 13 freighters totaling 90,000 G.R.T., 2 transports totaling 18,000 G.R.T., 2 patrol vessels, 3 escort vessels, 1 destroyer, course apparently 160°.

3) 1110/15 January CJ 6344 1 enemy unit, probably a mine-sweeper, course 130°, speed slight.

4) 1135/15 January 2 coasting freighters off Cape Gargano, course 180°, speed slight.

5) 1227/15 January CJ 9455 3 large landing craft and 2 apparent escort

vessels in line ahead, easterly course.

c) By radio intercept service:

Nothing to report.

d) By G.I.S. stations:

According to an agent's report, traffic between ports in the Eastern Mediterranean has increased considerably.

e) By naval forces:

Nothing to report.

IV. Current U-boat operations:

U 380 (Brandi) and U 642 (Brünning) were given the meridian in CH 9555 as the limit between their operational areas, and were informed that there are no other boats in the operational area off the North African coast.

U 453 (Lührs) reported particulars of a Naxos location of a shore location post assumed to exist near Cape Gargano (Adriatic). The boat's position at 0450 on 16 January was CO 1692.

The following were transmitted to the boats:

1) An extract from the Armed Forces Report.

2) Enemy movements as in III.A.d.4 and 15, III.B.b.2, III.B.d.

3) Positions of hospital and Red Cross ships.

4) Radio reminder concerning enemy anti-submarine defenses.

5) Radio reminder concerning the use of Aphrodite.

6) Serial Order No. 35 of C-in-C U-boats concerning the use of torpedoes against shallow draught vessels.

V. a) Successes:)
) Nothing to report.
b) Losses:)

VI. General situation:

Convoy position:

A westbound convoy, which was in the Cape Tenes-Oran sea area on the evening of 14 January, was in the immediate vicinity of Alboran at noon on 15 January.

(Signed) Kreisch.

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